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Monday, April 28, 2008
Uncover the faces of the terror machines first before confining them to their luxury apartments financed by Britain
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PLEASE SEE HOW THE DREADED TERROR MACHINES KEEP THEIR FACES COVERED SYMBOLIC TO THE WOMEN POWER OR DURGAS OF ISLAM.
THE HEINOUS KILLERS ARE THEN RECYCLED AND PLASTIC SURGEON ED ,MADE SIKHS OR CLEAN SHAVEN ;REUSED AND WHISKED AWAY TO THEIR LUXURY APARTMENTS IN BRITAIN ,CANADA AND THE SIXTEEN COMMON WEALTH TO ENJOY LIFE;FROM THE BACK DOORS OF THEIR LUXURY SUITES IN PRISON.
THE INDIAN GOVERNMENT HAS MADE A MOCKERY OF THE MHA AND THE ARMED FORCES BY COVERING THE FACES OF TERROR SUSPECTS .IT IS ALSO DONE IN PAKISTAN ,ANOTHER BRITISH GULAM.
IF THE JUDICIARY PRESUMES INNOCENCE UNTIL PROVEN GUILTY THEN WHY COVER FACES OF SUSPECTED TERROR?
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paulrevererides.com/.../
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elmugahidin.tripod.com/.
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www.abc.net.au/reslib/
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 | Pakistani policemen escort detained suspected Islamic militants with their faces covered outside an anti-terrorism court in Karachi on Wednesday. Court authorised the police to interrogate nine suspected militants to determine if they were involved in a fatal bombing at the Macedonian Consulate in this port city in 2002, officials said. — AP/PTI |
Click on image to enlarge
Online edition of India's National Newspaper
Saturday, Jan 06, 2007
http://www.thehindu.com/2007/01/06/stories/2007010613340100.htm
Terror suspect arrestedK.V. Subramanya and M. Ahiraj
| Were Infosys, Bangalore airport the targets of Pakistan-trained man? |
PRIZE CATCH: Policemen escorting suspected terrorist Bilal in Bangalore after his arrest outside the city. — PHOTO: V. SREENIVASA MURTHY
BANGALORE : The Bangalore police arrested Imran alias Bilal, 32, a suspected terrorist from Jammu and Kashmir, in the early hours of Friday.
A bag containing an AK-47 assault rifle, 300 live rounds of AK-47 ammunition, four AK-47 magazines, five hand grenades, a satellite phone, mobile phones, SIM cards, a Bangalore city map and other documents was seized from him.
Director-General and Inspector-General K.R. Srinivasan told presspersons here that the police, who were working in coordination with Central and State intelligence agencies and anti-terrorist cells, had information that a man carrying arms and ammunition was coming to Bangalore from Hospet in Bellary district. They intercepted a private bus, in which Imran was travelling, at 5.15 a.m. at Goruguntepalya, an industrial area on Tumkur Road.
However, The Hindu learnt from police sources that Imran was picked up from his Ranipet residence at Hospet around 10 p.m. on December 28. Some residents also told this newspaper that they were witness to his being taken away by a few people, who identified themselves as policemen.
Although Chief Minister H.D. Kumaraswamy announced that the police had foiled a terrorist plan to attack the airport and the Infosys facility in Bangalore, Mr. Srinivasan's response was guarded.
He told The Hindu that they were yet to confirm the antecedents and motives of Imran. "The Vidhana Soudha, the airport and the facility of the Information Technology major Infosys are high on the hit-list of terrorist outfits."
Highly placed sources in the police said Imran had undergone arms training in Pakistan and was earlier arrested by the Jammu and Kashmir police. He had studied in a private polytechnic in Bangalore and had been living at Hospet for the last five years. Certain locations such as the airport and the Infosys and Wipro facilities were marked on the map seized from him, the sources said.
Mr. Srinivasan said the Bangalore police would take the assistance of other agencies including the Jammu and Kashmir police in the investigation. He refused to divulge details of the arrest operation and said he had not sought them from the officers.
PLEASE ALSO SEE WHAT HAPPENED IN MY LIFE AND HOW TERROR OUTFITS GET PLEASURE OUT OF INFLICTING PAIN ON INNOCENT PEOPLE AND MISUSE OF MEDICAL SCIENCE.
KALRA DID NOT ALLOW ME TO GET PREGNANT ROM 1985 TO 89 AS HE IS FROM A CLAN WHERE WOMEN ARE USED AS SEX MACHINES .THEN IN 1989 WHILE I WAS TEACHING AT SCA SCHOOL I BECAME PREGNANT .KALRA WAS POSTED TO BARGI NAGAR DAM SITE AND WAS NEIGHBOR TO FISHERIES DEPARTMENT DAYANAND TIWARI;whose BEAUTIFUL wife ,MOTHER OF A DAUGHTER AND TWIN BOYS NAMED LUV &KUSH; supposedly committed suicide on HOLI FESTIVAL DAY 12-3-1990 BY CONSUMING AN AGRICULTURAL POISON
SULFAS
AFTER HE HAD SPENT THE ENTIRE DAY DRINKING WITH KALRA IN F4 BARGINAGAR.
THESE FILTHY KILLERS HAVE BEEN SUBSISTING AS FUNGUS IN NEARLY ALL THE GOVERNMENT DEPARTMENTS TOO AND POSTINGS WERE MANIPULATED.
DELIBERATELY I WAS DIAGNOSED AS SUFFERING FROM PREGNANCY DIABETES AND BLOOD PRESSURE TO MAKE ME STAY AT JABALPUR WITH MY PARENTS SO THAT THE BURDEN OF FEEDING A PREGNANT DAUGHTER FALLS ON MY HONEST FATHER WHO WAS THE ONLY EARNING MEMBER OF THE FAMILY AS I HAD BEEN MARRIED OFF AND I HAD BEEN MAKING HIS INSURANCE COVER NOTES.
COMMISSION TO AGENTS WAS LEGAL COMMISSION TO BRANCH MANAGERS BEFORE NATIONALIZATION AND MY FATHER WORKED FOR UNITED INDIA INSURANCE FROM MORNING TILL NIGHT CHEWING PAAN AND I MADE HIS COVER NOTES KEEPING CARBON PAPER.
MY FATHER REASONED THAT I WAS 45 KG IN WEIGHT AND WORKED VERY HARD IN KALRA' S IRREGULAR SERVANT LESS HOUSE AS WELL AS SERVICE IN SCA SCHOOL AND HOW COULD I SUFFER FROM DIABETES?KALRA GOT MY BLOOD TESTS DONE IN THREE LABS AND REPORTS WERE SAME GIVING ENORMOUS PHYSICAL AND MENTAL TORTURE.
MY FATHER HAD DIABETES AND HE CUT HIS FINGER GIVING A FIRST SKIN WOUND AND TOLD ME TO DO THE SAME.HIS FINGER BLEEDED PROFUSELY AND HAD TO BE BANDAGED WHILE MY BLOOD CLOTTED INSTANTLY.THE GREATEST FATHER THAT I HAD TOLD ME THAT A DIABETIC'S BLOOD DID NOT CLOT AS WELL AS ANY PUS FORMATION WAS FATAL AS GANGRENE SET IN.BOILS TOOK AGES TO HEAL AND WERE FILLED WITH PUS.
MY FATHER ALLOWED ME TO STAY IN HIS HOUSE FOR THE ENTIRE PREGNANCY AND LOOKED AFTER ME.IN THE 7TH MONTH GOLDY CHADDHA DREW NAKED PHOTOS OF ME IN THE MEN'S TOILET AND I RESIGNED.NUPUR ROY CHOWDHARY WAS MY DOCTOR WHO DID NOT ALLOW ME TO HAVE A NORMAL CHILDBIRTH EVEN THOUGH I HAD FULL HEALTHY PAINS AND PULLED MY SON WHO HAD GONE DOWN THE BIRTH CANAL BY CUTTING MY STOMACH OPEN ,NOT ONLY ENDANGERING HIS LIFE BUT SEVERELY MESSING UP MY PREGNANCY ORDEAL.THEN ON THE 10TH DAY WHILE I WAS TO BE DISCHARGED HER FILTHY STITCHES OPENED AND I STARTED BLEEDING FROM MY STOMACH.FOR 26 DAYS I WAS IN THE HOSPITAL FOR A FILTHY CESAREAN AND AFTER I WENT HOME EVERYDAY A NURSE FROM HER HOSPITAL CAME TO FILL UP THE HOLE THAT SHE HAD CREATED IN MY STOMACH,FURTHER BURDENING MY FAMILY.THE ANESTHETIC THAT SHE GAVE IN MY SPINAL BONE CREATED SEVERE PAIN FOR ME FOR 6 MONTHS AND I COULD NOT WALK STRAIGHT.
SO IN ABEER'S TIME I REQUESTED MAYA PATHAK OF BHOPAL TO GIVE ME GENERAL ANESTHETIC FOR OPERATION.THESE FILTHY IRISH BASTARDS NOT ONLY MESSED UP MY DAUGHTER'S BODY IN MY WOMB MAKING HER A HEMI HYPOTROPHIC CHILD LIKE ARDNARESHWAR FORM OF SHIVA GOD BUT ALSO AFTER THE OPERATION SHE GAVE ME NO ANESTHETIC FOR LOCAL PAIN AND I WAS MADE TO SUFFER LOCAL OPERATION PAIN WHICH WAS MORE SEVERE THAN EVEN BIRTH PAINS. THE BESTIAL SENSE OF PLAYING WITH A HUMAN BEING'S BODY COMES THROUGH .IN THE FIRST PLACE DELIBERATELY MY BODY WAS SUBJECTED TO A CESAREAN BY CHOWDHARY WHILE I WAS HAVING NORMAL PAINS AND THEN DURING ABEER'S TIME I WAS MADE TO SUFFER LOCAL PAIN OF TISSUES WHICH HAD BEEN OPERATED UPON .
THE SORDID SENSE OF CRUELTY COMES THROUGH.AFTER 2 DAYS OF HELL PAIN WHEN I SAW MY DAUGHTER'S BODY -YOU CAN WELL IMAGINE WHAT KIND OF SATAN I WAS LIVING WITH .THESE PEOPLE ARE EVIL AND GET SEXUAL PLEASURE IN INFLICTING PAIN ON OTHERS.
AND IT WAS AN IRISH TEAM THAT TOOK ABEER AS A RESEARCH ENDEAVOR THREE MONTHS LATER WHEN I TOOK HER TO AIIMS IN DELHI ,WHO DID HER CHROMOSOMAL ANALYSIS TWICE BUT AIIMS DID NOT GIVE ME THE REPORT.
ALL THIS BECAUSE MY FATHER WAS SUPPORTING THE POOR TRIBALS WHO GO IN THE JUNGLES WITH THEIR BASKETS TO LOOK FOR ARYUVEDIC MEDICINES TO HEAL PEOPLE NATURALLY WITHOUT PAIN.
I WAS PUNISHED BY MADARCHODS OF BHUKHAR PARCETEMOL WHICH WAS INFLICTED ON ME ON THE SECOND DAY OF MARRIAGE WHEN I TRAVELLED TO KASHMIR WITH MY BODY BURNING WITH 104 FEVER -HOT FOR BESTIAL KALRA TO ENJOY AND I SPITED ON HIS BED,AS WELL AS VOMITED.HIS HOT SEX BED REEKED OF VOMIT SMELL THEN OF PERFUMES OF AURANGZEB BHUKHARI.
"Satan in His Original Glory" (Blake-1805). The original/archetypal revolutionary
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jaipur column at rashtrapati bhavan
http://library.lakeforest.edu/collections/benton/data/research/
Ellora/albums/aurangzebsTombMosque/index.htm
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(Photo by Syed Zargham/Getty Images
Friday, April 9, 2004, Chandigarh, India
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Rice slams Pak on Taliban US troops may stay longer in Iraq: Rumsfeld EDITORIAL: Iraqis up in arms Al-Jazeera airs video of hostages
Vatican for UN involvement in Iraq |
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Washington, April 8
Washington, April 8
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LTTE demands talks on self-rule plan
Pakistan air force plane crashes This picture was a press release from Israeli sources purporting to show Palestinian terrorists. However one of the suspected terrorists forgot to take off his star of David necklace before being photographed. The sunglasses are most likely to hide his blue eyes also. His skin looks quite fair, too.
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CONTINUING MY WORK AGAINST PSYCHOLOGICAL TERRORISM AND CARRYING FORTH THE WORK OF MY ANCESTORS I DID MY POST GRADUATION IN PURE PSYCHOLOGY WON GOLD MEDALS; AND SUBMITTED AT THE DELHI UNIVERSITY ON 10-10-2005 -A SYNOPSIS ON THE INTRODUCTION OF FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY TO THE LAW AND JUDICIARY OF INDIA BY THE INDIAN EVIDENCE ACT OF 1872 ,CLAUSE 45 “OPINION OF EXPERTS “ WHEREIN PSYCHOLOGICAL INTERVENTION IS GIVEN FOR MENS REA IN CRIMINAL CASES AND MITIGATION OF SENTENCE SOUGHT,BY AFFIDAVIT OR EXPERT EVIDENCE IN COURTS OF LAW.
IN CIVILIAN CASES THE EXPERTS IN THE RESPECTIVE FIELDS SHOULD BE CALLED UPON TO SERVE AS EXPERT WITNESSES
ONLY THIS CAN PURGE
Please listen:-
http://www.smashitsusa.com/index.cfm?Page=Audio&SubPage=CollectionDetails&CollectionID=30
Risin' up, back on the street
Did my time, took my chances
Went the distance, now I'm back on my feet
Just a man and his will to survive
So many times, it happens too fast
You change your passion for glory
Don't lose your grip on the dreams of the past
You must fight just to keep them alive
Chorus:
It's the eye of the tiger, it's the cream of the fight
Risin' up to the challenge of our rival
And the last known survivor stalks his prey in the night
And he's watchin' us all in the eye of the tiger
Face to face, out in the heat
Hangin' tough, stayin' hungry
They stack the odds 'til we take to the street
For we kill with the skill to survive
chorus
Risin' up, straight to the top
Have the guts, got the glory
Went the distance, now I'm not gonna stop
Just a man and his will to survive
chorus
The eye of the tiger (repeats out)...
The hottest songs from Survivor
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Survivor_%28band%29
Survivor is an American rock band formed in 1977 by core members Jim Peterik and Frankie Sullivan.
PLEASE ALSO READ and judge WHETHER THESE VALIANT SOLDIERS OF KASHMIR WANTED TO FORM A UNION FOR THEMSELVES ALONE?
http://www.judis.nic.in/supremecourt/qrydisp.aspx?filename=10794
PETITIONER:
A.K. KAUL & ANR
Vs.
RESPONDENT:
UNION OF INDIA & ANR
DATE OF JUDGMENT19/04/1995
BENCH:
AGRAWAL, S.C. (J)
BENCH:
AGRAWAL, S.C. (J)
FAIZAN UDDIN (J)
CITATION:
1995 AIR 1403 1995 SCC (4) 73
JT 1995 (4) 1 1995 SCALE (2)755
ACT:
HEADNOTE:
JUDGMENT:
S.C. AGRAWAL, J.:
1. Leave granted.
2. The appellants were employed as Deputy Central Intelligence Officers in the Intelligence Bureau in the Ministry of Home Affairs of the Government of India.
On July 23, 1979,
the employees of the Intelligence Bureau formed an Association called "the Intelligence Bureau employees Association" (IBEA) for the purpose of ventilating their grievances.
Appellants, A.K.Kaul and Verghese Joseph,
were elected as the General Secretaries of IBEA and
appellant, B.B. Raval, was elected as the President.
On May 3, 1980, the Joint Director of the Intelligence Bureau issued, a Circular Memorandum declaring that the formation of the IBEA was in violation of the Civil Services (Conduct) Rules and that those who take part in the activities of the IBEA will attract disciplinary action.
Writ petitions
(Civil) Nos. 1117-1119 were filed in this Court challenging the said circular. This Court, on July 21, 1980, issued an order for issue of rule nisi on the said writ petitions and also passed an interim order directing that during the pendency of the writ petitions in this Court no disciplinary action shall be taken against any member of the IBEA for reasons mentioned in the circular. On December 26, 1980, orders were passed dismissing the appellants from service.
One such order regarding the dismissal of appellant, A.K. Kaul, is in the
following terms :
"Shri A.K. Kaul,
Deputy Central Intelligence Officer,
Intelligence Bureau,
New Delhi.
Whereas the President is satisfied under
sub-clause (c) of the proviso to clause(2) of
Article 311 of the Constitution that in the
interest of the security of the State it is
not expedient to hold an inquiry in the case
of Shri A. K. Kaul.
And whereas the President is satisfied that on
the basis of the information available, the
activities of Shri A.K. Kaul are such as to
warrant his dismissal from service.
Accordingly, the President hereby dismisses
Shri A.K. Kaul from service with immediate
effect.
(By order and in the name of President
Sd/-
(R. Mahadevan)
Under Secretary to the Govt. of
India Ministry of Home Affairs."
3. The orders for dismissal of appellants, Verghese Joseph and B.B. Raval are in the same terms.
The appellants filed separate writ petitions (Nos. 205-207/81 1) in this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution to challenge the said orders of dismissal.
After the constitution of the Central Administrative Tribunal under the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, (hereinafter referred to as 'the Tribunal') the
said writ petitions were transferred to the Tribunal for adjudication and they were registered as T.A. Nos. 1,2 and 3 of 1992.
4. Before the Tribunal the case put for-ward by the appellants was that they have been picked and chosen for punitive action for dismissal from service for the reason that they were important members of the IBEA, being office bearers as General Secretaries and the President, and that the real motive to pass the orders of dismissal was to penalise them for the active part they had taken in ventilating the grievances of the employees through the IBEA. The appellants also pleaded that they had an
excellent record of service and that they had not conducted themselves in such manner as to warrant their dismissal from service.
It was submitted that they were recipients of commendation certificates, appreciation letters and cash awards from time to time.
It was also stated in the applications that they had not acted contrary to the interest of national security at any time. The said applications were contested by the respondents who pleaded that the orders of dismissal had been passed by the President on being satisfied on the basis of the material available that the activities of the appellants were such as to warrant their dismissal from service by dispensing with the requirements of Article 311(2) of the Constitution in the interest of security of the State.
It was also pleaded on behalf of the respondents that the details of the material on the basis of which the satisfaction had been reached cannot be disclosed without detriment to public interest.
It was denied that the authorities of the Intelligence Bureau have a hostile attitude towards IBEA and it was stated that punitive action was taken on merits of each case and not because of the participation of the appellants in the activities of the IBEA.
During the pendency of the applications before the. Tribunal the ap-pellants moved Misc. Petitions Nos. 1897/ 92 in T.A. Nos. 1 and 2/92 and Miscellaneous Petition No. 732/92 in T.A.-No. 3/92 whereby they prayed for directions to the respondents to produce the records specified in the said applications for inspection of the Tribunal and/or by the appellants and their counsel.The said applications were opposed by the respondents who claimed privilege invoking Article 74(2) of the Constitution and Sections 123 and 124 of the Evidence Act and for that purpose affidavit of Mr.
Madhav Godbole, Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, New Delhi (the Head of the Department) was filed before the Tribunal.
Without prejudice to the said claim of privilege, the respondents had, however, stated that they had no objection whatsoever to the said documents relating to the dismissal of the appellants and those portions of documents that relate to the said dismissal orders being produced for perusal of the Tribunal in order to satisfy it that the claim of privilege against disclosure of the said official records is bona fide and genuine.
5. By judgment dated December 18, 1993 the Tribunal, after perusing the records that were placed for perusal of the Tribunal, upheld the claim of privilege and dismissed ,the applications filed by the appellants for inspection and production of the documents. On the basis of the said records the Tribunal has further found that the material considered by the President relate to the activities of the appellants which would prejudicially affect the security of the State and that the materials relied upon or the satisfaction of the President have nothing to do with the appellants' activities in relation to the IBEA.
The Tribunal has held that there is no substance in the case of the appellants that the orders of the dismissal were not bona fide and they have been passed to victimise the appellants for promoting and participating in the activities of the IBEA.
The Tribunal was of the view that the satisfaction had been arrived at after application of mind to the relevant materials without taking into consideration
irrelevant factors and that the impugned orders of dismissal from service dated December 26, 1980 arc not liable for interference.
The Tribunal, therefore, dismissed the applications of the appellants. Hence these appeals.
On behalf of the appellants it has been urged that the exercise of power under clause (c) of the second proviso to Article 3 11(2) of the Constitution is subject to judicial review and that an order passed under the said provisions is open to challenge before the courts on the ground that the satisfaction of the President or the Governor is vitiated by malafides or is based on considerations which have no relevance to the interest of the security of the State.
In this connection, Shri Sorabjee has submitted that in a case where the employee assails the action taken against him under Article 311(2)(c) it is obligatory on the part of the concerned Government to place before the court the relevant material on the basis of which the action was taken and such material can only be withheld from the court in cases where the claim of privilege is found to be justified under the
provisions of Sections 123 and 124 of the Evidence Act.
Shri Sorabjee has urged that the said claim of privilege does not extend to the disclosure of the nature of the activities on the basis of which the alleged satisfaction has been arrived at and the privilege can only relate to the material which has been relied upon in support of the said activities.
7. The learned Additional Solicitor General, appearing for the respondents, has, however, submitted that an order under clause (c) of second proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution is to be passed by the President or the Governor on the basis of his subjective satisfaction.
The material which forms the basis for arriving at the said satisfaction is not required to be disclosed both in view of Article 74(2) as well as under Sections 123 and 124 of the Evidence Act.
The learned Additional Solicitor General has, in this context, pointed out that while under clause (b) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) the competent authority is required to record in writing the reason for its satisfaction that it is not reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry, there is no such requirement for recording the reason in clause (c) and, therefore, there is no requirement to disclose the reasons for arriving at the satisfaction for taking action under clause (c) of second proviso to Article 311(2).
8. Article 311(2), as amended by the Constitution
(Fifteenth Amendment) Act, 1963, provides as follows :
"(2) No such persons aforesaid shall be
dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except
after an inquiry in which he has been informed
of the charges against him and given a
reasonable opportunity of being heard in
respect of those charges :
Provided that where it is proposed after such
inquiry to impose upon him any such penalty,
such penalty may be imposed on the basis of
the evidence adduced during such inquiry and
it shall not be necessary to give such person
any opportunity of making representation on
the penalty proposed
Provided further that this clause shall not
apply -
(a) where a person is dismissed or removed
or reduced in rank on the ground of conduct
which has led to his conviction on a criminal
charge; or
(b) when the authority empowered to dismiss
or remove a person or to reduce him in rank is
satisfied that for some reason, to be recorded
by that authority in writing it is not practi-
cable to hold such inquiry; or
(c) where the President or Governor, as the
case may be, is satisfied that in the interest
of the security of the State it is not
expedient to hold such inquiry. "
9. The provision of the second proviso came up for consideration before the Constitution Bench of this Court in Union of India & Anr. v. Tulsiram Patel & Ors., 1985 Supp.
(2) SCR 13 1, Madon, J., speaking for the majority, has observed that clause (2) of Article 311 gives a constitutional mandate to the principles of natural justice and audi alteram pattern rule by providing that a person employed in a civil capacity under the Union or a State shall not be dismissed or removed from service or reduced in rank until after an inquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and has been given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges and that this safeguard provided for a government, servant by clause (2) of Article 311(2) is, however, taken away when the second proviso to that clause becomes applicable. (Page 202). The Court has also pointed out that the paramount thing to bear in mind is that the second proviso will apply only where the conduct of a government servant is such as he deserves the punishment of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank and that before denying a government servant his constitutional right to an inquiry, the first consideration would be whether the conduct of the concerned government servant is such as justifies the penalty of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank and once that conclusion is
reached and the condition specified in the relevant clause of the second proviso is satisfied, that proviso becomes applicable and the government servant is not entitled to an inquiry. (Pages 204-205).
While dealing with clause (c) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) it has been stated :
"The question under clause (c), however, is
not whether the security of the State has been
affected or not, for the expression used in
clause (c) is "in the interest of the security
of the State". The interest of the security
of the state may be affected by actual acts or
even the likelihood of such acts taking place.
Further, what is required under clause (c) is
not the satisfaction of the President or the
Governor, as the case may be, that the
interest of the security of the State is or
will be affected but his satisfaction that in
the interest of the security of the State, it
is not expedient to hold an inquiry as
contemplated by Article 311(2). The sat-
isfaction of the President or Governor must,
therefore, be with respect to the expediency
or inexpediency of holding an inquiry in the
interest of the security of the State. " (p.
277)
"The satisfaction so reached by the President
or the Governor must necessarily be a
subjective satisfaction. Expediency involves
matters of policy. Satisfaction may be
arrived at as a result of secret information
received by the Government about the brewing
danger to the interest or the security of the
State and like matters. There may be other
factors which may be required to be
considered, weighed and balanced in order to
reach the requisite satisfaction whether
holding an inquiry would be expedient or not.
If the requisite satisfaction has been reached
as a result of secret information received by
the Government, making, known such information
may very often result in disclosure of the
source of such information. Once known, the
particular source from which the information
was received would no more be available to the
Government. The reasons for the satisfaction
reached by the President or the Governor under
clause (c) cannot, therefore, be required to
be recorded in the order of dismissal, removal
or reduction in rank nor can they be made
public." (p. 278)
10.The learned Judge did not consider it necessary to deal with the contention that the power of judicial review is not excluded where the satisfaction of the President or the Governor has been reached mala fide or is based on wholly extraneous or irrelevant grounds and that in such a case, in law there would be no satisfaction of the President or the Governor at all for the reason that in the matters under consideration before this court all the materials, including the advice tendered by the Council of Ministers, had been produced and they clearly showed that the satisfaction of the Governor was neither reached malafide nor was it based on any extraneous or irrelevant ground. (Page 279). In the light of the provisions contained in Article 74(2) and Article 163(3) it was submitted before the Court that leaving aside the advice given by the Ministers to the President or the Governor, the Government is bound to disclose at least the materials upon which the advice of Council of Ministers was based so that the court can examine whether the satisfaction of the President or the Governor, as the case may be, was arrived at mala fide or is based on wholly extraneous or irrelevant grounds so that such satisfaction would in law amount to no satisfaction at all and that if the Government does not voluntarily disclose such materials it can be compelled by the Court to do so.
Dealing with the said submission it was observed :
"Whether this should be done or not would
depend upon whether the documents in question
fall within the class of privileged documents
and whether in respect of them privilege has
been properly claimed or not. It is
unnecessary to examine this question any
further because in the cases under clause (c)
before us though at first privilege was
claimed, at the hearing privilege was waived
and the materials as also the advice given by
the Ministers to the Governor of Madhya
Pradesh who has passed the impugned orders in
those cases were disclosed." (p. 280)
11.It would thus appear that in Tulsiram Patel (supra) though the question whether the satisfaction of the President or the Governor under Article 311(2) is amenable to judicial review and the Government can be required to disclose the materials upon which the advice of the Council of Ministers was based so as to enable the court to exercisethe power of judicial review has been left open, the Court,after considering the said material, has recorded the finding that the satisfaction of the Governor was neither recorded malafide nor was it based on any extraneous or irrelevant ground.
12.It is, therefore, necessary to deal with this question in the instant case., We may, in this context, point out that a distinction has to be made between judicial review and justiciability of a particular action. In a written constitution the powers of the various organs of the State,are limited by the provisions of the Constitution.
The extent of those limitations on the powers has to be determined on an interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Constitution. Since the task of interpreting the provisions of the Constitution is entrusted to the Judiciary, it is vested with the power to test the validity of an action of every authority functioning under the Constitution on the touch stone of the constitution in order to ensure that the authority exercising the power conferred by the constitution does not transgress the limitations
placed by the Constitutions on exercise of that power. This power of judicial review is, therefore, implicit in a written constitution and unless expressly excluded by a provision of the Constitution, the power of judicial review is available in respect of exercise of powers under any ofthe provisions of the Constitution. Justiciability relates to a particular field falling within the purview of the power of judicial review. On account of want of judicially manageable standards, there may be matters which are not susceptible to the judicial process. In other words, during the course of exercise of the power of judicial review it may be found that there are certain aspects of the exercise of that power which are not susceptible to judicial process on account of want of judicially manageable standards and
are, therefore, not justiciable.
13. In the Slate of Rajasthan & Ors. v.
Union of India Etc. Etc., (1978) 1 SCR 1, one of the questions failing for consideration was whether satisfaction of the President in the matter of exercise of the power to make a Proclamation conferred under Article 356(1) of the Constitution is amenable to judicial review. At the relevant time when the impugned Proclamations were made there was an express provision in clause (5) of Article 356 which prescribed that "the satisfaction of the President
mentioned in clause (1) shall be final and conclusive and shall not be questioned in any Court on any ground."
In spite of such an express provision P.N. Bhagwati J. (as the learned Chief Justice then was) speaking for himself
and
A.C. Gupta J., has held that "if the satisfaction is mala
fides or is based on wholly extraneous or irrelevant
grounds, the Court would have the jurisdiction to examine it, because in that case there would be no satisfaction of the President in regard to the matter which he is required to be satisfied." (p.82).
Other learned Judges, with some variance, have adopted a similar approach. Beg CJ. has held that if it is revealed "that a constitutionally or legally prohibited or extraneous or collateral purpose is sought to be achieved by a proclamation under Article 356 of the Constitution, this Court will not shirk its duty to act in the manner in which the law may then oblige it to act."(p.46).
Chandrachud J. (as the learned Chief Justice then
was) has observed that if reasons given are wholly extraneous to the formation of the satisfaction, the Proclamation would be open to the attack that it is vitiated by legal mala fides." (p.60).
Goswami J. has held that the Court "would not refuse to consider when there may be sufficient materials to establish that the Proclamation under Article 356(1) is tainted with mala fides."(p.92).
Untwalia J. has said that the Court is not powerless to interfere with an order that is ultra vires, wholly illegal or passed malafide. (p. 95).
Fazal Ali J. has held that "on the reasons given by the President in his order if the Courts find that they are absolutely extraneous and irrelevant and based onpersonal and illegal considerations the Courts are not powerless to strike down the order on the ground of malafide if proved." (p. 120).
14. Clause (5) of Article 356 was deleted by the
Constitution (Forty Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978. In S.R.Bommai (supra) Sawant J. after noticing the observations in A.K. Roy v. Union of India 1982 (2) SCR 272, has observed that after deletion of clause (5) the judicial review of the Proclamation issued under Article 356 has become wider than indicated in the State of Rajasthan (supra).
Similarly,Jeevan Reddy J. has said : "Surely the deletion of clause(5) has not restricted the scope of judicial review.
Indeed, it has removed the cloud cast on the said power.The Court should, if anything, be more inclined to examine the constitutionality of the Proclamation after such deletion." (p. 255)
15. In S.R. Bommai (supra) differing views were expressed by the learned Judges on the scope and extent of the judicial review and justiciability of the action taken by the President in exercise of power conferred under Article 356(1). Sawant J., speaking for himself and Kuldip Singh J., had held that material on the basis of which the advice is given by the Council of Ministers and the President forms his satisfaction has to be scrutinised by Court within the acknowledged parameters of judicial review, viz., illegality, irrationality and mala fides. (p. 112).
Referring to the expression "if the President .... is satisfied" in Article
356(1) the learned Judge has said :
"Hence, it is not the personal whim wish, view
or opinion or the ipse dixit of the President
dehors the material but a legitimate inference
drawn from the material placed before him
which is relevant for the purpose. In other
words, the President has to be convinced of or
has to have sufficient proof of information
with regard to or has to be free from doubt or
uncertainly about the state of things indi-
cating that the situation in question has
arisen. Although, therefore, the sufficiency
or otherwise of the material cannot be
questioned the legitimacy of inference drawn
from such material is certainly open to
judicial review. " (p. 103)
16. According to the learned Judge, "Many of the parameters of judicial review developed in the field of administrative law are not antithetical to the field of constitutional law and they can equally apply to the domain covered by the constitutional law." (p.94). The learned Judge has applied the tests laid down by this Court in Barium Chemicals Ltd.v. Company Law Board. 1966 Supp. SCR. 311.
17. Jeevan Reddy J., speaking for himself and one of us(Agrawal J.), did not, however, give such a wide scope to the power of judicial review in respect of a proclamation made under Article 356 (1). After pointing out that Barium Chemicals (supra) is a decision concerning subjective satisfaction of an authority created by a statute, the learned Judge has held that the principles enshrined in that case "cannot ipso facto be extended to the exercise of
constitutional power under Article 35 of the Constitution and that "having regard to the fact that this is a high Constitutional functionary in the Nation, it may not be appropriate to adopt the tests applicable in the case of action taken by statutory or administrative authorities nor, at any rate, in their entirety." (p.267).
He preferred to adopt the formulation that "if a Proclamation is found to be mala fide or is found to be based wholly on extraneous or irrelevant grounds, it is liable to be struck down." (p.268). The teamed Judge has observed: "The truth orcorrectness of the material cannot be questioned by the court nor will it go into the adequacy of the material.
It will also not substitute its opinion for that of the President. Even if some of the material on which the action is taken is found to be irrelevant, the court would still not interfere so long as there is some relevant material sustaining the action.
The ground of mala fides takes in inter alia situations-where the Proclamation is found to be a clear case of abuse of power, or what is sometimes called fraud on power cases where this power is invoked for achieving oblique ends." (p. 268).
The learned Judge has further stated: "The court will not lightly presume abuse or misuse. The court would, as it should, tread wearily, making allowance for the fact that the President and the Union Council of Ministers are the best judges of the situation, that they alone are in possession of information and material sensitive in nature sometimes and that the Constitution has trusted their judgment in the matter. But all this does not mean that the President and Union Council of Ministers are the final arbiters in the matter or that
their opinion is conclusive." (pp.268 269).
Pandian J. has expressed his agreement with the judgment of Jeevan Reddy J.
Ahmadi J. (as the learned Chief Justice then was),while expressing his agreement with the view expressed in the State of Rajasthan (supra) has held that a proclamation issued under Article 356(1) of the Constitution can be challenged on the limited ground that the action is mala fide or ultra vires Article 356 itself and has held that the test laid down in Barium Chemicals (supra) and subsequent decisions for adjudging the validity of administrative action can have no application for testing the satisfaction of the President under Article 356. (p.82)
19. Verma J., speaking for himself and Yogeshwar Dayal J., has taken the same view. The learned Judge has held though the Proclamation under Article 356 is subject to judicial review the area of justiciability is narrow. While holding that the test for adjudging the validity of an administrative action and the grounds of its invalidity indicated in Barium Chemicals "(Supra) and other cases of that category have no application for testing and invalidating a Proclamation issued under Article 356, the learned
Judge has said that the grounds of invalidity are those mentioned in State of Rajasthan (supra). (p. 85)
20. K. Ramaswamy J. has held: "The decision can be tested on the ground of legal mala fides, or high irrationality in the exercise of the discretion to issue Presidential Proclamation and the traditions parameters of judicial review, therefore cannot be extended to the area of exceptional and extraordinary power exercise under Article 356". The learned Judge has also held that the "doctrine of proportionality cannot be extended to the power exercised under Article 356." (p. 209)
21. It would thus appear that in S.R Bommai (supra) though all the learned Judges have held that the exercise of power under Article 356 (1) is subject to judicial review but in the matter of justiciability of the satisfaction of the President, the view of the majority (Pandian, Ahmadi, Verma,Agrawal, Yogeshwar Dayal and Jeevan Reddy JJ.) is that the principles evolved in Barium Chemicals (supra) for adjudging the validity of an action based on the subjective satisfaction of the authority created by statute do not, in their entirety, apply to the exercise of a constitutional power under Article 356.
On the basis of the judgment of Jeevan Reddy J., which takes a narrower view than that taken by Sawant J., it can be said that the view of the majority
(Pandian, Kuldip Singh, Sawant, Agrawal and Jeevan Reddy JJ.) is that :
(i) the satisfaction of the President while
making Proclamation under Article 356(1) is
justiciable;
(ii) it would be open to challenge on the
ground of mala fides or being based wholly on
extraneous and/or irrelevant grounds;
(iii)even if some of the materials on which
the action is taken is found to be irrelevant,
the court would still not interfere so long as
there is some relevant material sustaining the
action;
(iv) the truth or correctness of the material
cannot be questioned by the Court nor will it
go into the adequacy of the material and it
will also not substitute its opinion for that
of the President;
(v) the ground of mala fide takes in inter
alia situations where the proclamation is
found to be a clear case of abuse of power or
what is sometimes called fraud on power;
(vi) the court will not lightly presume abuse
or misuse of power and will make allowance for
the fact that the President and the Union
Council of Ministers are the best judge of the
situation and that they are also in possession
of information and material and that the
Constitution has trusted their judgment in the
matter; and
(vii) this does not mean that the President
and the Council of Ministers arc the final
arbiters in the matter or that their opinion
is conclusive.
22.As to the bar to an inquiry by the court imposed under Article 74(2) of the Constitution, all the Judges in S.R. Bommai (supra) have held that the said bar under Article 74(2) is confined to the advice tendered by the Council of Ministers to the President and it does not extend to the material on the basis of which the advice was tendered and, therefore, Articles 74(2) does not bar the production of the material on which the advice of the Council of Ministers is based. This is, however, subject to the right to claim privilege against the production of the said material under Section 123 of the Evidence Act.
23.Is there anything in the provisions of clause (c) of the second proviso to Article 311 (2) which compels a departure fro the principles laid down in S.R. Bommai (supra) governing justiciability of the satisfaction of the President in the matter of exercise of power under Article 356? We have not been able to discern any reason for making a departure. As compared the clause (c) of the second proviso to Article 311 (2), which deals with an individual employee, the power conferred by Article 356, resulting in displacement of the elected government of a State and imposition of President's rule in the State, is of much greater significance a. effecting large number of persons.
We may, in this context, refer to clause (b) of the second proviso to Article 311 (2) whereunder it is permissible to dispense with the requirements of Article 311 (2) if the authority empowered to dismiss or remove a person or to reduce him in rank is satisfied that for some reason, to be recorded by that authority in writing, it is not reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry. Clause (3) of Article 311 makes the said decision of the authority final.
In spite of the said provision attaching finality to the decision this Court, in Tulsiram Patel (supra), has held :
"The finality given by clause (3) of Article
311 to the disciplinary authority's decision
that it was not reasonably practicable to hold
the inquiry is not binding upon the court.
The court will also examine the charge of mala
fides, if any, made in the writ petition. In
examining the relevancy of the reasons, the
court will consider the situation which
according to the disciplinary authority made
it come to the conclusion that it was not
reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry.
If the court finds that the reasons are ir-
relevant, then the recording of its satis-
faction by the disciplinary authority would
be, an abuse of power conferred upon it by
clause (b) and would take the case out of the
purview of that clause and the impugned order
of penalty would stand invalidated." (p.274)
24.Clause (b) differs from clause (c) in as much as under clause (b) the competent authority is required to record in writing the reasons for its satisfaction and there is no such requirement in clause (c). This difference, in our opinion, does not mean that the satisfaction of the President or the Governor under clause (c) is immune from judicial review and is not justiciable. It only means that the provisions contained in clause (c) are more akin to those contained in Article 356(1) which also does not contain any requirement to record the reasons for the satisfaction of the President. Since the satisfaction of the President in the matter of making a proclamation under Article 356(1) is justiciable within the limits indicated in S.R. Bommai (supra) the satisfaction of the President or the Governor, which forms the basis for passing an order under clause (c) of the second proviso to Article 311 (2), can also be justiciable within the same limits.
25.Under clause (c) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) the President or the Governor has to satisfy himself about the expediency in the interests of the security of the State to hold an enquiry as prescribed under Article 311 (2). Are the considerations involving the interests of the security of the State of such a nature as to exclude the satisfaction arrived at by the President or the Governor in respect of the matters from the field of justiciability? We do not think so.
Article 19(2) of the Constitution permits the State to impose, by law, reasonable restrictions in the interests of the security of the State on the exercise of the right to freedom of speech and expression conferred by subclause (a) of clause (1) of Article 19.
The validity of the law imposing such restrictions under Article 19(2) is open to judicial review on the ground that the restrictions are not reasonable or they are not in the interests of the security of the State. The Court is required to adjudicate on the question whether a particular restriction on the
right to freedom of speech and expression is reasonable in the interests of the security of the State and for that purpose the Court takes into consideration the interests of the security of the State and the need of the restrictions for protecting those interests. If the Courts are competent to adjudicate on matters relating to the security of the State in respect of restrictions on the right to freedom of speech and expression under Article 19 (2) there appears to be no reason why the Courts should not be competent to go into the question whether the satisfaction of the President or the Governor for passing an order under Article 311 (2)
(c) is based on considerations having a bearing on the interests of the security of the State. While examining the validity of a law imposing restrictions on the right to freedom of speech and expression this Court has emphasised the distinction between security of the State and maintenance of public order and has observed that only serious and aggravated forms of public order which are calculated to endanger the security of the State would fall within the ambit of clause (2) of Article 19. (See : Romesh Thappar v. The
State of Madras, 1950 SCR 594, at p. 601).
So also in Tulsiram Patel (supra) the Court has pointed out the distinction between the expressions 'security of the State', 'public order' and 'law and order' and has stated that situations which affect public order are graver than those which affect law and order and situations which affect security of the State are graver than those which affect public order.
The President or the Governor while exercising the power under Article 311 (2) (c) has to bear in mind this distinction between situations which affect the security of the State and the situations which affect public order or law and order and for the purpose of arriving at his satisfaction for the purpose of passing an order under Article 311 (2) (c) the President or the Governor can take into consideration only those circumstances which have a bearing on the interests of the security of the State and not on situations having a bearing on law and order or public order. The satisfaction of the President or the Governor would be vitiated if it is based on circumstances having no bearing on the security of the State. If an order passed under Article 311(2) (c) is assailed before a court of law
on the ground that the satisfaction of the President or the Governor is not based on circumstances which have a bearing on the security of the State the Court can examine the circumstances on which the satisfaction of the President or the Governor is based and if it finds that the said circumstances have no bearing on the security of the State the court can hold that the satisfaction of the President or the Governor which is required for passing such an order has been vitiated by wholly extraneous or irrelevant considerations.
26. It would be useful, in this context, to take note of the decision of the House of Lords in Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Services, 1985 (1) AC 374, which related to the Government Communications Head Quarters (GCHQ). The main functions of GCHQ were to ensure the security of military and official communications and to provide the government with signals intelligence which involved the handling of secret information vital to the national security.
Since 1947 staff employed at GCHQ had been permitted to belong to national trade unions and most had done so. There was a well-established practice of consultation between the official and trade union sides about important alterations in the terms and conditions of service of the staff.
On December 22, 1983 the Minister for the Civil Service gave an instruction for the immediate variation of the terms and conditions of service of the staff with the effect that they would no longer be permitted to belong to national trade unions.
There had been no consultation with the trade unions or with the staff at GCHQ prior to the issuing of that instruction. The said instruction was challenged by a trade union and six individuals who sought judicial review of the said instruction.
Immunity from judicial review was claimed on the ground that the said instruction had been issued in exercise of the prerogative power of the Crown. The House of Lords held that executive action was not immune from judicial review merely because it was carried out in pursuance of the power derived from a common law or prerogative, rather than a statutory source, and a minister acting under a prerogative power might, depending upon its subject matter, be under the same duty to act fairly as in the case of action under a statutory power. On behalf of the Minister it was submitted that prior consultation would involve a real risk that it would occasion the very kind of disruption that was threat to national security and which it was intended to avoid.
While recognising that the decision on whether the requirements of national security outweigh the duty of fairness in any particular case, is for the Government and not for the courts, Lord Fraser of Tully belton said
"But if the decision is successfully chal-
lenged on the ground that it has been reached
by a process which is unfair then the
Government is under an obligation to produce
evidence that the decision was, in fact, based
on grounds of national security," (p. 402)
According to Lord Scarman
"The point of principle in the appeal is as to
the duty of the court when in proceedings
properly brought before it a question arises
as to what is required in the interest of
national security. The question may arise in
ordinary litigation between private persons as
to their private rights and obligations: and
it can arise as in this case in proceedings
for judicial review of a decision by a public
authority."
"But, however it arises, it is a matter to be
considered by the court in the circumstances
and context of the case. Though there, are
limits dictated by law and common sense which
the court must observe in dealing with the
question the court does 'not abdicate its
judicial functions. If the question arises as
a matter of fact, the court requires evidence
to be given. If it arises as a factor to be
considered in reviewing the exercise of a
discretionary power, evidence is also needed
so that the court may determine whether it
should intervene to correct excess or abuse of
the power," [p. 404]
27. Similarly Lord Roskill has said:
"The courts have long shown themselves
sensitive to the assertion by the executive
that considerations of national security must
preclude judicial investigation of a
particular individual grievance. But even in
that field the courts will not act on a mere
assertion that questions of national security
were involved. Evidence is required that the
decision under challenge was in fact founded
on those grounds. 'Mat that principle exists
is 1 beyond doubt.?' [p. 420]
28.On the basis of the evidence that was adduced in that case it was held that the evidence established that the minister had considered, with reason, that prior consultation about her instruction would have involved a risk of precipitating disruption at GCHQ and revealing vulnerable areas of operation, and, accordingly, she had shown that her decision had in fact been based on considerations of national security that out weighed the applicants' legitimate expectation of prior consultation.
29. In Bakshi Sardari Lal (Dead) through LRs Ors. v.Union of India & Anr., 1987 (4) SCC 114, in a challenge to orders of dismissal passed under clause (c) of the second. proviso to Article 311 (2) it was contended on behalf of the appellants that the High Court was wrong in holding that the sufficiency of satisfaction of the President was not justiciable.
While dealing with the said contention, the court, after referring to the decision in
Tulsiram Patel (supra), has observed :
"The record of the case produced before us
clearly indicates that the reason has been
recorded though not communicated. That would
satisfy, the requirements of the law as
indicated in Tulsiram Patel Case . The plea of
mala fides as had been contended before the
High Court and causally reiterated before us
arises out of the fact that typed orders dated
June 3, 1971, were already on record in the
file when the papers were placed before the
President; such a contention is without any
substance." [p. 121]
30.This would show that the court did go into the question whether the impugned orders were vitiated by mala, fides. As noticed earlier in Tulsiram Patel (supra) also the Court, while dealing with the Madhya Pradesh Police Forces matters, did examine the question whether the impugned orders of dismissal passed under Article 311(2)(c) were vitiated by mala fides or were based on irrelevant considerations and after considering all the materials that were produced before the Court by the State Government, the Court recorded the finding that the facts leave no doubt that the situation was such that prompt and urgent action was necessary and the holding of inquiry into the conduct of each of the petitioners would not have been expedient in the interests of the security of the State.
31.We are, therefore, of the opinion that an order passed under clause (c) of the second proviso to Article 311 (2) is subject to judicial review and its validity can be examined by the court on the ground that the satisfaction of the President or the Governor is vitiated by mala fides or is based on wholly extraneous or irrelevant grounds within the limits laid down in S.R Bommai (supra).
32.In order that the Court is able to exercise this power of judicial review effectively it must have the necessary material before it to determine whether the satisfaction of the President or the Governor as the case may be, has been arrived at in accordance with the law and is not vitiated by mala fides or extraneous or irrelevant factors. This brings us to the question whether the Government is obligated to place such material before the Court. It is no doubt true that unlike clause (b) of the second proviso to Article 311
(2) which requires the authority to record in writing the reason for its satisfaction that it is not reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry clause (c) of the second proviso does not prescribe for the recording of reasons for the satisfaction. But the absence of such a requirement to record reason for the satisfaction does not dispense with the obligation on the part of the concerned Government to satisfy the court or the Tribunal if an order passed under clause (c) of the second proviso to Article 311 (2) is challenged before such court or tribunal that the satisfaction was arrived at after taking into account relevant facts and circumstances and was not vitiated by mala fides and was not based on extraneous or irrelevant considerations. In the absence of the said circumstances being placed before the court or the Tribunal it may be possible for the concerned employee to establish his case that the satisfaction was vitiated by mala fides or was based on extraneous or irrelevant considerations.
While exercising the power under Article 311 (2) (c) the President or the Governor acts in accordance with the advice tendered by the Council of
Ministers. (See : Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab, 1975 (1) SCR 814). Article 74(2) and Article 163 (3) which preclude the court from inquiring into the question whether any, and if so, what advice was tendered by the Ministers to the President or the Governor enable the concerned Government to withhold from the court the advice that was tendered by the Ministers to the President or the Governor. But, as laid down in S.R. Bommai (supra), the said provisions do not permit the Government to withhold production in the Court of the material on which the advice of the Ministers was based.
This is, however, subject to the claim of privilege under Sections 123 and 124 of the Evidence Act in respect of a particular document or record. The said claim of privilege will have to be considered by the court or tribunal on its own merit. But the upholding of such claim for privilege would not stand in the way of the concerned Government being required to disclose the nature of the activities of the employee on the basis of which the satisfaction of the President or the Governor was arrived at for the purpose of passing an order under clause (c) of the second proviso to Article 311 (2) so that the court or tribunal may be able to determine whether the said activities could be regarded as having a reasonable nexus with the interest of the security of the State.
In the absence of any indication about the nature of the activities it would not be possible for the court or tribunal to determine whether the satisfaction was arrived at on the basis of relevant considerations. The nature of activities in which employee is said to have indulged in must be distinguished from the material which supports his having indulged in such activities. The non-disclosure of such material would be permissible if the claim of privilege is
upheld. The said claim of privilege would not extend to the disclosure of the nature of the activities because such disclosure would not involve disclosure of any information connecting the employee with such activities or the source of such information.
33.In our opinion, therefore, in a case where the validity of an order passed under clause (c) of the second proviso to Article 111(2) is assailed before a court or a Tribunal it is open to the court or the Tribunal to examine whether the satisfaction of the President or the Governor is vitiated by mala fides or is based on wholly extraneous or irrelevant grounds and for that purpose the Government is obliged to
place before the court or tribunal the relevant material on the basis of which the satisfaction was arrived at subject to a claim of privilege under Sections 123 and 124 of the Evidence Act to withhold production of a particular document or record. Even in cases where such a privilege is claimed the Government concerned must disclose before the Court or tribunal the nature of the activities in which the Government employee is said to have indulged in.
34.In the present case the appellants had sought production
and inspection of the following documents:
(a) The records and files containing the
"information" on the basis of which the
President was "satisfied " for the purpose of
exercising his powers under clause (c) of the
second proviso to Article 311 (2).
(b) The records and files containing the
description of "activities of the petitioners
which warranted their 'dismissal' from
service".
(c) The records and files containing the
details of "misconduct" attributed to the
petitioners, as covered in CCS (Conduct)
Rules, 1965.
(d) A copy of the charge of misconduct and
the statement of allegation in support thereof
framed by the Competent Authority against the
petitioners before coming to the conclusion
that "it is not expedient to hold an inquiry
in the case of Shri B.B. Raval (petitioners)."
(e) A copy of the original order passed by
the President of India under Article 311
(2)(c) on the basis of which Shri R.
Mahadevan, Under Secretary to the Government
of India, Ministry of Honic Affairs issued the
impugned order dated 26th December, 1980 "By
order and in the name of the
President".
(f) A copy of the order of delegation of
powers of the President of India authorising
Shri R. Mahadevan, Under Secretary to
authenticate the order of the President and
issue the same in his name.
(g) Records and files containing the de-
liberations, recommendations and findings of
the Committee of Advisors (as envisaged in
O.M. dated 26th July, 1980) advising the
President of India to exercise powers under
Article 311 (2)(c) of the Constitution.
(h) Copies of any other records, files,
notification or recommendations relevant to
the issue of the impugned order, that the
Hon'ble Tribunal may direct the respondents to
produce for rendering full and effective
assistance to the Hon'ble Tribunal in the
interest of justice and for adjudication of
this case.
35. Dr. Madhav Godbole in his affidavit claimed privilege under Article 74(2) as well as under Sections 123 and 124 of the Evidence Act. The Tribunal after referring the decision of this Court in S.P. Gupta & Ors., etc. etc. v. Union of India & Ors. etc. etc., 1982
(2) SCR 365, has observed that
the following classes of documents are protected from disclosure :
"(i) Cabinet minutes, minutes of discussions
between heads of departments, high level
inter-departmental communications and
dispatches from ambassadors abroad.
(ii) Papers brought into existence for the
purpose of preparing a submission to cabinet.
(iii) Documents which relate to the framing of
the Government policy at a high level.
(iv) Notes and minutes made by the respective
officers on the relevant files, information
expressed or reports made and gist of official
decisions reached.
(v) Documents concerned with policymaking
within departments including minutes and the
like by junior officials and correspondence
with outside bodies."
36.The Tribunal, after examining the records produced before it, has observed that the records contain cabinet minutes, papers brought into existence for the purpose of preparing submission to the cabinet, notes made by the respective officers, information expressed and the gist of official decisions. Having regard to the fact that the appellants were working in a highly sensitive Organisation entrusted with the delicate job of gathering, collecting and analysing intelligence necessary to maintain the unity, integrity and sovereignty of the country and that secrecy is the essence of the organisation and exposure may tend to demolish the organisation and aggravate the hazards in gathering informa tion and dry up the sources that provide essential and sensitive information needed to protect public interest, the Tribunal has held that it will not be in public interest to permit disclosure of such documents. The Tribunal has, therefore, upheld the claim of privilege. We do not find any ground to take a different view in the matter.
37.After looking into the records the Tribunal has recorded the finding that the materials considered by the President relate to the activities of the appellants which would prejudicially affect the security of the State and that the materials relied upon for the satisfaction of the President have nothing to do with the activities of the appellants in relation to IBEA and that the impugned orders have not been passed in violation of the interim order passed by this Court in W.P. O Nos. 1119 of 1980 and that there is no substance in the appellants' case that the orders of dismissal are not bona fide and had been passed to victimise the appellants for promoting and participating in the activities of IBEA.
The learned Additional Solicitor General has submitted that the Tribunal has not committed any error in adopting this course and has placed reliance on the decision of this Court in Jamaat-e-Islamdi Hind v. Union of India, 1995 (1) SCC 428.
38.In Jamaat-e-Islamdi Hind (supra) a notification had been issued by the Government of India under Section 3 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 declaring that the Jamaat-e-Islami Hind was an unlawful Association. The said notification was referred for adjudication to the Tribunal constituted under the said Act. Before the Tribunal the only material produced by the Central Government was a resume prepared on the basis of some intelligence reports and the affidavits of two officers who spoke only on the basis of the records and not from personal knowledge. The Tribunal held that there was sufficient cause for declaring the Association to be unlawful and confirmed the notification. On behalf of the appellant it was urged that the only material produced at the inquiry does not constitute legal evidence for the purpose in as much as it was, at best, hearsay and that too without disclosing the source from which it emanates to give an opportunity to the appellant to effectively rebut the same.
On the other hand, on behalf of the respondent it was submitted that the requirement of natural justice in such a situation was satisfied by mere disclosure of information without disclosing the source of the information. This Court, while holding that the minimum requirement of natural justice must be satisfied to make the adjudication meaningful, observed that the said requirement of natural justice in a case of this kind had to be tailored to safeguard public interest which must always out-weigh every lesser interest. It was said:
"It is obvious that the unlawful activities of
an association may quite often be clandestine
in nature and, therefore, the source of
evidence of the unlawful activities may
require continued confidentiality in public
interest. In such a situation, disclosure of
the source of such information, and, may be,
also full particulars thereof, is likely to be
against the public interest. ....... However,
the nondisclosure of sensitive information and
evidence to the association and its office-
bearers, whenever justified in pubic interest.
does not necessarily imply its non-disclosure
to the Tribunal as well." [p.447]
39.These observations in Jamaat-e-Islamdi Hind (supra) lend support to the view that in a case where the material is of such a nature that it requires continued confidentiality in public interest it would be permissible for the court or tribunal to look into the same while permitting the nondisclosure to the other party to the adjudication. It cannot, therefore, be said that the Tribunal, in the present case, was in error in looking into the record for the purpose of determining whether the satisfaction has been vitiated for any of the reasons mentioned by the appellants.
40. The learned counsel for the appellants have invited our attention to the averments contained in C.M. No. 8494 of 1980 filed on behalf of the respondent in W.P. No. 1117-19 of 1980 in this Court in support of their submission that the impugned orders of dismissal have been passed on the basis of the activities referred to in para 6 of the said application. This submission has to be, rejected in view of the finding recorded by the Tribunal that the materials considered by the President relate to the activities of the appellants which would prejudicially affect the security of the State and that the said materials have nothing to do with the activities of the appellant in
relation to IBEA.
41. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are unable to hold that the impugned orders for the dismissal of the appellants are vitiated by malafides or are based on wholly extraneous or irrelevant grounds and we do not find any ground to interfere with the decision of the Tribunal. The appeals are, therefore, dismissed.
But in the circumstances without any order as to costs.
27
The cruel hands of Jamaat-e-Islamdi Hind near Police Headquarters Delhi is a filthy representation of mata mandir at Jammu wherein the muslims claim that the goddess of power in India is theirs through organised crime supported by Britain,
as well as their subsidiary alliances in Arya Samaj and Khalistan terror outfits who are surviving by the cunt and murder of women.
It is also an obvious reference to Jamaica /West Indies and English Cricket Betting ,through which a major chunk of terrorist earnings come.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rahul_Gandhi
Rahul Gandhi (born 19 June 1970) is an Indian politician and member of the Parliament of India, representing the Amethi constituency.[1] His political party is the Indian National Congress.[2]He worked in London with the strategy consultancy firm Monitor Group,[citation needed] before returning to India in late 2002 to run an engineering and technology outsourcing firm in Mumbai[9].
37 YEARS ELLIGIBLE BACHELOR TAKES OVER THE REINS OF THE CONGRESS
TERRORISM OF ARYA SAMAJ ACT OF 1937 AND AKIN TEMPORARY ARTICLE 370 OF 4500 CRORE GRANT KASHMIR
DELHI KA KASHMIR -KYA STINK HAI OF JAGPRAVESH ISLAMIC DAYANAND KI VAGINAL MOUTH SARASWATI
1997MODUS OPERANDI OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZED CRIME -IPC SECTION 503,506 ,507-CRIMINAL INTIMIDATION AND OPEN DEFIANCE OF LAW BY USING HEINOUS SYMBOLS
WHY DOES THE INDIAN MUSLIM WANTS TO REMAIN IN FILTH AND BECOME A CRIMINAL?DOOSRI RADHA -TERA MERA RISHTA ADHA-COMBAT HONESTY WITH LIFE TIME
BEAUTIFUL HASINA PARKER OF KENNEDY CAR PARKING MURDER-MUHAMMAD MAID,SEX , ARABIAN PETROL CARLOS,MUKHERJEE NAGAR GOVERNMENT SERVANTS-ISLAM/ARYA SAMAJ
Time in Washington 
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