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Saturday, May 3, 2008

NATURE'S CASINO









SHAKYA VANSHYA DHARAM SHALA YAH DHARAMSHALA CHOUDHARY VALDEV SINGH SINGH JI KE SUPUTRA CHOUDHARY JUNGLEE SINGH SHATRIYA (Kachi) SABZI MANDI SHAHER DELHI MEIN TAIYAAR KARAYI.MITI PHALGUN SHUKLA 12 SAMVAT 1994 TAAREEKH 13 MARCH SAN 1938 EASVI +NOTE +DHARAMSHALA KI DUKAAN KAMRE VAGHARAH DHARAMSHALA VE MANDIR KE LIYE VAKHPH HAIN.
























IS THIS A COINCIDENCE THAT I SHIFTED TO DELHI IN MAY 2003 IN UTTER HEINOUSNESS AND FILTH OF HOUSE NO 1513, OUTRAM LANE MADE BY LODHA KALRA ,WITH MY MONEY AND BANK LOAN AND WAS 38 YEARS OLD WHILE IN CHATTISGARH AND 39 IN DELHI MY DATE OF BIRTH BEING 1964 AND DLF KA IC SETHI GANGA RAM PSYCHIATRIST AND KUSHAL PAL SINGH HAVING SIMILAR FACES THAT A CASE WAS ALSO LISTED IN THE SUPREME COURT WITH SAME SYMBOLIC NUMBERS AS WELL AS AGAINST THE FILTHY GUTTER OF DLF.MY FATHER DIED ON 16-11-1994 AND THE BUILDER MAFIA WORD CONTRACTOR IS ALSO THERE.
PLEASE READ




 



















































SLP(C)No. 938 OF 2003

ITEM No.64
Court No. 5
SECTION XIV



S U P R E M E C O U R T
O F
I N D I A

RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS

Petition(s) for Special Leave to Appeal
(Civil) No.938/2003

(From the judgement and order dated
10/09/2002 in
CWP 1940/02

of The HIGH COURT OF DELHI AT N. DELHI)


BIRLA VXL LTD.
Petitioner (s)


VERSUS

DLF UNIVERSAL LTD.
http://www.dlf-group.com/
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/DLF_Universal
Respondent (s)


(With prayer for interim relief)

Date : 03/02/2003 This Petition was called on for
hearing today.


CORAM :
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE R.C. LAHOTI
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE BRIJESH KUMAR


For Petitioner (s) Mr. K.K. Venugopal, Sr. Adv.
Mr. L.K. Bhushan, Adv.
Ms. Jasleen Oberoi, Adv.
Mrs. Shiraz Contractor Patodia,Adv.

For Respondent (s) Mr. J.C. Seth, Adv.
Mr. B.K.Satija,Adv.


UPON hearing counsel the Court made the following
O R D E R

List on 4.2.2003.
http://www.uiic.co.in/

( P.D. Balodi )

( Radha R. Bhatia )

Court Master
Court Master


http://www.birla-vxl.com/

http://www.digjam.co.in/http://www.lmu.edu/Page32597.
aspx?Date
Time=633040276200000000&PageMode=View

http://www.panachemag.com/Holiday_06/Features/IPO/IPO.asp


Top:

the Israel Philharmonic Orchestra. Above: Zubin Mehta,
music director for life.

See full-size image.

www.lmu.edu/AssetFactory.aspx?did=14309
336 x 338 - 84k
Image may be scaled down and subject to copyright.
http://www.digjam.co.in/Web/photo_gallery.aspx?
fromGType=printcampaigns

http://www.uiic.co.in/
http://www.uiic.co.in/contactus.jsp

Regd. & Head Office
# 24 , Whites Road
Chennai-600014
India
Phone:091-044-28520161

United India Insurance Company Limited was incorporated as a Company on 18th February 1938. General Insurance Business in India was nationalized in 1972. 12 Indian Insurance Companies, 4 Cooperative Insurance Societies and Indian operations of 5 Foreign Insurers, besides General Insurance operations of southern region of Life Insurance Corporation of India were merged with United India Insurance Company Limited. After Nationalization United India has grown by leaps and bounds and has 18300 work force spread across 1340 offices providing insurance cover to more than 1 Crore policy holders. The Company has variety of insurance products to provide insurance cover from bullock carts to satellites.

United India has been in the forefront of designing and implementing complex covers to large customers, as in cases of ONGC Ltd , GMR- Hyderabad International Airport Ltd, Mumbai International Airport Ltd Tirumala-Tirupati Devasthanam etc. We have been also the pioneer in taking Insurance to rural masses with large level implementation of Universal Health Insurance Programme of Government of India & Vijaya Raji Janani Kalyan Yojana ( covering 45 lakhs women in the state of Madhya Pradesh) , Tsunami Jan Bima Yojana (in 4 states covering 4.59 lakhs of families) , National Livestock Insurance and many such schemes.


We have also made our presence in more than 200 tier II & II towns and villages through our innovative Micro Offices.






http://www.fortliberty.org/american-flag/american-flag.shtml








Date: Fri, 5 Oct 2007 00:17:48 -0700 (PDT)

From: "mamta dhody"

Subject: NATURE'S CASINO

To: custqueries@tmf.co.in, dtt@tatamotors.com, atul.dhagat@tatamotors.com, nijhawan@tatamotors.com, sbi.09423@sbi.co.in, vice_president@whitehouse.gov, feedback@hindustantimes.com, paulkk@nic.in, feedback@kashmirgroup.com, webmaster@kashmir-information.com, dmsatna@mp.nic.in, infor@ncaer.org, webmaster@iaf.nic.in, webmaster@cathnews.com, cbcipro@vsnl.net, colirf@catholic.org, contact@catholic.net, presidentofindia@rb.nic.in, gujjars@iname.com, vprotect@vsnl.com, dhiraj.s@pmo.nic.in, plancom@nic.in, dch@nic.in, mvraja@yojana.nic.in, kirit.parikh@nic.in, abhijit.sen@nic.in, vl.chopra@nic.in, b.mungekar@nic.in, bjpco@bjp.org, delhicourts@yahoo.com, vpops.nyb@statebank.com, mamta_dhody@yahoo.co.in, vprotect@vsnl.net, editet@timesgroup.com, bastar@cg.nic.in, cmcg@nic.in, mamtadhodykalra@yahoo.com, cmdelhi@nic.in, indianarmy@bol.net.in, webmasterindiannavy@nic.in, dgdps@ndb.vsnl.net.in, dirdesidoc@vsnl.net, letters@hindustantimes.com, bo_383@licindia.com, delhi.sec@gmail.com, vbhaskar@msn.com, mamtadhodykalra@gmail.com, saamana@vsnl.net, chiefminister@maharashtra.gov.in, innervoice@hindustantimes.com, clickonline@bbc.co.uk, lkadvani@nic.in

Date: Wed, 3 Oct 2007 12:00:21 -0700 (PDT)

From: "mamta dhody"

Subject: NATURE'S CASINO

Date: Wed, 3 Oct 2007 11:41:00 -0700 (PDT)

From: "mamta dhody kalra"

Subject: NATURE'S CASINO

To: mamtadhody_1964@yahoo.com

Date: Wed, 3 Oct 2007 11:34:10 -0700 (PDT)

From: "mamta dhody kalra"

Subject: NATURE'S CASINO

To: atmishra@nic.in, arunkjha@nic.in, kvichq@bom3.vsnl.net.in, ditkvic@bom3.vsnl.net.in, rdvvcc1@rediffmail.com, rdulib@sancharnet.in, daffurk@hotmail.com, rdulib@bom6.vsnl.net.in, sushdubey_24@yahoo.co.in, sfrimp@mp.nic.in, dsfri995@sancharnet.in, pandey_rk1@yahoo.com, rpsfri@rediffmail.com, rgsoni_sni@rediffmail.com, prashantjadhav14@rediffmail.com, pawar_sfri@rediffmail.com, rbtiwari_sfri@rediffmail.com, skt_sfri@rediffmail.com, shrivastavajls123@rediffmail.com, opc_sfri@rediffmail.com, pj_sfri@rediffmail.com, pb_sfri@rediffmail.com, as_sfri@rediffmail.com, rakeshjainson@rediffmail.com, klv_sfri@rediffmail.com, ssraghu_sfri@rediffmail.com, sarkar_sfri@rediffmail.com, richaseth1972@rediff.com, ramamurthy.kv@nic.in, kvr_murthy1@rediffmail.com, dhurve.ps@nic.in, mishra.madhu@nic.in, bobseshadri@deccanherald.co.in, kurelay.vibha@nic.in, jabalpur@mp.nic.in, ckharish@deccanherald.co.in, ads@deccanherald.co.in, vp@deccanherald.co.in, ngbadri@deccanherald.co.in, tony@deccanherald.co.in, editor@dailyexcelsior.com, dayafter@dayafterindia.com, info@dayafterindia.com, dayafter@ndf.vsnl.in, subscription@dayafterindia.com, sunildang@dayafterindia.com, sangeeta@sansad.nic.in, ravi.chandran@sansad.nic.in, bssolanki@sansad.nic.in, S.Sonowal@sansad.nic.in, shisoren@sansad.nic.in, dcs@sansad.nic.in, rsuman@sansad.nic.in, makswain@sansad.nic.in, jayaben@sansad.nic.in, thomapc@sansad.nic.in, vk.thummar@sansad.nic.in, braja@sansad.nic.in, tytler@sansad.nic.in, vajpayee@sansad.nic.in, vzawma@sansad.nic.in, varmarl@sansad.nic.in, dvgopal@sansad.nic.in, rpverma@sansad.nic.in, rajeshverma@sansad.nic.in, vijayan@sansad.nic.in, vkumar@sansad.nic.in, ak.vundavalli@sansad.nic.in, akpradhan@sansad.nic.in, lalmani.prasad@sansad.nic.in, jitin.prasada@sansad.nic.in, preneet@sansad.nic.in, varkalav@sansad.nic.in, nd.rai@sansad.nic.in, pappu.yadav@sansad.nic.in, pappuyadav@nic.in, akjyoti@yahoo.co.uk, ks.rao@sansad.nic.in, msrn@rb.railnet.gov.in, mvrawale@sansad.nic.in, bachi@sansad.nic.in, rsrawat@sansad.nic.in


Date: Wed, 3 Oct 2007 11:32:17 -0700 (PDT)

From: "mamta dhody kalra"

Subject: NATURE'S CASINO

To: highcourt.cg@nic.in, korba.cg@nic.in, raigarh.cg@nic.in, raipur.cg@nic.in, rnandgaon.cg@nic.in, surguja.cg@nic.in, foodmin.cg@nic.in, panchayatmin.cg@nic.in, hmin.cg@nic.in, agrimin.cg@nic.in, forestmin.cg@nic.in, welfaremin.cg@nic.in, watermin.cg@nic.in, pwmin.cg@nic.in, publichealth.cg@nic.in, phemin.cg@nic.in, socialmin.cg@nic.in, cs.cg@nic.in, shivraj@nic.in, bksray@nic.in, vkkapoor@nic.in, joyoommen@nic.in, s.minj@nic.in, tradhakrishnan@nic.in, vivekdhand@nic.in, dsmisra@nic.in, narayan.singh@nic.in, rcsinha@nic.in, ajaysingh@nic.in, mkraut@nic.in, pcdalei@nic.in

CC: vc@gbpuat.ernet.in, vc@hnbgugrw.ren.nic.in, vc@Kumuni.ren.nic.in, dir@sgpgi.ren.nic.in, uorve@rurkiu.ernet.in, director@becs.ernet.in, vcdkb@burdwan.ernet.in, registrar@evcc.ernet.in, root@isical.ernet.in, dean@isical.ernet.in, JUCL@ginsc101.vsnl.net.in, klyuniv@giasc01.vsnl.net.in, vuniv@hijli.iitkgp.ernet.in, root@vbharat.ernet.in, dgd@JADAV.ERNET.in, 20point@up.nic.in, aaremes@up.nic.in, abhay@up.nic.in, abhijata@up.nic.in, abhilashr1@up.nic.in, abhilashr2@up.nic.in, abhishek@up.nic.in, abishnoi@up.nic.in, abu@up.nic.in, accounts@up.nic.in, accounts_lko@up.nic.in, acct@up.nic.in, acdevi@up.nic.in, acmeshram@up.nic.in, acmesram@up.nic.in, aco@up.nic.in, acoup@up.nic.in, ad_upacs@up.nic.in, adagr@up.nic.in, adall@up.nic.in, adarshjc@up.nic.in, adbar@up.nic.in, adbs_upacs@up.nic.in, adbs_upsacs@up.nic.in, adcam@up.nic.in, adcare_upacs@up.nic.in, adcare_upsacs@up.nic.in, adcgov@up.nic.in, adcoord_upsacs@up.nic.in, adcp_upacs@up.nic.in, adcp_upsacs@up.nic.in, addaga@up.nic.in, addagm@up.nic.in, addald@up.nic.in, addbry@up.nic.in, addbsi@up.nic.in, addckt@up.nic.in, adddptn@up.nic.in, addfzd@up.nic.in, addgkp@up.nic.in, addjsi@up.nic.in, addknp@up.nic.in, addlko@up.nic.in, addmdd@up.nic.in, addmrt@up.nic.in, addmzp@up.nic.in, addsrr@up.nic.in, addvns@up.nic.in, adeebs@up.nic.in, adelec-dmh@up.nic

Date: Wed, 3 Oct 2007 11:29:03 -0700 (PDT)

From: "mamta dhody kalra"

Subject: NATURE'S CASINO

To: ekta.alreja@metronow.co.in, govindraj.ethiraj@bsmail.in, letters@business-standard.com, feedback@business-standard.com

CC: mpf.ofb@nic.in, msf.ofb@nic.in, metal@cal.vsnl.net.in, ocfav.ofb@nic.in, gmocf@sancharnet.in, ocfs.ofb@nic.in, oefhz.ofb@nic.in, ofa.ofb@nic.in, ofaj_ngp@sancharnet.in, ofbagm_bhv@sancharnet.in, ofbh.ofb@nic.in, gmofbl@sancharnet.in, ofc.ofb@nic.in, ofch.ofb@nic.in, ofdc@sify.com, ofdr@vsnl.com, ofdun.ofb@nic.in, ofi.ofb@nic.in, ofkat.ofb@nic.in, ofm.ofb@nic.in, ofn.ofb@nic.in, hyd1_armour@sancharnet.in, indianarmy@bol.net.in, cdaopune@cdaopune.org, recruitingofficers@vsnl.net, rajaram@armypost.nic.in, webmasterindiannavy@nic.in, ordkham@sancharnet.in, writeme@jagdishtytler.com, ofbtrade@dataone.in, ofbtrade@vsnl.net, ofboard@giascl01.vsnl.net.in, afk.ofb@nic.in, cfa.ofb@nic.in, efa.ofb@mail.nic.in, fgk.ofb@nic.in, gif.ofb@nic.in, happ.ofb@nic.in, hvfavadi@vsnl.com, sbi.05453@sbi.co.in, SP.Mustafa@unilever.com, balaji.mani@unilver.com, Paresh.Chaudhry@unilever.com, mailmanager@karvy.com, gcc@corp.murugappa.com, ombudsperson@corp.murugappa.com, wsins@thehindu.co.in, admin@defenceindia.com, monthlypeacemaker@yahoo.com, comments@whitehouse.gov, letters@thehindu.co.in, gurumurthyt@cec.murugappa.com, leenags@cholayil.com

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http://www.uiic.co.in/contactus.jsp

http://www.business-standard.com/general/newbsvideo.php?cat=top&videoid=6321

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Forwarded Message

Date: Wed, 3 Oct 2007 09:13:16 -0700 (PDT)

From: "mamta kalra"

Subject: NATURE'S CASINO

To: iiiexams@vsnl.net, mprasad@nic.in, Jsecps@hotmail.com, lkchandel@nic.in, mitrapp@yahoo.com.in, college_insurance@yahoo.co.in, gidwani@iii.org.in, subramanian@iii.org.in, chavan@iii.org.in, shenoy@iii.org.in, ndkokare@iii.org.in, munshi@iii.org.in, rathaur@iii.org.in, gandhi@iii.org.in, jnoronha@iii.org.in, salian@iii.org.in, edsouza@iii.org.in, sbadri@iii.org.in, vnkokare@iii.org.in, mamta_jabdhody@yahoo.com, paulkk@nic.in, editor@expressindia.com, wsins@thehindu.co.in, admin@defenceindia.com, mr.satyanarayana@sbi.co.in, commcentre.sbsc@sbi.co.in, monthlypeacemaker@yahoo.com, comments@whitehouse.gov, letters@thehindu.co.in, tiwarimn66@yahoo.com, admin@mumbaicyberlab.org

CC: kvs2811@yahoo.com, robhopal@uiic.co.in, rochandigarh@uiic.co.in, rochennai@uiic.co.in, rocoimbatore@uiic.co.in, roguwahati@uiic.co.in, rohubli@uiic.co.in, rohyderabad@uiic.co.in, rojaipur@uiic.co.in, rokochi@uiic.co.in, rokolkota@uiic.co.in, rolucknow@uiic.co.in, roludhiana@uiic.co.in, romadurai@uiic.co.in, romumbai1@uiic.co.in, romumbai2@uiic.co.in, ronagpur@uiic.co.in, ronewdelhi1@uiic.co.in, ronewdelhi2@uiic.co.in, ropatna@uiic.co.in, ropune@uiic.co.in, rovadodara@uiic.co.in, rovizag@uiic.co.in, grievance@uiic.co.in, roahmedabad@uiic.co.in, robangalore@uiic.co.in, bramani@gicofindia.com, rcsekaran@gicofindia.com, tvviswanathan@gicofindia.com, goparay@gicofindia.com, vsushila@gicofindia.com, raghunath@gicofindia.com, hgrokade@gicofindia.com, pngandhi@gicofindia.com, jaugustine@gicofindia.com, suchitag@gicofindia.com, kvpathak@gicofindia.com, kolkota.ro@aicofindia.org, anilsant19@aol.com, gic1@ingos.ru, response@gicdubai.com, mvvchalam@gicofindia.com, drwaghela@gicofindia.com, saarcteam@gicofindia.com, asiateam@gicofindia.com, africateam@gicofindia.com, europeteam@gicofindia.com, creditre@gicofindia.com, marineteam@gicofindia.com, lifeandhealthteam@gicofindia.com, avn_uw@gicofindia.com, motoragriteam@gicofindia.com, liabs@gicofindia.com, nmclaimsteam@gicofindia.com, matclaimsteam@gicofindia.com

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A RICH TRIBUTE TO MR.JAGDISH CHANDRA

DHODY OF UNITED INDIA INSURANCE

ON HIS 13TH DEATH ANNIVERSAY

-16-11-1994 TO 16-11-2007.


http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Catastrophe_bond

REFERENCE :-Business Standard-1st July 2007 page 4

Catastrophe bond

From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia

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Catastrophe bonds (also known as cat bonds) are risk-linked securities that transfer a specified set of risks from the sponsor to the investors. They are often structured as floating-rate corporate bonds whose principal is forgiven if specified trigger conditions are met. They are typically used by insurers as an alternative to traditional catastrophe reinsurance.

For example, if an insurer has built up a portfolio of risks by insuring properties in Florida, then they might wish to pass some of this risk on so that they can remain solvent after a large hurricane. They could simply purchase traditional catastrophe reinsurance, which would pass the risk on to reinsurers. Or they could sponsor a cat bond, which would pass the risk on to investors. In consultation with an investment bank, they would create a special purpose entity that would issue the cat bond. Investors would buy the bond, which might pay them a coupon of LIBOR plus anywhere from 3 to 20%. If no hurricane hit Florida, then the investors made a healthy return on their investment. But if a hurricane hits Florida and triggers the cat bond, then the principal initially paid by the investors is forgiven, and is instead used by the sponsor to pay their claims to policyholders.

Contents

[hide]

1 History

2 Investors

3 Ratings

4 Structure

5 Trigger types

6 Market participants

7 Patents

8 References

9 External links

10 See also

[edit] History

The notion of securitizing catastrophe risks became prominent in the aftermath of Hurricane Andrew, notably in work published by Richard Sandor, Ken Froot and a group of professors at the Wharton School who were seeking vehicles to bring more risk-bearing capacity to the catastrophe reinsurance market. The first experimental transactions were completed in the mid-1990s by AIG, Hannover Re, St. Paul Re and USAA. The market grew to $1-2 billion of issuance per year for the 1998-2001 period, and over $2 billion per year following 9-11. Issuance doubled again to a run rate of approximately $4 billion on an annual basis in 2006 following Hurricane Katrina, and was accompanied by the development of Reinsurance Sidecars. Issuance continued to increase through 2007 despite the passing of the post-Katrina "hard market" as a number of insurers sought diversification of coverage through the market, including State Farm, Allstate, Liberty Mutual, Chubb and Travelers along with long-time issuer USAA. Total issuance exceeded $4 billion in the second quarter of 2007 alone.

It should be possible to adapt these instruments to other contexts. Professor Lawrence Cunningham of George Washington University suggests adapting cat bonds to the risks that large auditing firms face in cases asserting massive securities law damages. Lawrence A. Cunningham, Securitizing Audit Failure Risk: An Alternative to Damages Caps, William & Mary Law Review (2007) It does not appear that Professor Cunningham is seeking to patent his idea as an invention, although that it is not clear.

[edit] Investors

Investors choose to invest in catastrophe bonds because their return is largely uncorrelated with the return on other investments in fixed income or in equities, so cat bonds help investors achieve diversification. Investors also buy these securities because they generally pay higher interest rates (in terms of spreads over funding rates) than comparably rated corporate instruments as long as they are not triggered.

Key categories of investors who participate in this market include hedge funds, specialized catastrophe-oriented funds and asset managers. Life insurers, reinsurers, banks, pension funds and other investors have also participated in offerings.

A number of specialized catastrophe-oriented funds play a significant role in the sector, including Clariden Leu Ltd, Credit Suisse Asset Management, Fermat Capital Management, Nephila, Stark, Securis, Coriolis, Banque AIG, Solidum, Pentalia, Goldman Sachs Asset Management and others.

[edit] Ratings

Cat bonds are often rated by an agency such as Standard & Poor's, Moody's, or Fitch Ratings. A typical corporate bond is rated based on its probability of default due to the issuer going into bankruptcy. A catastrophe bond is rated based on its probability of default due to an earthquake or hurricane triggering loss of principal. This probability is determined with the use of catastrophe models. Most catastrophe bonds are rated below investment grade (BB and B category ratings) and the various rating agencies have recently moved toward a view that securities must require multiple events before occurrence of a loss in order to be rated investment grade.

[edit] Structure

Most catastrophe bonds are issued by special purpose reinsurance companies domicilied in the Cayman Islands, Bermuda or Ireland. These companies typically write one or more reinsurance policies to protection buyers (most commonly insurers or reinsurers) called "cedants." This contract may be structured as a derivative in cases in which it is "triggered" by one or more indices or event parameters (see below) rather than losses of the cedant.

Some bonds cover the risk that multiple losses will occur. The first second event bond (Atlas Re) was issued in 1999. The first third event bond (Atlas II) was issued in 2001. Subsequently, bonds triggered by fourth through ninth losses have been issued. Such transactions generally cover a the portfolio of a single cedant or fixed arrays of events. The first actively managed pool of bonds and other contracts ("Catastrophe CDO") called Gamut was issued in 2007 with Nephila as the asset manager.

[edit] Trigger types

The sponsor and investment bank who structure the cat bond must choose how the principal impairment is triggered. Cat bonds can be categorized into four basic trigger types. The trigger types listed first are more correlated to the actual losses of the insurer sponsoring the cat bond. The trigger types listed farther down the list are not as highly correlated to the insurer's actual losses, so the cat bond has to be structured carefully and properly calibrated, but investors would not have to worry about the insurer's claims adjustment practices.

Indemnity: triggered by the issuer's actual losses, so the sponsor is indemnified, as if they had purchased traditional catastrophe reinsurance. If the layer specified in the cat bond is $100 million excess of $500 million, and the total claims add up to more than $500 million, then the bond is triggered.

Modeled loss: instead of dealing with the company's actual claims, an exposure portfolio is constructed for use with catastrophe modeling software, and then when there is a large event, the event parameters are run against the exposure database in the cat model. If the modeled losses are above a specified threshold, the bond is triggered.

Indexed to industry loss: instead of adding up the insurer's claims, the cat bond is triggered when the insurance industry loss from a certain peril reaches a specified threshold, say $30 billion. The cat bond will specify who determines the industry loss; typically it is a recognized agency like PCS. "Modified index" linked securities customize the index to a company's own book of business by weighting the index results for various territories and lines of business.

Parametric: instead of being based on any claims (the insurer's actual claims, the modeled claims, or the industry's claims), the trigger is indexed to the natural hazard caused by nature. So the parameter would be the windspeed (for a hurricane bond), the ground acceleration (for an earthquake bond), or whatever is appropriate for the peril. Data for this parameter is collected at multiple reporting stations and then entered into specified formulae. For example, if a typhoon generates windspeeds greater than X meters per second at 50 of the 150 weather observation stations of the Japanese Meteorological Agency, the cat bond is triggered.

[edit] Market participants

This article does not cite any references or sources. (July 2007)

Please help improve this article by adding citations to reliable sources. Unverifiable material may be challenged and removed.

Examples of cat bond sponsors include insurers, reinsurers, corporations and government agencies. Over time, frequent issuers have included USAA, Hartford, Swiss Re, Munich Re, Liberty Mutual, SCOR, Hannover Re, Allianz and Tokio Marine & Fire.

To date, all direct catastrophe bond investors have been institutional investors since all broadly distributed transactions have been distributed in that format. These have included specialized catastrophe bond funds, hedge funds, investment advisors (money managers), life insurers, reinsurers, pension funds and others. Individual investors have generally purchased such securities through specialized funds.

Examples of investment banks and other dealers that are active in the issuance of catastrophe bonds are ABN Amro, Aon Capital Markets, Deutsche Bank, BNP Paribas, Goldman Sachs, MMC Securities Corp., Lehman Brothers, Willis Capital Markets, and Swiss Re Capital Markets. Some of these groups also make secondary markets in these bonds. Most bond offering documents include an expert modeling analysis, with the bulk of these being prepare by AIR, EQEcat and Risk Management Solutions.

Numerous law firms have been active in this space, notably Cadwalader, Wickersham & Taft LLP.

[edit] Patents

There are a number of issued US patents and pending US patent applications related to catastrophe bonds.[1] These are examples of insurance patents. Insurance patents are a recent trend since the 1998 State Street Bank decision affirmed that business method patents were allowed by United States patent law. There are approximately 150 new patent applications filed each year on new insurance products and processes. [2]

[edit] References

[edit] External links

1. IQPC's 2nd Insurance Linked Securities Summit

2. General information website on insurance securitizations (by Okubo)

3. Article "Applications of Insurance Securitization" (UChicago Business School)

4. Article on Insurance Derivatives (by Alex Krutov)

5. Presentation by Diego Rangel

6. Mad scramble for capital fuels cat bond market

7. Conference on Insurance- and Risk-Linked Securities (the Bond Markets Association)

8. In Nature's Casino (by Michael Lewis)

[edit] See also

Catastrophe modeling

Fixed income

Reinsurance

Risk management

•Reinsurance Sidecar

Captive insurance

Alternative Risk Transfer

Retrieved from http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Catastrophe_bond

Categories: Articles lacking sources from July 2007 | All articles lacking sources | Bonds | Offshore finance | Insurance | Types of insurance

By MICHAEL LEWIS

Published: August 26, 2007

It was Aug. 24, 2005, and New Orleans was still charming. Tropical Depression 12 was spinning from the Bahamas toward Florida, but the chances of an American city’s being destroyed by nature were remote, even for one below sea level. An entire industry of weather bookies — scientists who calculate the likelihood of various natural disasters — had in effect set the odds: a storm that destroys $70 billion of insured property should strike the United States only once every 100 years. New Orleanians had made an art form of ignoring threats far more likely than this; indeed, their carelessness was a big reason they were supposedly more charming than other Americans. And it was true: New Orleanians found pleasure even in oblivion. But in their blindness to certain threats, they could not have been more typically American. From Miami to San Francisco, the nation’s priciest real estate now faced beaches and straddled fault lines; its most vibrant cities occupied its most hazardous land. If, after World War II, you had set out to redistribute wealth to maximize the sums that might be lost to nature, you couldn’t have done much better than Americans had done. And virtually no one — not even the weather bookies — fully understood the true odds.

Skip to next paragraph

Sasha Bezzubov for The New York Times

Courting destruction in Palm Beach, Fla.

But there was an exception: an American so improbably prepared for the havoc Tropical Depression 12 was about to wreak that he might as well have planned it. His name was John Seo, he was 39 years old and he ran a hedge fund in Westport, Conn., whose chief purpose was to persuade investors to think about catastrophe in the same peculiar way that he did. He had invested nearly a billion dollars of other people’s money in buying what are known as “cat bonds.” The buyer of a catastrophe bond is effectively selling catastrophe insurance. He puts down his money and will lose it all if some specified bad thing happens within a predetermined number of years: a big hurricane hitting Miami, say, or some insurance company losing more than $1 billion on any single natural disaster. In exchange, the cat-bond seller — an insurance company looking to insure itself against extreme losses — pays the buyer a high rate of interest.

Whatever image pops to mind when you hear the phrase “hedge fund manager,” Seo (pronounced so) undermines it. On one hand, he’s the embodiment of what Wall Street has become: quantitative. But he’s quirky. Less interested in money and more interested in ideas than a Wall Street person is meant to be. He inherited not money but math. At the age of 14, in 1950, his mother fled North Korea on foot, walked through live combat, reached the United States and proceeded to become, reportedly, the first Korean woman ever to earn a Ph.D. in mathematics. His father, a South Korean, also came to the United States for his Ph.D. in math and became a professor of economic theory. Two of his three brothers received Ph.D.’s — one in biology, the other in electrical engineering. John took a physics degree from M.I.T. and applied to Harvard to study for his Ph.D. As a boy, he says, he conceived the idea that he would be a biophysicist, even though he didn’t really know what that meant, because, as he puts it, “I wanted to solve a big problem about life.” He earned his doctorate in biophysics from Harvard in three years, a department record.

His parents had raised him to think, but his thoughts were interrupted once he left Harvard. His wife was pregnant with their second child, and the health plan at Brandeis University, where he had accepted a job, declared her pregnancy a pre-existing condition. He had no money, his parents had no money, and so to cover the costs of childbirth, he accepted a temp job with a Chicago trading firm called O’Connor and Associates. O’Connor had turned a small army of M.I.T. scientists into options traders and made them rich. Seo didn’t want to be rich; he just wanted health insurance. To get it, he agreed to spend eight weeks helping O’Connor price esoteric financial options. When he was done, O’Connor offered him 40 grand and asked him to stay, at a starting salary of $250,000, 27 times his post-doc teaching salary. “Biophysics was starved for resources,” Seo says. “Finance was hurling resources at problems. It was almost as if I was taking it as a price signal. It was society’s way of saying, Please, will you start solving problems over here?”

His parents, he suspected, would be appalled. They had sacrificed a lot for his academic career. In the late 1980s, if you walked into the Daylight Donuts shop in Dallas, you would have found a sweet-natured Korean woman in her early 50s cheerfully serving up honey-glazed crullers: John’s mom. She had abandoned math for motherhood, and then motherhood for doughnuts, after her most promising son insisted on attending M.I.T. instead of S.M.U., where his tuition would have been free. She needed money, and she got it by buying this doughnut shop and changing the recipe so the glaze didn’t turn soggy. (Revenues tripled.) Whatever frustration she may have felt, she hid, as she did most of her emotions. But when John told her that he was leaving the university for Wall Street, she wept. His father, a hard man to annoy, said, “The devil has come to you as a prostitute and has asked you to lie down with her.”

A willingness to upset one’s mother is usually a promising first step to a conventional Wall Street career. But Seo soon turned Wall Street into his own private science lab, and his continued interest in deep questions mollified even his father. “Before he got into it, I strongly objected,” Tae Kun Seo says. “But now I think he’s not just grabbing money.” He has watched his son quit one firm to go to work for another, but never for a simple promotion; instead, John has moved to learn something new. Still, everywhere he goes, he has been drawn to a similar thorny problem: the right price to charge to insure against potential losses from extremely unlikely financial events. “Tail risk,” as it is known to quantitative traders, for where it falls in a bell-shaped probability curve. Tail risk, broadly speaking, is whatever financial cataclysm is believed by markets to have a 1 percent chance or less of happening. In the foreign-exchange market, the tail event might be the dollar falling by one-third in a year; in the bond market, it might be interest rates moving 3 percent in six months; in the stock market, it might be a 30 percent crash. “If there’s been a theme to John’s life,” says his brother Nelson, “it’s pricing tail.”
·

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http://www.nytimes.com/2007/08/26/magazine/26neworleans-t.html?_r=1&oref=slogin

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Benjamin_Spock



http://www.spiked-online.com/index.php?/site/reviewofbooks_

article/3630/

Benjamin McLane Spock (May 2, 1903March 15, 1998) was an American pediatrician whose book Baby and Child Care, published in 1946, is one of the biggest best-sellers of all time. Its revolutionary message to mothers was that "you know more than you think you do." Spock was the first pediatrician to study psychoanalysis to try to understand children's needs and family dynamics. His ideas about childcare influenced several generations of parents to be more flexible and affectionate with their children, and to treat them as individuals, whereas the previous conventional wisdom had been that child rearing should focus on building discipline, and that, e.g., babies should not be "spoiled" by picking them up when they cried.

Benjamin Spock

Spock with his granddaughter, Susannah, in 1967
Born May 2, 1903(1903-05-02)
New Haven, Connecticut
Died March 15, 1998 (aged 94)
La Jolla, California
Nationality American
Fields Pediatrics


Political involvement

In 1962, Spock joined The Committee for a Sane Nuclear Policy, otherwise known as SANE. Spock was politically outspoken and active in the movement to end the Vietnam War. In 1968, he and four others (including William Sloane Coffin) were singled[citation needed] out for prosecution by then Attorney General Ramsey Clark on charges of conspiracy to counsel, aid, and abet resistance to the draft. Spock and three of his alleged co-conspirators were convicted, although the five had never been in the same room together. His two-year prison sentence was never served; the case was appealed and in 1969 a federal court set aside his conviction.

In 1967, Spock was to be nominated as Martin Luther King, Jr.'s vice-presidential running mate at the National Conference for New Politics over Labor Day weekend in Chicago. According to William F. Pepper's Orders to Kill, however, the conference was broken up by agents provocateurs working for the government.

Spock was the People's Party candidate in the 1972 United States presidential election with a platform that called for free medical care, the repeal of "victimless crime" laws, including the legalization of abortion, homosexuality, and marijuana, a guaranteed minimum income for families and the immediate withdrawal of all American troops from foreign countries.[4] In the 1970s and 1980s, Spock demonstrated and gave lectures against nuclear weapons and cuts in social welfare programs.

In 1972, Spock, Julius Hobson (his Vice Presidential candidate), Linda Jenness (Socialist Workers Party Presidential candidate), and Socialist Workers Party Vice Presidential candidate Andrew Pulley wrote to Major General Bert A. David, commanding officer of Fort Dix, asking for permission to distribute campaign literature and to hold an election-related campaign meeting. On the basis of Fort Dix regulations 210-26 and 210-27, General David refused the request. Spock, Hobson, Jenness, Pulley, and others then filed a case that ultimately made its way to the United States Supreme Court (424 U.S. 828 -- Greer, Commander, Fort Dix Military Reservation, et al., v. Spock et al), which ruled against the plaintiffs.

424 U.S. 828:[5]

Election results:[6]

See also an interview in The Libertarian Forum, December 1972. The Libertarian is largely favorable to Spock's views as being pro-libertarian. http://www.mises.org/journals/lf/1972/1972_12.pdf

[edit] Views on gender

Spock embraced women's and girls' equality relatively early. Editions of Baby and Child Care issued in the mid-1970s were edited to refer to babies and children as "she" about half the time. This was a departure from the norm at that time. Especially among established authors of Spock's age, there was still a strong school of thought claiming that the pronoun "he" was correct for all persons unless speaking of a specific female or female matters. Spock's book was the first major/mainstream book to abandon that view and usage.[citation needed]


Dr Benjamin Spock and Mary
Morgan aboard one of their boats.
(Photo used with kind permission
of Mary Morgan.)

Mary Morgan

Mary Morgan was born Mary Morgan Wright in Searcy, Arkansas, on 27 November 1943. She was raised in Bald Knob, Arkansas, and attended Hendrix College, where she majored in mathematics. Later she taught in Little Rock’s Central High School.

She worked in the Department of Psychiatry at the University of Arkansas Medical School as programme coordinator for continuing education. This is when she met Dr Spock, when he came to speak in Little Rock on the need for free, good-quality medical care for all Americans. A nurse said that she would ‘cook me a spaghetti dinner’ if Morgan joined her at the talk.

Morgan invited Dr Spock to give a workshop on the ‘Uses and Abuses of Power’ in 1970 in San Francisco, where she had moved. She met Dr Spock at San Francisco airport with a dozen roses, and they were not separated for the next 25 years. She wrote his memoirs Spock on Spock in 1985 for Patheon.

They were arrested many times together for their various demonstrations against the Vietnam War and nuclear power plants. They lived on boats most of their lives together: one boat in Maine in the summer, and another boat in the British Virgin Islands in the winter. Dr Spock wrote more during this 25-year period than any other time of his life. They enjoyed a life of travel when they were off the boats.

After Dr Spock’s death in 1998, Morgan founded the Dr Spock Company, and built the DrSpock.com website. She found a co-author, Dr Robert Needlman at University Hospitals in Cleveland, and revised Dr Spock’s Baby and Child Care, published by Pocket Books. She took up surfing in Santa Cruz and swims in California, and is passionate about her poetry.

Dr Spock’s legacy lives on with his latest edition of Baby and Child Care, and the website. Also Morgan presented the Dr Spock Award of Compassion in Washington, DC in April this year.

Date: Sat, 17 Mar 2007 03:39:42 -0700 (PDT)
From:"mamta dhodykalra"
Subject: Should Insurance save savers from banker's follies?
To:robhopal@uiic.co.in, rochandigarh@uiic.co.in, rochennai@uiic.co.in, rocoimbatore@uiic.co.in, roguwahati@uiic.co.in, rohubli@uiic.co.in, rohyderabad@uiic.co.in, rojaipur@uiic.co.in, rokochi@uiic.co.in, rokolkota@uiic.co.in, rolucknow@uiic.co.in, roludhiana@uiic.co.in, romadurai@uiic.co.in, romumbai1@uiic.co.in, romumbai2@uiic.co.in, ronagpur@uiic.co.in, ronewdelhi1@uiic.co.in, ronewdelhi2@uiic.co.in, ropatna@uiic.co.in, ropune@uiic.co.in, rovadodara@uiic.co.in, rovizag@uiic.co.in, grievance@uiic.co.in, roahmedabad@uiic.co.in, robangalore@uiic.co.in

HTML Attachment [ Scan and Save to Computer ]

TO,
CHAIRMAN CUM MANAGING DIRECTOR,
UNITED INDIA INSURANCE CO.LIMITED,
24,WHITES ROAD,MADRAS-600014.
Should Insurance save savers from banker's follies?
APRIL 7-1990.
Reference pages 52-58-THE ECONOMIST -A SURVEY OF INTERNATIONAL BANKING.
STATE BANKS INSTITUTE OF INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATION MANAGEMENT.
OPEN ATTACHMENTS FOR FULL ARTICLE.
MAMTA DHODY KALRA
1513,OUTRAM LANE ,
MUKHERJEE NAGAR,
DELHI-9

http://delhigovt.nic.in/bioaslovely.asp

Shri Arvinder Singh Lovely
HON'BLE MINISTER OF EDUCATION & TOURISM, LANGUAGES,
GURDWARA ELECTIONS & GURDWARA ADMINISTRATION



Shri Arvinder Singh Lovely, s/o Balvinder Singh, was born on 11.12.1968. He has done his graduation from Delhi University in Political Science. While he was in the college he was elected to Students' Union of SGTB Khalsa College (Morning ). It was during his college life he was actively involved with various social organizations.

He was appointed General Secretary, Delhi Pradesh Youth Congress in the year 1990 and during the year 1992-1996, he was appointed General Secretary of All India NSUI.

For the first time in 1998 he was elected to Delhi Legislative Assembly. As MLA he was not only actively associated with the formulation of several Govt. Policies but, also engaged with several social and academic organizations. He was also entrusted with the responsibility of the Chairman of Bhimrao Ambedkar College, Delhi. It is because of his excellent track record as MLA, he was given Best legislative Award for the year 2000. He was appointed Gen. Secretary, Delhi Pradesh Congress Committee in 2000, and President, East District Congress Committee (I).

In the year 2003, he was re-elected to Delhi Legislative Assembly by getting 73.53 % of the total number of polled votes, which is the highest among all the 70 constituencies of Delhi Legislative Assembly. For the first time he has given the responsibilities of Education, Tourism, Languages, Gurdwara Election & Gurdwara Administration Minister, in the Council of Ministers of Govt. of Delhi.

LAW AND JUDICIARY,RAMRAJYA AMERICA AND RUSSIA,POLITICIANS OF DAYANAND AND BRITAIN AND 13TH SAMSKARA OF MARRIAGE OF HINDUS


































































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Booking the Bourgeoisie:

The Niyogi Murder Trial

C.N. Subramaniam

Comrade Shankar Guha Niyogi, the popular trade union leader of Chattisgarh, was murdered in his sleep on the night of 27th September 1991. After preliminary investigation by the police of Madhya Pradesh state, the case was handed over to the Central Bureau of Investigation (CBI). The Chattisgarh Mines Shramik Sangh (CMMS) and the Chattisgarh Mukti Morcha (CMM) whose leader Niyogi had been have charged that the leading industrialists of Bhilai, Moolchand Shah, Chandrakant Shah, Naveen Shah of the Simplex and allied group of industries and other industrialists like Kedia of Kedia Distilleries were behind the murder. Chandrakant Shah was arrested but he escaped from police custody from a hospital. After 2 years the person alleged to have committed the murder was apprehended in Uttar Pradesh. The CBI charge-sheeted Moolchand Shah, Naveen Shah and Chandrakant Shah, a few of their henchmen and the hired assassin, Paltan Mallah. Initially the trial was held in camera for fear of the sentiments of the workers. Under sustained pressure from the workers and legal action by the union the trial was made public and thereafter was attended by a large number of workers in every sitting.

The trial court after examining all witnesses and hearing all the arguments convicted Moolchand Shah, Chandrakant Shah, Naveen Shah, besides Gyan Prakash Mishra, Avdhesh Rai Abhai Singh and Paltan Mallah. Paltan Mallah who actually committed the murder was sentenced to death while the others who conspired and masterminded the crime were given life sentences and fined.

This was the first time in history that a conspiracy by capitalists to kill a trade union leader was established in a court of law and the capitalists were convicted. As such it marks a milestone in the working class history, especially in the legal aspects of the labour movement.

As was to be expected the convicted appealed in the High Court. Here again in a departure from convention K.G. Kannabiran - a leading civil right activist lawyer with known sympathies for the workers' and peasants' movements was commissioned by the CBI to argue the prosecution's case. After going through the arguments the High Court set aside the judgement of the lower court in toto for want of sufficient evidence.

The matter is now with the Supreme Court.

In the following pages we will examine the case in greater detail and discuss some of the issues it throws for the working class movement.

The Importance of the Niyogi Murder Trial

Niyogi was not the first or the last trade unionist to be murdered. His murder was in fact followed by the murder of another popular unionist of Bombay, Dr. Datta Samant. Subsequently another labour leader of Madhya Pradesh, from Maihar, was killed. While it does not take much investigative skill to come to the surmise that the affected capitalists engineer the murders it is seldom or never possible to actually 'prove it beyond reasonable doubt' in court as per bourgeois laws. Such conspiracies are hatched in secrecy, by word of mouth and the act of conspiring is usually far removed from the act of crime both in time and place. Further the professional killers who are hired for the purpose seldom know of or meet those who ultimately finance them. As such it is next to impossible to prove the role of the capitalists' 'beyond reasonable doubt'. This has effectively enabled capitalists to get away with using individual terror to remove active labour leaders or intimidate them. At best it is the hired assassin who is nabbed and punished and never the mastermind behind the crime.

In other words the present legal framework is highly inadequate to book and punish capitalists indulging in terror tactics and the physical liquidation of labour leaders. It is therefore necessary to break new ground without at the same time compromising the principle of the democratic rights of the accused persons. It is in this context that the Niyogi murder trial assumes great importance.

At the trial court the prosecution marshalled much evidence to support its case though as we shall see it did leave a few stones unturned in the case. The credit for breaking new ground really goes to the judge Sh. T.K. Jha who creatively interpreted the law in the difficult situation. We must also recognise the important role played by thousands who attended the trial sessions and effectively conveyed to the judge what the jury of the working people thought of the case. Their presence added considerable weight to the prosecution's case.

The Prosecution's Case

The prosecution built its case against the accused capitalists on the following basis:

(I.) The struggle under Niyogi's leadership of the workers of the factories owned by the capitalists had caused serious loss to them and therefore they had a motive in seeing him dead. (II.) They had adopted extra-legal terror tactics to combat the growing power of the union - and the murder was a logical follow-up. (III.) They had closely monitored the movements of Niyogi with an intent to attack him. (IV.) Shortly before his death Niyogi had gathered information that his life was in serious danger from them and he had said so to a journalist of national standing and also recorded his apprehension in a tape-recorded message to his comrades. (V.) The alleged hired assassin had implicated them in his extra-judicial confessions. (VI.) The behaviour of the accused -absconding and escaping from custody indicated their involvement in the crime.

We shall take each of these points by quoting extensively from the judgement of the trial court.

I. The judgement says,

'When deceased Niyogi came to Bhilai in 1990 and began agitation of workers there the Simplex Group had been most affected. The largest number of members of CMM had been dismissed by the Simplex Group. Civil suits were filed on behalf of Simplex Industry in which it was stated that due to the strike of Shankar Guha Niyogi this industry was having lakhs of rupees of loss...

'The accused Moolchand Shah was not even prepared to accept the demand letter of CMM...

'This accused had not gone to the meetings called by the Assistant Labour Commissioner for the resolution of the labour problem.' (Para 498-500).

'This agitation by Niyogi had become as unbearable to the Simplex group as the scorching midday sun in summer and ultimately they got the accused Paltan who by murdering Niyogi .. proved to be a source of solace.' (Para 9).

The judgement established the fact that Niyogi and CMM were trying to regularise the employment of the workers and to ensure a 'living wage' for them and to win for them the freedom to organize. It is these that the Simplex Group was most disturbed about and fought tooth and nail to resist. Further, knowing that any serious participation in tripartite negotiations leading to resolution of the issue would legitimise and strengthen the union the Shahs avoided such negotiations as far as possible.

Instead they sought to intimidate the workers through extra-legal means. To quote the judgement again, 'during the movement the industrialists started sponsoring murderous attacks on the workers of CMM.' (Para 6).

The prosecution sought to establish though somewhat tenuously that the Shahs were behind the attacks on several union leaders like Umashankar Rai and had planned attacks on others like Bharat Bhushan Pandey.

Moolchand Shah had with him the addresses of Umashankar Rai and Bharat Bhushan Pandey, who had been attacked or had formally expressed apprehension of an attack to the police.

An important evidence in the case was a confidential note found at Moolchand Shah's place on how to combat Niyogi and the CMM. It outlines several strategies to be followed simultaneously in order to discredit Niyogi personally, foster rival unions, implicate union leaders in false cases and demoralisation of union members. However it does not mention any plan to kill Niyogi and takes care not to outline any openly extra-legal measures. Nevertheless when one reads the document in conjunction with the actual conduct of the capitalists it is clear that they were keen to achieve the objectives through a combination of legal and extra-legal measures. The note even if it does not reveal any criminal intent is clear in setting out the objective of decimating the trade union movement led by Niyogi.

The prosecution further tried to establish the fact that the industrialists were keenly following the movements of the union leaders especially Niyogi. A piece of paper containing the registration number of the car used by Niyogi was found with the accused industrialist. While this in itself may be innocuous seen along with the other developments this assumes some significance. The industrialists were certainly trying to keep track of Niyogi's movements.

The most crucial evidence produced by the prosecution was the apprehension repeatedly expressed by Niyogi during the last week of his life and even a few hours before he was murdered.

The judgement of the trial court reads, 'In the afternoon of 27-9-91 Niyogi had told the journalist N.K. Singh (of India Today - CNS) that the industrialists of Bhilai have organised a private army and used their goondas to crush the worker's movement. He had also said that the Shahs of Simplex wanted to get him killed.' He had expressed similar apprehension to Rajendra Sail a few hours before his murder.

Niyogi had also recorded a message during these days for his comrades in case he was killed. He said, 'I know these people are after my life. I know it well that .... they shall kill me. Yet I know that by killing me no one can finish our movement.' Thereafter he specifically names, 'the people of Simplex' especially Moolchand Shah, Prabhnath Mishra, a friend of Shantilal Jain, Kedia. 'My belief is that Moolchand Shah and Kedia .. only are at this time behind all the conspiracies... And therefore I am getting my-heart felt feelings taped because perhaps very soon something is going to happen.' The prosecution wanted this statement to be treated as the dying declaration of Niyogi.

This was no empty demagogy or a generalised fear as Niyogi elsewhere had pointed out that the industrialists were preparing for a major violent offensive and he was sure of an impending attack. He had noted in his diary the information that Gyan Prakash had received 5 lakhs from Simplex to purchase firearms and hire some goondas from Siwan district. In this connection he mentions the names of Chandrakant Shah, Awadhesh and others. A few weeks before the attack he had met the President of India and expressed his apprehensions. He repeated it to N.K. Singh twice during the interview on the day of his death and had been warning his close associates too. All this clearly indicates that he had definite information that these named industrialists were planning to liquidate him and other leaders of CMM. These statements of Niyogi were also accepted by the trial court as implicating the industrialists.

The clinching evidence against the industrialists was the non-judicial confession made by the alleged assassin Paltan Mallah to his relatives. While he was in hiding after the murder of Niyogi he had told his relatives that he had murdered Niyogi for money and that the Shah brothers- Moolchand, Navin and Chandrakant were behind this. Paltan Mallah had fled from Bhilai and was on the run in Uttar Pradesh and Nepal for 2 years after the crime. He was apprehended on some other charges and it became known that he was wanted in the Niyogi case. The country-made firearm with which he had killed Niyogi and the motorcycle he had used in the act were recovered from the homes of his relatives. Some of his relatives deposed that he had confessed his crime to them and requested them to protect him from the police. In the court Paltan stoutly denied that the arms were recovered from him and that he had made any confessional statement to his relatives. The trial court rejected his pleas in this regard.

The prosecution also cited two more grounds for implicating Chandrakant Shah. Firstly it was firmly established that at the height of the labour movement he had gone along with Gyan Prakash, Avdesh Rai, and Abhay Singh to Nepal. The motive seems to have been to purchase arms illegally to combat the movement. Niyogi was eventually killed with a country-made firearm but nevertheless the Nepal visit was a part of the attempt at illegal stockpiling of arms for an attack on the union activists. Secondly Chandrakant Shah shortly after the murder of Niyogi once the suspicion of the police turned on one of his accomplices fled Bhilai in his vehicle and travelled from town to town and stayed in hotels under false names. He also abandoned his vehicle with blood stains to give the impression that the police had killed him. All this was taken to confirm his criminal intent at dodging investigations.

The trial court after going through all this evidence decided that indeed the industrialists of Bhilai were behind the murder of Niyogi. They were duly awarded life terms and a fine of 10 lakh rupees.

As can be seen from the above, on a number of points the prosecution was on weak grounds. Indeed each piece of evidence seen separately could be seen to be innocuous or doubtful. However given the difficulty in proving such conspiracies and by seeing all the evidences in conjunction with each other the conclusion that the said industrialists conspired to kill Niyogi could not be escaped.

In this the trial court was influenced by the conviction that Niyogi and his union were fighting for the legitimate rights of the workers and the industrialists were trying to deny workers their legitimate dues by hook or crook. 'Thus the industrialists were not prepared to give their workers a place of equality and situation of class struggle was created' (para 353).

It was this conviction strengthened by the presence of workers in the trial proceedings that led the judge to piece together the evidence the way he did.

'Deceased Shankar Guha Niyogi was a labour leader of national stature. He was brutally murdered only because of leading the labour movement in Bhilai.' (Para 595).Further, 'Niyogi had done a lot for the education and health of the children of workers. He had linked his labour movement to Social Reform. The accused ... by murdering Niyogi not only harmed his family but has hurt the human feelings of thousands of workers who form the foundation of our society.' (Para 614).

The High Court Judgement

This is in sharp contrast to the attitude of the High Court which set aside the above judgement. Para 39 of its judgement reads as follows, 'Evidence given by police officers... as well as copies of plaints... only show that Niyogi was creating trouble for the Simplex Group.' 'Accused Moolchand Shah was resisting him in a lawful manner by starting legal proceedings.' (Para 103). There is little wonder that the High Court should arrive at a diametrically opposite conclusion about the case. In this way it outrightly rejected the foundation upon which the trial court's judgement rested.

About the confidential note on combatting Niyogi the high court says, it 'reaffirms that .... rival trade unions be given importance, that the criminal cases pending against Niyogi in different courts be pursued and that the foreign link of Niyogi be traced and published....This too rules out that there was a scheme to physically eliminate him.'The court completely ignores the evidences gathered about the attitude of the management to the legitimate demands of the workers' union.

The High Court further rejected the apprehensions of Niyogi on what clearly appear to be specious grounds. Regarding the diary entry it says, 'evidently this entry contains allegations about some persons hired from Siwan district. It also says that the plot was foiled. It is also significant that accused Paltan has nothing to do with Siwan district and has not been named in this diary.' (Para 106). The important point about the diary entry was not that it was indicating who the assassin was but about the plans of the industrialists to engage in an armed offensive.

Regarding the apprehensions expressed in the tape-recorded message and the interview to NK Singh it says, 'It also names Simplex and Kedia as the persons behind the conspiracy against him. We agree that nothing turns on these documents ... if Niyogi had apprehensions from the Shahs of Simplex, he had also expressed the same fear from other industrialists also...' (para 110-114). In other words the apprehensions of Niyogi that the industrialists of Bhilai especially the Shahs were planning to get him killed were set aside simply on the ground that he had felt that he was under threat from Kedia besides the Shahs.

Similarly the court takes up each piece of evidence gathered examines it in isolation and dismisses it as 'not incriminating'. The High Court also refused to accept the prosecution's plea regarding Paltan Mallah and concluded that he was being framed by the CBI, that the instrument of crime (a country-made pistol) was not recovered from him and that he had not made any confession at all. Likewise it also concluded that his alleged statement implicating the industrialists was concocted by the CBI. It also rejected the evidence of the ballistic expert that the instrument recovered from Paltans' relatives' house was the same as the one with which Niyogi was fired at.

In Conclusion

As we had pointed out earlier the evidence that could be gathered against the industrialists could not be foolproof or absolutely convincing. Yet given the circumstances it did indicate a very strong possibility of the complicity of the named industrialists in the murder of Niyogi. The strength of the prosecution lay in establishing the motive for the crime, the previous build up for criminal assault on the union leaders and Niyogi's consequent apprehension stated and recorded in various ways. It also managed to establish as far as it was possible the evidence for the industrialists' complicity in the crime. This evidence may not have been strong enough but has to be seen in conjunction with the other factors established fairly clearly.

It would seem from the above that given the present frame of criminal law industrialists can get away with murder of union leaders and more with a little care. It is therefore likely to encourage more such acts of violence against the labour movement. It is therefore imperative for the trade union movement across the country to exert pressure on the judiciary to force it to redefine criminal law in regard to violence against trade unionists. To a modest degree this was achieved by the working class of Chattisgarh when the trial court judge in effect accepted the substantial arguments of the CMM. However much more concerted pressure at the national level is necessary to build judicial precedents. Secondly it also demonstrates the need for the trade union movement to build an intelligence network of its own to conduct investigations and build strong cases against the criminal industrialists and their hirelings.

Click here to return to the April 1999 index.

www.sacw.net | 8 February 2005

India: Niyogi Murder Trial

CHRONICLE OF A MURDER ACQUITTAL FORETOLD

by Rakesh Shukla

In a recent decision, the Supreme Court acquitted Moolchand Shah owner of

Simplex industries and Chandrakant Shah owner of Oswal Iron and Steel

Private Ltd in the Shankar Guha Niyogi murder case. The wheels of justice

having ground have spewed forth the conviction of Palton Mallah for the

murder. Palton is a young man from Gorakhpur involved in petty crime in the

Bhilai region. He had neither any connection nor any animosity towards

Niyogi. Palton was the hired killer. No one has even remotely suggested any

reason why Palton Mallah acting on his own should kill Niyogi. The

conviction of the two industrialists by the trial court appears to be the

only appears to be the only instance of the punishment of someone powerful

for the murder of a social crusader fighting for the exploited.

Niyogi known for his brilliant combination of struggle with constructive

work, was shot dead at Bhilai in Chattisgarh on September 28, 1991. In an

audio tape discovered within days of his assassination by his children,

Niyogi named Moolchand Shah, Kailashpati Kedia of the Chattisgarh

Distelleries and an IG of police as persons conspiring to eliminate him. The

"contract killing" of Niyogi was ordered because he was organizing the

contract workers and demanding implementation of labour laws. The first

charter of demands submitted by Niyogi to Simplex asked for work an

eight-hour working day, regularization of contract work for work of a

permanent nature, living wages, safety appliances, medical and earned leave.

The industrialists reacted by dismissing 4,200 workers. In addition, attacks

were launched on workers by hired thugs.

As per a document seized from the house of Moolchand Shah, an "action plan

tocombat Niyogi" was formulated. Pressure was brought to bear and in

February 1991 Niyogi was arrested. In July 1991, proceedings to extern

Niyogi from Chattisgarh were initiated. However, both these attempts failed

to check the workers movement. This failure of the arrest and externment

seems to have led to the conspiracy which resulted in Niyogi's

assassination. On the basis of ballistic evidence, incriminating documents,

extra-judicial confessions, witnesses, Niyogi's cassette and diaries, the

trial court convicted Moolchand Shah, Chandrakant Shah, the hired assassin

Palton Mallah and three others of murder.

The audio tape and entries in the diary by Niyogi naming individuals

responsible for his death have been taken by the apex court to be of no

particular relevance on the specious reasoning that they "do not refer to an

event which ultimately was the cause of his death". Under Article 32(1) of

the Evidence Act in addition to statements as to cause of death even

statements "as to any of the circumstances of the transaction which resulted

in his death" are also relevant facts in case the person is dead. The

cassette in Niyogi's voice and entries in the diary do indicate

circumstances of the transaction which led to his murder.

Visit to Nepal to for purchase of firearms evidenced by entries of foreign

made firearms on the back of old hotel bills have also been held to not

further the conspiracy on the ground that, "No bills proving purchase of

foreign-made weapons were recovered from any of these accused persons".

There is little chance that a purchase of firearms in Nepal to commit a

killing in India would be accompanied by bills proving purchase.

Watching the movements of a person to work out the best time and opportunity

to eliminate him seems to be something of a standard operating procedure for

assassinations. Recovery of slips from the accused bearing the registration

of the car and jeep being used by Niyogi indicating surveillance by them

have been discarded with a bald, "We are not able to attach any further

importance to these documents". Similarly recovery of a letter from one of

the accused on the day of the murder to another accused stating that Rs

20,000/- had been paid for the job has been held to show that there was

"some money transaction betweenthe second accused and the sixth accused" and

not in any way establishing that it was "consideration for the illegal act

carried out at the instance of the second accused".

The award, as part payment for the assassination, of the contract of a

parking stand in Maurya Talkies has been held to be innocuous. Even

absconding by the accused, generally taken as a sign of guilt, has been

explained away as understandable in view of the murder of a trade union

leader and allegations against the industrialists. Observing that

extra-judicial confession by Palton Mallah naming the industrialists has

only corroborative value, the Court declaring that there is no substantive

evidence acquitted the main persons responsible for the murder.

In a case of circumstantial evidence, there is no direct evidence of

eye-witnesses to the murder. It is the weaving together of the factum of

financial loss due to agitations led by Niyogi, the watching of his

movements, the trip to Nepal to purchase firearms, the audio cassette and

entries in the diary naming individuals, payment of Rs 20,000/- and the

absconding taken together which do seem to establish a conspiracy as held by

the trial court.

The workers of Chattisgarh have struggled for decades for the rights that

are theirs as per the laws of the land. The acquittal of the industrialists

is far more than a verdict in a criminal case of murder. Faith in the rule

of law and the direction of the struggles of the workers is bound to be

impacted by the judgement.

Return to the The South Asia Labour Activists Library > www.sacw.net

GANGARAM HOSPITAL-DELHI
http://www.sgrh.com/
Multi-Organ Transplantation
Psychiatry (Mental problems)

Dr. I. C. Sethi

K P Singh, Chairman, DLF Group. Photograph courtesy: DLF

His plan leaked and he was summoned. The colonel in charge




DPM, MD


Retired Consultant

Department of Psychiatry

Medical School: Grant Medial College, Bombay (DPM)

Special Training: National Institute of Mental Health and Neurosciences (MD)

Interests: Geriatric psychiatry

Residence:

G-62, Sector 25

Noida - 201301

Tel: 95120-2442505

Mobile: 9810728658

Email: sarojsethi1@rediffmail@com


Fax: 95120-2535388

Private OPD: Mon-Sat

12 noon-2 pm

Second Clinic: G-62, Sector 25

Noida - 201301

Tel: 91-4535388

91-4442505

Timings: 7-9 pm

Mon-Sat

http://www.dlf.in/wps/portal/DLFCity?jspName=aboutus/chairmans_profile

The DLF Group was founded in 1946. We developed some of the first residential

colonies in Delhi such as Krishna Nagar in East Delhi, which was completed in 1949.

Since then we have been responsible for the development of many of Delhi’s other

well known urban colonies, including South Extension, Greater Kailash, Kailash

Colony and Hauz Khas.

Following the passage of the Delhi Development Act in 1957, the state assumed

control of real estate development activities in Delhi, which resulted in restrictions

on private real estate colony development. We therefore commenced acquiring land

at relatively low cost outside the area controlled by the Delhi Development Authority,

particularly in the district of Gurgaon in the adjacent state of Haryana.

This led to our first landmark real estate development project –

DLF Qutab Enclave, which has now evolved into DLF City. DLF City is spread

over 3,000 acres in Gurgaon and is an integrated township, which includes

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with schools, hospitals, hotels and shopping malls. It also boasts of the

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Born on August 15, 1931, at Bulandshahar in Uttar Pradesh, Mr. K. P.

Singh comes from a family of successful landlords and lawyers. After

graduating in Science from Meerut College, he went to UK to pursue higher

studies in Aeronautical Engineering. Along the line, Mr. Singh got selected

to the prestigious Indian Army, by British Officers services Selection Board, UK.

Subsequently, he joined the Indian Military Academy at Dehradun.

He thereafter was commissioned into The Deccan Horse- a renowned cavalry

regiment of The Indian Army. In the year 1960, he joined American Universal

Electric Company, a joint venture between Universal Electric Company of Owosso,

Michigan and the Singh family. Subsequently, he promoted another company, i.e.

Willard India Limited in collaboration with ESB inc of Philadelphia for manufacturing

automatic and industrial batteries in India and became its Managing Director.

In the year 1979, he joined DLF Universal Limited. American Universal Company

merged with DLF Universal Limited and Mr. Singh became the Managing

Director of this new company. Today, the Group has established a national

position as a comprehensive and optimum value solution provider

combining high-end technology, design and aesthetics in order to meet its

customer aspirations across the residential, commercial and retail segments

the real estate industry

http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/
shows/binladen/
who/family.html
Posted by : mamtaomsharan ( 29:05:2004 11:46 ) | Post a reply to this message
Topic : SEBI CHIEF’S INNOVATION AND REGULATION ON THE UNBRIDLED FOREIGN INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS-REFERENCE-ET

SEBI CHIEF’S INNOVATION AND REGULATION ON THE UNBRIDLED FOREIGN INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS-REFERENCE-ET
REFERENCE-ET-TUESDAY-25TH MAY 2004.PG.4
THE TENDENCY OF THE FOREIGN INVESTORS TO CONTROL THE MARKET HAS SEEN A CRASH IN THE STOCKMARKET WHICH SHOULD NOT AS A RULE FORM THE BACKBONE OF INDIAN ECONOMY..FIIS ARE PITTED AGAINST THE FDIS IN THE INNOVATION SUGGESTED BELOW TO THE BETTERMENT OF THE FDIS(FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTORS) WHO ARE FINDING A COZY CORNER BOTH IN THE STATE OF
PUNJAB AND OUR FINANCE SUPREMO –P CHINTABHARAM JI.
ANY COMPANY WHICH TAKES OUT A PUBLIC ISSUE OF EACH SHARE OF RS.100 ,USUALLY EITHER BUYS FROM THE MARKET LATER ON TO EARN OUT OF ITS OWN SHARES OR MAINTAINS ITS OWN MUTUAL FUND/FINANCE /PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT COMPANIES ALONG WITH ALLIED BROKERS AND PROFIT SHARING FIIS TO CONTROL ITS PRICE IN THE MARKET.HOWEVER WITH THE UNBRIDLED FLOW OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT NOWADAYS MANY COMPANIES WILL LOSE DRASTICALLY ON THEIR PORTFOLIOS IF THERE IS NO STRIDENT MARKET REGULATOR FROM SEBI BENEFITING THE FDIS AND DOMESTIC INDUSTRY SHARES.the brokers commission should increase with the increase in the price of the shares and decrease with the decrease in the price of the shares .sbi life is already a subsidiary of fdi.
THE SUGGESTED REMEDIAL MEASURE IS THAT FOR EVERY SHARE OF RS.100 WHICH CROSSES THE RS.140 MARK ON TRADING SHOULD MAKE IT MANDATORY FOR THE BROKER WHO SUPPOSE EARNS A COMMISSION OF RS.4 ON THE TRANSACTION TO PAY RS.1 TO THE PARENT COMPANY AS PROFIT ON ITS SHARE.THAT IS WITH A 40% INCREASE IN THE PRICE OF SUPPOSE JINDAL POWER SHARE ,THE BROKER TRADING ON THE SHARE WILL GIVE A PART OF HIS PROFIT TO JINDAL POWER AND A REGULATOR TO EVERY TRANSACTION WILL CREDIT THE SAME MONEY INTO JINDAL POWERS ACCOUNT.THAT IS ALONG WITH BUYING SHARES OF ONES OWN COMPANY FOR PROFIT ANY INDIAN COMPANY WILL ALSO GAIN WHEN ITS SHARE CROSSES 40% PROFIT MARK.HOWEVER THIS GAIN WILL COME UNDER STRICT TAXATION FOR THE COMPANY AND REBATE FOR THE BROKER DOING THE TRANSACTION.THAT IS FOR A RS.4 PROFIT BY THE BROKER RS.1 WILL GO THE PARENT COMPANY AND THIS WILL EARN HIM TAX REBATE OF .50P.IN ONE RUPPEE HE WILL LOSE .50P AND GAIN TAX REBATE OF .50P.,IN EACH RUPPEE THAT HE CREDITS TO THE PARENT COMPANY.HOWEVER THESE TRANSACTIONS WILL NEED A VERY UPDATED SOFTWARE AND STRIDENT MARKET REGULATION .THESE MEASURES ARE HOWEVER ONLY FOR PROFITS,and totally journalistic and research oriented.
When osama was used by the pentagon to dismantle a 1943 building ,he was actually helping
America to to build a totally new modern warfare arsenal including the latest computer technology satellite dhobi syndrome especially for India and making the insurance companies pay for it.
MAMTA DHODY KALRA,
1513,OUTRAM LANE,
MUKHERJEE NAGAR,
DELHI-110009.

Topic : SEBI CHIEF’S INNOVATION AND REGULATION ON THE UNBRIDLED FOREIGN INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS-REFERENCE-ET

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Tree view | Message No. : 12195

SEBI CHIEF’S INNOVATION AND REGULATION ON THE UNBRIDLED FOREIGN INSTITUTIONAL INVESTORS-REFERENCE-ET
REFERENCE-ET-TUESDAY-25TH MAY 2004.PG.4
THE TENDENCY OF THE FOREIGN INVESTORS TO CONTROL THE MARKET HAS SEEN A CRASH IN THE STOCKMARKET WHICH SHOULD NOT AS A RULE FORM THE BACKBONE OF INDIAN ECONOMY..FIIS ARE PITTED AGAINST THE FDIS IN THE INNOVATION SUGGESTED BELOW TO THE BETTERMENT OF THE FDIS(FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTORS) WHO ARE FINDING A COZY CORNER BOTH IN THE STATE OF
PUNJAB AND OUR FINANCE SUPREMO –P CHINTABHARAM JI.
ANY COMPANY WHICH TAKES OUT A PUBLIC ISSUE OF EACH SHARE OF RS.100 ,USUALLY EITHER BUYS FROM THE MARKET LATER ON TO EARN OUT OF ITS OWN SHARES OR MAINTAINS ITS OWN MUTUAL FUND/FINANCE /PORTFOLIO MANAGEMENT COMPANIES ALONG WITH ALLIED BROKERS AND PROFIT SHARING FIIS TO CONTROL ITS PRICE IN THE MARKET.HOWEVER WITH THE UNBRIDLED FLOW OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT NOWADAYS MANY COMPANIES WILL LOSE DRASTICALLY ON THEIR PORTFOLIOS IF THERE IS NO STRIDENT MARKET REGULATOR FROM SEBI BENEFITING THE FDIS AND DOMESTIC INDUSTRY SHARES.the brokers commission should increase with the increase in the price of the shares and decrease with the decrease in the price of the shares .sbi life is already a subsidiary of fdi.
THE SUGGESTED REMEDIAL MEASURE IS THAT FOR EVERY SHARE OF RS.100 WHICH CROSSES THE RS.140 MARK ON TRADING SHOULD MAKE IT MANDATORY FOR THE BROKER WHO SUPPOSE EARNS A COMMISSION OF RS.4 ON THE TRANSACTION TO PAY RS.1 TO THE PARENT COMPANY AS PROFIT ON ITS SHARE.THAT IS WITH A 40% INCREASE IN THE PRICE OF SUPPOSE JINDAL POWER SHARE ,THE BROKER TRADING ON THE SHARE WILL GIVE A PART OF HIS PROFIT TO JINDAL POWER AND A REGULATOR TO EVERY TRANSACTION WILL CREDIT THE SAME MONEY INTO JINDAL POWERS ACCOUNT.THAT IS ALONG WITH BUYING SHARES OF ONES OWN COMPANY FOR PROFIT ANY INDIAN COMPANY WILL ALSO GAIN WHEN ITS SHARE CROSSES 40% PROFIT MARK.HOWEVER THIS GAIN WILL COME UNDER STRICT TAXATION FOR THE COMPANY AND REBATE FOR THE BROKER DOING THE TRANSACTION.THAT IS FOR A RS.4 PROFIT BY THE BROKER RS.1 WILL GO THE PARENT COMPANY AND THIS WILL EARN HIM TAX REBATE OF .50P.IN ONE RUPPEE HE WILL LOSE .50P AND GAIN TAX REBATE OF .50P.,IN EACH RUPPEE THAT HE CREDITS TO THE PARENT COMPANY.HOWEVER THESE TRANSACTIONS WILL NEED A VERY UPDATED SOFTWARE AND STRIDENT MARKET REGULATION .THESE MEASURES ARE HOWEVER ONLY FOR PROFITS,and totally journalistic and research oriented.
When osama was used by the pentagon to dismantle a 1943 building ,he was actually helping
America to to build a totally new modern warfare arsenal including the latest computer technology satellite dhobi syndrome especially for India and making the insurance companies pay for it.
MAMTA DHODY KALRA,
1513,OUTRAM LANE,
MUKHERJEE NAGAR,
DELHI-110009.

 
THE INDIAN EVIDENCE ACT, 1872
 
 
ACT No.  1 OF 1872*
 
 
[15th March, 1872.]
 
 
Preamble.
 
 
     Preamble.-WHEREAS  it  is  expedient to consolidate,  define  and
amend the law of Evidence;
 
     It is hereby enacted as follows:--
 
 
PART I
 
 
RELEVANCY OF FACTS
 
 
                                PART I
 
                          RELEVANCY OF FACTS
 
 
CHAPTER I
 
 
PRELIMINARY
 
 
 
                        CHAPTER I.-PRELIMINARY
 
 
1.
 
 
Short title.
Extent.
Commencement of Act.
 
     1. Short  title.-This  Act may be called the Indian Evidence Act,
1872.
 
Extent.
 
Extent.-It  extends to the whole of India 1*[except the State of Jammu
and  Kashmir] and applies to all judicial proceedings in or before any
Court, including Courts-martial, 2*[other than Courts-martial convened
under  the Army Act, (29 & 30 Vict., c.  109)] 3*[the Naval Discipline
Act  or  4***  the Indian Navy (Discipline) Act, 1934 (34  of  1934),]
5*[or the Air Force Act] (7 Geo.  5, c.  51.) but not to affidavits 6*
presented  to  any  Court  or officer, nor to  proceedings  before  an
arbitrator;
 
Commencement of Act.
 
 
Commencement of Act.-And it shall come into force on the first day of
September, 1872.
 
 
2.
 
 
Repeal of enactments.
 
 
     2. [Repeal  of enactments.] Rep. by the Repealing Act, 1938 (1 of
1938), s. 2 and Sch.
 
 
3.
 
 
Interpretation clause.
 
 
     3. Interpretation  clause.-In  this Act  the following  words and
expressions are  used in  the  following  senses,  unless  a  contrary
intention appears from the context:-
 
"Court."
 
     "Court" includes  all Judges  7*  and  Magistrates  8*,  and  all
          persons, except  arbitrators,  legally  authorized  to  take
          evidence.
---------------------------------------------------------------------
1 Extended to and brought into force in Dadra and Nagar Haveli (w.e.f.
  1.7.65) by Reg.  6 of 1963, s.2 & Sch.  I.
 
2  The Act comes into force in Pondicherry on 1.10.1963 vide Re. 7 of
   1963, s. 3 and Sch. I.
 
3  Extended to Goa, Daman and Diu by Reg. 11 of 1963, s. 3 & Sch.
 
4  Extended  to  Laccadive,  Minicoy   and  Amindivi  Islands  (w.e.f.
   1-10-1067);  vide Reg.  8 of 1965, s.  3 & Sch.
---------------------------------------------------------------------
 
1.   Subs. by  Act 3  of 1951,  s. 3  and Sch.,  for  "except  Part  B
     States".
2.   Ins. by  Act 18  of 1919, s. 2 and Sch. I. See s. 127 of the Army
     Act (44 and 45 Vict., c. 58).
3.   Ins. by Act 35 of 1934, s. 2 and Sch.
4.   The words "that Act as modified by" rep. by the A. O. 1950.
5.   Ins. by Act 10 of 1927, s. 2 and Sch. I.
6.   As to  practice relating  to affidavits,  see the  Code of  Civil
     Procedure, 1908  (Act 5 of 1908), s. 30 (c) and Sch. I, Order XIX.
     See also the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act 5 of 1898), ss.
     539 and 539A.
7.   Cf. the  Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act 5 of 1908), s. 2, the
     Indian Penal Code (Act 45 of  1860), s. 19; and, for a definition
     of "District Judge", the General Clauses Act, 1897 (10  of 1897),
     s. 3 (17).
8.   Cf. the  General Clauses  Act, 1897  (10 of  1897), s. 3 (32) and
     Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act 5 of 1898).
 
*Amended in W. Bengal by W. Ben. Act 20 of 1960.
 
Amended in Tamil Nadu by T.N. Act 67 of 1979.
 
2
 
"Fact."
 
     "Fact" means and includes--
 
                    (1) any  thing, state  of things,  or relation  of
               things, capable of being perceived by the senses;
 
                    (2) any  mental condition  of which  any person is
               conscious.
 
                            Illustrations
 
     (a) That there are certain objects arranged in a certain order in
a certain place, is a fact.
 
     (b) That a man heard or saw something, is a fact.
 
     (c) That a man said certain words, is a fact.
 
     (d) That  a man holds a certain opinion, has a certain intention,
acts in  good faith  or fraudulently,  or uses  a particular word in a
particular sense,  or is  or was  at a  specified time  conscious of a
particular sensation, is a fact.
 
     (e) That a man has a certain reputation, is a fact.
 
"Relevant."
 
            One fact is said to be relevant to another when the one is
          connected with  the other  in any of the ways referred to in
          the provisions  of this  Act relating  to the  relevancy  of
          facts.
 
"Facts in issue."
 
     The expression "facts in issue" means and includes--
 
               any fact  from which, either by itself or in connection
          with other  facts, the  existence, non-existence,  nature or
          extent of  any right,  liability, or disability, asserted or
          denied in any suit or proceeding, necessarily follows.
 
     Explanation.--Whenever, under  the provisions  of the law for the
          time being  in force  relating to  Civil Procedure,  1*  any
          Court records  an issue  of fact, the fact to be asserted or
          denied in the answer to such issue is a fact in issue.
 
                            Illustrations
 
A is accused of the murder of B.
 
At his trial the following facts may be in issue:--
 
     that A caused B's death;
 
     that A intended to cause B's death;
 
     that A had received grave and sudden provocation from B;
 
     that A, at the time of doing the act which caused B's death, was,
     by reason  of unsoundness  of  mind,  incapable  of  knowing  its
     nature.
---------------------------------------------------------------------
1.   See now  Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act 5 of 1908); as to the
     settlement of issues, see Sch. I, Order XIV.
 
3
 
"Document".
 
     "Document" 1*  means any  matter expressed  or described upon any
          substance by  means of letters, figures or marks, or by more
          than one  of those  means, intended to be used, or which may
          be used, for the purpose of recording that matter.
 
                            Illustrations
 
A writing 2* is a document:
 
2* Words printed lithographed or photographed are documents:
 
A map or plan is a document:
 
An inscription on a metal plate or stone is a document:
 
A caricature is a document.
 
"Evidence."
 
     "Evidence" means and includes--
 
               (1) all  statements which the Court permits or requires
          to be made before it by witnesses, in relation to matters of
          fact under inquiry;
 
          such statements are called oral evidence;
 
               (2) all  documents produced  for the  inspection of the
          Court;
 
          such documents are called documentary evidence.
 
"Proved."
 
     A fact  is said  to be proved when, after considering the matters
          before it,  the  Court  either  believes  it  to  exist,  or
          considers its  existence so  probable  that  a  prudent  man
          ought, under  the circumstances  of the  particular case, to
          act upon the supposition that it exists.
 
"Disproved."
 
     A fact  is said  to be  disproved  when,  after  considering  the
          matters before  it, the  Court either  believes that it does
          not exist, or considers its non-existence so probable that a
          prudent man ought, under the circumstances of the particular
          case, to act upon the supposition that it does not exist.
 
"Not proved."
 
     A fact  is said  not to  be proved  when it is neither proved nor
          disproved.
 
"India."
 
     3*["India" means  the territory  of India  excluding the State of
          Jammu and Kashmir.]
---------------------------------------------------------------------
1.   Cf. the Indian Penal Code (Act 45 of 1860), s. 29 and the General
     Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1897), s. 3 (18).
2.   Cf. definition  of "writing" in the General Clauses Act, 1897 (10
     of 1897), s. 3 (65).
3.   Subs. by  Act 3  of 1951,  s. 3  and Sch.,  for the definition of
     "State" and "States" which was ins. by the A. O. 1950.
 
4
 
 
4.
 
 
"May presume."
 
"Shall Presume."
 
"Conclusive proof."
 
 
     4. "May  presume."-Whenever  it is  provided by this Act that the
Court may  presume a  fact, it  may either regard such fact as proved,
unless and until it is disproved, or may call for proof of it:
 
"Shall presume."-Whenever it is directed by this Act  that  the  Court
shall  presume a fact, it shall regard such fact as proved, unless and
until it is disproved:
 
"Conclusive proof."-When one fact  is  declared  by  this  Act  to  be
conclusive  proof  of  another,  the  Court shall, on proof of the one
fact, regard the other as proved, and shall not allow evidence  to  be
given for the purpose of disproving it.
 
 
CHAPTER II
 
 
OF THE RELEVANCY OF FACTS
 
 
                CHAPTER II.  OF THE RELEVANCY OF FACTS
 
 
5.
 
 
Evidence may be given of facts in issue and relevant facts.
 
 
     5. Evidence  may be  given of facts in issue and relevant facts.-
Evidence may  be given  in any  suit or proceeding of the existence of
non-existence of  every fact  in issue  and of such other facts as are
hereinafter declared to be relevant, and of no others.
 
     Explanation.--This section  shall not  enable any  person to give
evidence of  a fact  which he is disentitled to prove by any provision
of the law for the time being in force relating to Civil Procedure. 1*
 
                            Illustrations
 
     (a) A  is tried  for the  murder of  B by beating him with a club
with the intention of causing his death.
 
     At A's trial the following facts are in issue:--
 
          A's beating B with the club;
 
          A's causing B's death by such beating;
 
          A's intention to cause B's death.
 
     (b) A  suitor does  not bring with him, and have in readiness for
production at  the first  hearing of  the case,  a bond  on  which  he
relies. This  section does not enable him to produce the bond or prove
its  contents  at a subsequent stage of the proceedings, otherwise than
in accordance  with the  conditions prescribed  by the  Code of  Civil
Procedure 1*.
 
 
6.
 
 
Relevancy of facts forming part of same transaction.
 
 
     6. Relevancy  of facts  forming part  of same  transaction.-Facts
which, though  not in  issue, are so connected with a fact in issue as
to form  part of  the same  transaction, are  relevant,  whether  they
occurred at the same time and place or at different times and places.
---------------------------------------------------------------------
1.   See now the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (Act 5 of 1908).
 
5
 
                            Illustrations
 
     (a) A  is accused of the murder of B by beating him. Whatever was
said or  done by  A or  B or  the by-standers  at the  beating, or  so
shortly before  or after  it as  to form part of the transaction, is a
relevant fact.
 
     (b) A  is accused  of waging  war against  the  1*[Government  of
India] by  taking part  in an  armed insurrection in which property is
destroyed,  troops  are  attacked  and  gaols  are  broken  open.  The
occurrence of  these facts is relevant, as forming part of the general
transaction, though A may not have been present at all of them.
 
     (c) A  sues B for a libel contained in a letter forming part of a
correspondence. Letters  between the  parties relating  to the subject
out of  which the  libel arose, and forming part of the correspondence
in which  it is  contained, are  relevant facts,  though they  do  not
contain the libel itself.
 
     (d) The  question is,  whether certain  goods ordered from B were
delivered to  A. The  goods were  delivered  to  several  intermediate
persons successively. Each delivery is a relevant fact.
 
 
7.
 
 
Facts which are the occasion, cause or effect of facts in issue.
 
 
     7. Facts  which are  the occasion,  cause or  effect of  facts in
issue.-Facts  which are  the occasion,  cause or  effect, immediate or
otherwise, of  relevant facts,  or facts in issue, or which constitute
the state of things under which  they happened,      which afforded an
opportunity for their occurrence or transaction, are relevant.
 
                            Illustrations
 
     (a) The question is, whether A robbed B.
 
     The facts that, shortly before the robbery, B went to a fair with
money in  his possession,  and that he showed it or mentioned the fact
that he had it, to third persons, are relevant.
 
     (b) The question is, whether A murdered B.
 
     Marks on  the ground, produced by a struggle at or near the place
where the murder was committed, are relevant facts.
 
     (c) The question is, whether A poisoned B.
 
     The state  of B's  health before the symptoms ascribed to poison,
and habits  of B,  known to  A, which  afforded an opportunity for the
administration of poison, are relevant facts.
 
 
8.
 
 
Motive, preparation and previous or subsequent conduct.
 
 
     8. Motive,  preparation and  previous or  subsequent conduct.-Any
fact is  relevant which  shows or  constitutes a motive or preparation
for any fact in issue or relevant fact.
 
     The conduct  of any  party, or  of any agent to any party, to any
suit or  proceeding, in  reference to  such suit  or proceeding, or in
reference to  any fact  in issue  therein or relevant thereto, and the
conduct of  any person  an offence  against whom is the subject of any
proceeding, is  relevant, if  such conduct influences or is influenced
by any  fact in issue or relevant fact, and whether it was previous or
subsequent thereto.
---------------------------------------------------------------------
1.   Subs. by the A. O. 1950 for "Queen".
 
6
 
     Explanation 1.--The  word "conduct"  in  this  section  does  not
include statements, unless those statements accompany and explain acts
other than  statements; but  this explanation  is not  to  affect  the
relevancy of statements under any other section of this Act.
 
     Explanation 2.--When  the conduct  of any person is relevant, any
statement made  to him  or in  his presence and hearing, which affects
such conduct, is relevant.
 
                            Illustrations
 
     (a) A is tried for the murder of B.
 
     The facts  that A  murdered C, that B knew that A had murdered C,
and that B had tried to extort money from A by threatening to make his
knowledge public, are relevant.
 
     (b) A  sues B  upon a bond for the payment of money. B denies the
making of the bond.
 
     The fact  that, at the time when the bond was alleged to be made,
B required money for a particular purpose, is relevant.
 
     (c) A is tried for the murder of B by poison.
 
     The fact  that, before  the death of B, A procured poison similar
to that which was administered to B, is relevant.
 
     (d) The question is, whether a certain document is the will of A.
 
     The facts  that, not  long before the date of the alleged will, A
made inquiry  into matters to which the provisions of the alleged will
relate, that  he consulted vakils in reference to making the will, and
that he  caused drafts  of other  wills to be prepared of which he did
not approve, are relevant.
 
     (e) A is accused of a crime.
 
     The facts  that, either  before or  at the  time of, or after the
alleged crime,  A provided  evidence which  would tend  to give to the
facts of  the case  an appearance  favourable to  himself, or  that he
destroyed or concealed evidence, or prevented the presence or procured
the absence  of persons  who might  have been  witnesses, or  suborned
persons to give false evidence respecting it, are relevant.
 
     (f) The question is, whether A robbed B.
 
     The facts  that, after B was robbed, C said in A's presence- "the
police are  coming to  look for  the  man  who  robbed  B,"  and  that
immediately afterwards A ran away, are relevant.
 
     (g) The question is, whether A owes B rupees 10,000.
 
     The facts  that A asked C to lend him money, and that D said to C
in A's presence and hearing- "I advise you not to trust A, for he owes
B 10,000  rupees," and that A went away without making any answer, are
relevant facts.
 
     (h) The question is, whether A committed a crime.
 
     The fact  that A  absconded after  receiving a letter warning him
that inquiry  was being made for the criminal, and the contents of the
letter, are relevant.
 
     (i) A is accused of a crime.
 
     The facts  that, after  the commission  of the  alleged crime, he
absconded, or  was in  possession  of  property  or  the  proceeds  of
property acquired by the
 
7
 
crime, or  attempted to  conceal things  which were or might have been
used in committing it, are relevant.
 
     (j) The question is, whether A was ravished.
 
     The facts  that, shortly  after the  alleged  rape,  she  made  a
complaint relating  to the  crime, the  circumstances under which, and
the terms in which, the complaint was made, are relevant.
 
     The fact  that, without making a complaint, she said that she had
been ravished is not relevant as conduct under this section, though it
may be  relevant as  a dying declaration under section 32, clause (1),
or as corroborative evidence under section 157.
 
     (k) The question is, whether A was robbed.
 
     The fact  that,  soon  after  the  alleged  robbery,  he  made  a
complaint relating  to the offence, the circumstances under which, and
the terms in which, the complaint was made, are relevant.
 
     The fact  that he  said he  had been  robbed without  making  any
complaint, is  not relevant,  as conduct under this section, though it
may be  relevant as  a dying declaration under section 32, clause (1),
or as corroborative evidence under section 157.
 
 
9.
 
 
Facts necessary to explain or introduce relevant facts.
 
 
     9. Facts  necessary to explain or introduce relevant facts.-Facts
necessary to explain or introduce a fact in issue or relevant fact, or
which support  or rebut  an inference  suggested by a fact in issue or
relevant fact,  or which establish the identity of any thing or person
whose identity is relevant, or fix the time or place at which any fact
in issue  or relevant  fact happened,  or which  show the  relation of
parties by  whom any  such fact was transacted, are relevant in so far
as they are necessary for that purpose.
 
                            Illustrations
 
     (a) The question is, whether a given document is the will of A.
 
     The state  of A's  property and  of his family at the date of the
alleged will may be relevant facts.
 
     (b) A  sues B  for a  libel imputing disgraceful conduct to A ; B
affirms that the matter alleged to be libellous is true.
 
     The position  and relations  of the  parties at the time when the
libel was published may be relevant facts as introductory to the facts
in issue.
 
     The particulars  of a  dispute between  A and  B about  a  matter
unconnected with  the alleged  libel are  irrelevant, though  the fact
that there  was a dispute may be relevant if it affected the relations
between A and B.
 
     (c) A is accused of a crime.
 
     The fact  that,  soon  after  the  commission  of  the  crime,  A
absconded from  his house,  is relevant  under section  8, as  conduct
subsequent to and affected by facts in issue.
 
     The fact  that at  the time  when he  left home he had sudden and
urgent business at the place to which he went, is relevant, as tending
to explain the fact that he left home suddenly.
 
     The details  of the  business on  which he left are not relevant,
except in  so far  as they are necessary to show that the business was
sudden and urgent.
 
8
 
     (d) A  sues B  for inducing C to break a contract of service made
by him  with A. C, on leaving A's service, says to A-"I am leaving you
because B  has made  me a  better offer." This statement is a relevant
fact as  explanatory of  C's conduct,  which is  relevant as a fact in
issue.
 
     (e) A,  accused of  theft, is seen to give the stolen property to
B, who  is seen  to give  it to  A's wife. B says as he delivers it-"A
says your  are to hide this." B's statement is relevant as explanatory
of a fact which is part of the transaction.
 
     (f) A  is tried  for a  riot and is proved to have marched at the
head of a mob. The cries of the mob are relevant as explanatory of the
nature of the transaction.
 
 
10.
 
 
Things said or done by conspirator in reference to common design.
 
 
     10. Things  said or  done by  conspirator in  reference to common
design. Where  there is  reasonable round  to believe that two or more
persons have  conspired together to commit an offence or an actionable
wrong, anything  said, done  or written  by any one of such persons in
reference  to  their  common  intention,  after  the  time  when  such
intention was first entertained by any one of them, is a relevant fact
as against  each of  the persons believed to be so conspiring, as well
for the  purpose of proving the existence of the conspiracy as for the
purpose of showing that any such person was a party to it.
 
                            Illustration
 
     Reasonable ground  exists for  believing that  A has  joined in a
conspiracy to wage war against the 1*[Government of India].
 
     The facts  that B  procured arms in Europe for the purpose of the
conspiracy, C  collected money  in  Calcutta  for  a  like  object,  D
persuaded persons  to join  the  conspiracy  in  Bombay,  E  published
writings advocating the object in view at Agra, and F transmitted from
Delhi to  G at  Kabul the money which C had collected at Calcutta, and
the contents  of a  letter written  by H  giving  an  account  of  the
conspiracy, are  each relevant,  both to  prove the  existence of  the
conspiracy, and  to prove  A's complicity  in it, although he may have
been ignorant  of all  of them,  and although the persons by whom they
were done  were strangers  to him,  and although  they may  have taken
place before he joined the conspiracy or after he left it.
 
 
11.
 
 
When facts not otherwise relevant become relevant.
 
 
     11. When  facts not otherwise relevant become relevant.-Facts not
otherwise relevant are relevant--
 
          (1) if  they are  inconsistent with  any fact  in  issue  or
               relevant fact;
 
          (2) if  by themselves or in connection with other facts they
               make the  existence or  non-existence of  any  fact  in
               issue or relevant fact highly probable or improbable.
 
                            Illustrations
 
     (a) The  question is whether A committed a crime at Calcutta on a
certain day.
 
     The fact that, on that day, A was at Lahore is relevant.
---------------------------------------------------------------------
1.   Subs. by the A. O. 1950 for "Queen".
 
9
 
     The fact  that, near the time when the crime was committed, A was
at a  distance from  the place  where it  was committed,  which  would
render it  highly improbable, though not impossible, that he committed
it, is relevant.
 
     (b) The question is, whether A committed a crime.
 
     The  circumstances  are  such  that  the  crime  must  have  been
committed either  by A,  B, C  or D.  Every fact  which shows that the
crime could  have been  committed by  no one  else and that it was not
committed by either B, C or D, is relevant.
 
 
12.
 
 
In suits  for damages,  facts tending  to enable  Court  to  determine
amount are relevant.
 
 
     12. In  suits for  damages, facts  tending  to  enable  Court  to
determine amount  are relevant. In suits in which damages are claimed,
any fact  which will  enable the  Court to  determine  the  amount  of
damages which ought to be awarded, is relevant.
 
 
13.
 
 
Facts relevant when right or custom is in question.
 
 
     13. Facts relevant when right or custom is in question.-Where the
question is  as to the existence of any right or custom, the following
facts are relevant:-
 
          (a) any transaction by which the right or custom in question
               was created, claimed, modified, recognized, asserted or
               denied, or which was inconsistent with its existence:
 
          (b) particular  instances in  which the  right or custom was
               claimed, recognized  or  exercised,  or  in  which  its
               exercise was disputed, asserted or departed from.
 
                            Illustration.
 
     The question  is whether  A has  a right  to a  fishery.  A  deed
conferring the  fishery on A's ancestors, a mortgage of the fishery by
A's  father,  a  subsequent  grant  of  the  fishery  by  A's  father,
irreconcilable with  the mortgage,  particular instances  in which A's
father exercised  the right, or in which the exercise of the right was
stopped by A's neighbours, are relevant facts.
 
 
14.
 
 
Facts showing  existence of  state of  mind, or  of  body,  or  bodily
feeling.
 
 
     14. Facts  showing existence  of state  of mind,  or of  body, of
bodily feeling.-Facts showing the existence of any state of mind, such
as intention, knowledge, good faith, negligence, rashness, ill-will or
good-will towards  any particular  person, or showing the existence of
any state  of body or bodily feeling, are relevant, when the existence
of any  such state  of mind  or body or bodily feeling, is in issue or
relevant.
 
     1*[Explanation 1.--A  fact relevant as showing the existence of a
relevant state  of mind  must show  that the state of mind exists, not
generally, but in reference to the particular matter in question.
 
     Explanation 2.--But where, upon the trial of a  person accused of
an offence, the previous commission by the  accused  of  an offence is
---------------------------------------------------------------------
1.   Subs. by Act 3 of 1891, s. 1, for the original Explanation.
---------------------------------------------------------------------
 
20
 
relevant within  the meaning  of this section, the previous conviction
of such person shall also be a relevant fact. 1*]
 
                            Illustrations.
 
     (a) A  is accused  of receiving  stolen goods  knowing them to be
stolen. It  is proved that he was in possession of a particular stolen
article.
 
     The fact  that, at  the same  time, he  was in possession of many
other stolen  articles is  relevant, as  tending to  show that he knew
each and  all of  the articles  of which  he was  in possession  to be
stolen.
 
     2*[(b) A  is accused of fraudulently delivering to another person
a counterfeit coin which, at the time when he delivered it, he knew to
be counterfeit.
 
     The fact  that, at the time of its delivery, A was possessed of a
number of other pieces of counterfeit coin is relevant.
 
     The fact  that A  had been  previously convicted of delivering to
another person  as  genuine  a  counterfeit  coin  knowing  it  to  be
counterfeit is relevant.]
 
     (c) A  sues B  for damage done by a dog of B's which B knew to be
ferocious.
 
     The facts that the dog had previously bitten X, Y and Z, and that
they  had made complaints to B, are relevant.
 
     (d) The  question  is  whether A,  the  acceptor  of  a  bill  of
exchange, knew that the name of a payee was fictitious.
 
     The fact that A had accepted other bills drawn in the same manner
before they  could have  been transmitted  to him  by the payee if the
payee had been a real person, is relevant, as showing that A knew that
the payee was a fictitious person.
 
     (e) A  is accused  of defaming  B  by  publishing  an  imputation
intended to harm the reputation of B.
 
     The fact of previous publications by A respecting B, showing ill-
will on  the part of A towards B is relevant, as proving A's intention
to harm B's reputation by the particular publication in question.
 
     The facts that there was no previous quarrel between A and B, and
that A repeated the matter complained of as he heard it, are relevant,
as showing that A did not intend to harm the reputation of B.
 
     (f) A  is sued by B for fraudulently representing to B that C was
solvent, whereby  B, being  induced to  trust C,  who  was  insolvent,
suffered loss.
 
     The  fact that, at the time when A represented C to be solvent, C
was  supposed  to be solvent by his neighbours and by persons  dealing
with  him,  is relevant, as showing that A made the representation  in
good faith.
 
     (g) A  is sued by B for the price of work done by B, upon a house
of which A is owner, by the order of C, a contractor.
 
     A's defence is that B's contract was with C.
 
     The fact  that A  paid C for the work in question is relevant, as
proving that  A did,  in good  faith, make over to C the management of
the work  in question,  so that C was in a position to contract with B
on C's own account, and not as agent for A.
---------------------------------------------------------------------
1.   See the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act 5 of 1898), s. 311.
2.   Subs. by Act 3  of 1891, s. 1, for the original illustration (b).
 
11
 
     (h) A  is accused  of the  dishonest misappropriation of property
which he  had found, and the question is whether, when he appropriated
it, he believed in good faith that the real owner could not be found.
 
     The fact  that public notice of the loss of the property had been
given in the place where A was, is relevant, as showing that A did not
in good faith believe that the real owner of the property could not be
found.
 
     The fact  that A  knew, or had reason to believe, that the notice
was given fraudulently by C, who had heard of the loss of the property
and wished to set up a false claim to it, is relevant, as showing that
the fact that A knew of the notice did not disprove A's good faith.
 
     (i) A  is charged  with shooting at B with intent to kill him, In
order to  show A's  intent the fact of A's having previously shot at B
may be proved.
 
     (j)  A   is  charged  with  sending  threatening  letters  to  B.
Threatening letters  previously sent  by A  to B  may  be  proved,  as
showing the intention of the letters.
 
     (k) The question is, whether A has been guilty of cruelty towards
B, his wife.
 
     Expressions of their feeling towards each other shortly before or
after the alleged cruelty are relevant facts.
 
     (l) The question is whether A's death was caused by poison.
 
     Statements made  by  A during  his illness as to his symptoms are
relevant facts.
 
     (m) The question is, what was the state of A's health at the time
when an assurance on his life was effected.
 
     Statements made by A as to the state of his health at or near the
time in question are relevant facts.
 
     (n) A  sues B for negligence in providing him with a carriage for
hire not reasonably fit for use, whereby A was injured.
 
     The fact  that B's  attention was drawn on other occasions to the
defect of that particular carriage is relevant.
 
     The fact  that B  was habitually  negligent about  the  carriages
which he let to hire is irrelevant.
 
     (o) A  is tried for the murder of B by intentionally shooting him
dead.
 
     The fact  that A  on other  occasions shot  at B  is relevant  as
showing his intention to shoot B.
 
     The fact  that A  was in  the habit  of shooting  at people  with
intent to murder them, is irrelevant.
 
     (p) A is tried for a crime.
 
     The fact that he said something indicating an intention to commit
that particular crime is relevant.
 
     The fact  that he said something indicating a general disposition
to commit crimes of that class is irrelevant.
 
 
15.
 
 
Facts bearing on question whether act was accidental or intentional.
 
 
     15. Facts  bearing on  question whether  act  was  accidental  or
intentional.-When there is a question whether an act was accidental or
intentional, 1*[or done with a particular knowledge or intention,] the
fact that  such act formed part of a series of similar occurrences, in
each of which the person doing the act was concerned, is relevant.
---------------------------------------------------------------------
1.   Ins. by Act 3 of 1891, s. 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------
 
12
 
                            Illustrations
 
     (a) A  is accused  of burning  down his  house in order to obtain
money for which it is insured.
 
     The facts  that A  lived in  several houses  successively each of
which he  insured, in each of which a fire occurred, and after each of
which fires  A received payment from a different insurance office, are
relevant, as tending to show that the fires were not accidental.
 
     (b) A  is employed  to receive money from the debtors of B. It is
A's duty  to make  entries in  a book  showing the amounts received by
him. He  makes an  entry showing  that on  a  particular  occasion  he
received less than he really did receive.
 
     The question  is, whether  this false  entry  was  accidental  or
intentional.
 
     The facts  that other  entries made  by A  in the  same book  are
false, and  that the  false entry  is in each case in favour of A, are
relevant.
 
     (c) A  is accused  of fraudulently  delivering to B a counterfeit
rupee.
 
     The  question   is,  whether   the  delivery  of  the  rupee  was
accidental.
 
     The facts  that, soon  before or  soon after the delivery to B, A
delivered counterfeit  rupees to  C, D  and E are relevant, as showing
that the delivery to B was not accidental.
 
 
16.
 
 
Existence of course of business when relevant.
 
 
     16. Existence  of course of business when relevant.-When there is
a question  whether a  particular act  was done,  the existence of any
course of  business, according  to which  it naturally would have been
done, is a relevant fact.
 
                            Illustrations
 
     (a) The question is, whether a particular letter was despatched.
 
     The facts  that it  was the  ordinary course  of business for all
letters put  in a  certain place  to be  carried to the post, and that
particular letter was put in that place are relevant.
 
     (b) The  question is,  whether a particular letter reached A. The
facts that  it was  posted in due course, and was not returned through
the Dead Letter Office, are relevant.
 
                              ADMISSIONS
 
 
17.
 
 
Admission defined.
 
 
     17. Admission  defined.-An  admission is  a  statement,  oral  or
documentary, which  suggests any  inference as to any fact in issue or
relevant fact,  and which is made by any of the persons, and under the
circumstances, hereinafter mentioned.
 
 
18.
 
 
Admission-by party to proceeding or his agent;
 
by suitor in representative character;
 
by party interested in subject matter;
 
by person from whom interest derived.
 
 
     18. Admission  by party  to proceeding  or his  agent.-Statements
made by  a party  to the proceeding, or by an agent to any such party,
whom the  Court regards,  under the  circumstances  of  the  case,  as
expressly or impliedly authorized by him to make them, are admissions.
 
by  suitor  in representative  character-Statements made by parties to
suits suing or sued in a representative character, are not admissions,
unless they were made while the party making them held that character.
 
13
 
Statements made by--
 
by party interested in subject matter;
 
     (1) persons who have any proprietary or pecuniary interest in the
          subject-matter of the proceeding, and who make the statement
          in their character of persons so interested, or
 
by person from whom interest derived.
 
     (2) persons  from whom the parties to the suit have derived their
          interest in the subject-matter of the suit,
 
are admissions,  if they  are  made  during  the  continuance  of  the
interest of the persons making the statements.
 
 
19.
 
 
Admissions by  persons whose  position must be proved as against party
to suit.
 
 
     19. Admissions  by persons  whose  position  must  be  proved  as
against party  to suit.-Statements  made  by persons whose position or
liability it  is necessary  to prove as against any party to the suit,
are admissions,  if such  statements would be relevant as against such
persons in relation to such position or liability in a suit brought by
or against  them, and  if they  are made whilst the person making them
occupies such position or is subject to such liability.
 
                            Illustration
 
     A undertakes to collect rents for B.
     B sues A for not collecting rent due from C to B.
     A denies that rent was due from C to B.
     A statement  by C  that he  owed B rent is an admission, and is a
relevant fact as against A, if A denies that C did owe rent to B.
 
 
20.
 
 
Admissions by persons expressly referred to by party to suit.
 
 
    20. Admissions by persons expressly referred to by party to suit.-
Statements made by person to whom a party to the suit   has  expressly
referred  for  information  in  reference  to  a matter in dispute are
admissions.
 
                            Illustration
 
     The question is, whether a horse sold by A to B is sound.
 
     A says  to B--"Go and ask C, C knows all about it." C's statement
is an admission.
 
 
21.
 
 
Proof of  admissions against  persons making  them, and by or on their
behalf.
 
 
     21. Proof of admissions against persons making them, and by or on
their behalf.-Admissions are relevant and may be proved as against the
person who  makes them,  or his  representative in  interest; but they
cannot be  proved by  or on  behalf of the person who makes them or by
his representative in interest, except in the following cases:-
 
          (1) An admission may be proved by or on behalf of the person
               making it,  when it  is of  such a  nature that, if the
               person making  it were  dead, it  would be  relevant as
               between third persons under section 32.
 
          (2) An admission may be proved by or on behalf of the person
               making it,  when it  consists of  a  statement  of  the
               existence
 
14
 
               of any  state of  mind or  body, relevant  or in issue,
               made at  or about  the time  when such state of mind or
               body existed,  and is  accompanied by conduct rendering
               its falsehood improbable.
 
          (3) An admission may be proved by or on behalf of the person
               making it,  if it  is relevant  otherwise  than  as  an
               admission.
 
                            Illustrations
 
     (a) The question between A and B is, whether a certain deed is or
is not forged. A affirms that it is genuine, B that it is forged.
 
     A may  prove a statement by B that the deed is genuine, and B may
prove a  statement by  A that  deed is  forged; but  A cannot  prove a
statement by  himself that  the deed  is genuine,  nor can  B prove  a
statement by himself that the deed is forged.
 
     (b) A, the captain of a ship, is tried for casting her away.
 
     Evidence is  given to  show that  the ship  was taken  out of her
proper course.
 
     A produces  a book  kept by  him in  the ordinary  course of  his
business showing  observations alleged  to have been taken by him from
day to  day, and  indicating that  the ship  was not  taken out of her
proper course.  A may  prove these  statements, because  they would be
admissible between  third parties,  if he were dead, under section 32,
clause (2).
 
     (c) A is accused of a crime committed by him at Calcutta.
 
     He produces  a letter  written by  himself and dated at Lahore on
that day, and bearing the Lahore post-mark of that day.
 
     The statement  in the  date of the letter is admissible, because,
if A were dead, it would be admissible under section 32, clause (2).
 
     (d) A  is accused  of receiving  stolen goods  knowing them to be
stolen.
 
     He offers  to prove  that he  refused to  sell them  below  their
value.
 
     A may prove these statements, though they are admissions, because
they are explanatory of conduct influenced by facts in issue.
 
     (e) A  is  accused  of  fraudulently  having  in  his  possession
counterfeit coin which he knew to be counterfeit.
 
     He offers  to prove that he asked a skilful person to examine the
coin as  he doubted whether it was counterfeit or not, and  that  that
person did examine it and told him it was genuine.
 
     A may  prove these  facts for  the reasons  stated  in  the  last
preceding illustration.
 
 
22.
 
 
When oral admissions as to contents of documents are relevant.
 
 
     22.  When  oral  admissions  as  to  contents  of  documents  are
relevant.-Oral  admissions as  to the  contents of  a document are not
relevant, unless  and until  the party  proposing to  prove them shows
that he is entitled to give secondary evidence of the contents of such
document  under   the  rules  hereinafter  contained,  or  unless  the
genuineness of a document produced is in question.
 
15
 
 
23.
 
 
Admissions in civil cases when relevant.
 
 
     23. Admissions  in civil  cases when  relevant.-In civil cases no
admission is  relevant, if it is made either upon an express condition
that evidence  of it  is not  to be given, or under circumstances from
which the  Court can  infer that  the  parties  agreed  together  that
evidence of it should not be given.
 
     Explanation.--Nothing in  this section  shall be  taken to exempt
any barrister,  pleader, attorney or vakil from giving evidence of any
matter of  which he  may be  compelled to  give evidence under section
126.
 
 
24.
 
 
Confession caused by inducement, threat or promise, when irrelevant in
criminal proceeding.
 
 
     24. Confession  caused by  inducement, threat  or  promise,  when
irrelevant in  criminal proceeding.-A  confession  made by  an accused
person is  irrelevant in  a criminal  proceeding, if the making of the
confession appears to the Court to have been caused by any inducement,
threat or  promise 1*  having reference  to  the  charge  against  the
accused person,  proceeding from a person in authority and sufficient,
in the opinion of the Court, to give the accused person grounds, which
would appear  to him  reasonable, for supposing that  by making  it he
would gain  any advantage  or avoid  any evil  of a temporal nature in
reference to the proceedings against him.
 
 
25.
 
 
Confession to police-officer not to be proved.
 
 
     25. Confession  to police-officer not to be proved.-No confession
made to  a police-officer2*,  shall  be proved  as  against  a  person
accused of any offence.
 
 
26.
 
 
Confession by  accused while  in custody  of police  not to  be proved
against him.
 
 
     26. Confession  by accused  while in  custody of police not to be
proved against  him.-No  confession made by any person whilst he is in
the custody  of a  police-officer, unless  it be made in the immediate
presence of a Magistrate, 3* shall be proved as against such person.
 
     4*[Explanation.--In this  section "Magistrate"  does not  include
the head  of  a  village  discharging  magisterial  functions  in  the
Presidency of Fort St. George 5*** or elsewhere, unless such headman is
a Magistrate  exercising the  powers of a Magistrate under the Code of
Criminal Procedure, 18826* (10 of 1882).]
 
 
27.
 
 
How much of information received from accused may be proved.
 
 
     27. How much of information received from accused may be proved.-
Provided  that,   when  any  fact  is  deposed  to  as  discovered  in
consequence  of  information  received  from  a  person accused of any
---------------------------------------------------------------------
1.   For prohibition  of such  inducements,  etc.,  see  the  Code  of
     Criminal Procedure 1898 (Act 5 of 1898), s. 343.
2.   As to  statements made  to a police-officer investigating a case,
     see s. 162, ibid.
3.   A Coroner  has been  declared to be a Magistrate for the purposes
     of this  section,  see the Coroners Act, 1871 (4 of 1871), s. 20.
4.   Ins. by Act 3 of 1891, s. 3.
5.   The words "or in Burma" rep. by the A. O. 1937.
6.   See now the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act 5 of 1898).
---------------------------------------------------------------------
 
16
 
offence,  in  the  custody  of  a  police-officer,  so  much  of  such
information, whether  it amounts  to a  confession or  not, as relates
distinctly to the fact thereby discovered, may be proved.
 
 
28.
 
 
Confession made  after removal  of impression  caused  by  inducement,
threat or promise, relevant.
 
 
     28.  Confession  made  after  removal  of  impression  caused  by
inducement, threat  or promise,  relevant.-If  such a confession as is
referred to  in section  24 is made after the impression caused by any
such inducement,  threat or  promise has, in the opinion of the Court,
been fully removed, it is relevant.
 
 
29.
 
 
Confession otherwise  relevant not  to become  irrelevant  because  of
promise of secrecy, etc.
 
 
     29.  Confession  otherwise  relevant  not  to  become  irrelevant
because of  promise of secrecy, etc.-If such a confession is otherwise
relevant, it  does not  become irrelevant  merely because  it was made
under a promise of secrecy, or in consequence of a deception practised
on the  accused person for the purpose of obtaining it, or when he was
drunk, or because it was made in answer to questions which he need not
have answered,  whatever may have been the form of those questions, or
because he  was not  warned  that  he  was  not  bound  to  make  such
confession, and that evidence of it might be given against him.
 
 
30.
 
 
Consideration of  proved confession  affecting person  making  it  and
others jointly under trial for same offence.
 
 
     30. Consideration of proved confession affecting person making it
and others  jointly under  trial for  same offence.-When  more persons
than one  are  being  tried  jointly  for  the  same  offence,  and  a
confession made  by one  of such   persons  affecting himself and some
other of such persons is proved, the Court may take into consideration
such confession  as against  such other  person as well as against the
person who makes such confession.
 
     1*[Explanation.-"Offence"  as  used in this section, includes the
abetment of, or attempt to commit, the offence.*2]
 
                            Illustrations
 
     (a) A  and B  are jointly tried for the murder of C. It is proved
that A  said--"B and  I murdered C". The Court may consider the effect
of this confession as against B.
 
     (b) A  is on  his trial for the murder of C. There is evidence to
show that  C was  murdered by  A and  B, and  that B  said--"A  and  I
murdered C".
 
     This statement  may not  be taken into consideration by the Court
against A, as B is not being jointly tried.
 
 
31.
 
 
Admissions not conclusive proof, but may estop.
 
 
     31. Admissions  not conclusive  proof, but  may estop.-Admissions
are not  conclusive proof of the matters admitted but they may operate
as estoppels under the provisions hereinafter contained.
---------------------------------------------------------------------
1.   Ins. by Act 3 of 1891, s. 4.
2.   Cf. the  Indian Penal  Code (Act 45 of 1860), Explanation 4 to s.
     108.
---------------------------------------------------------------------
 
17
 
       STATEMENTS BY PERSONS WHO CANNOT BE CALLED AS WITNESSES
 
 
32.
 
 
Cases in  which statement  of relevant  fact by  person who is dead or
cannot be found, etc., is relevant.
 
When it relates to cause of death;
 
or is made in course of business;
 
or against interest of maker;
 
or gives opinion as to public  right  or custom, or matters of general
interest;
 
or relates to existence of relationship;
 
or is made in will or deed relatin to family affairs;
 
or in document relating to transaction mentioned in section 13, clause
(a);
 
or  is  made  by several persons and expresses  feelings  relevant  to
matter in question;
 
 
     32. Cases  in which  statement of  relevant fact by person who is
dead or  cannot be  found, etc.,  is relevant.-Statements,  written or
verbal, of  relevant facts made by a person who is dead, or who cannot
be found,  or who  has become  incapable of  giving evidence, or whose
attendance cannot  be procured  without an  amount of delay or expense
which under  the circumstances  of  the  case, appears  to  the  Court
unreasonable, are themselves relevant facts in the following cases:--
 
When it relates to cause of death.-
 
          (1) When  the statement  is made by a person as to the cause
               of his  death, or as to any of the circumstances of the
               transaction which  resulted in  his death,  in cases in
               which the  cause of  that  person's  death  comes  into
               question.
 
          Such statements  are relevant  whether the  person who  made
               them was  or was  not, at the time when they were made,
               under expectation  of death,  and whatever  may be  the
               nature of  the proceeding  in which  the cause  of  his
               death comes into question.
 
or is made in course of business;
 
          (2) When  the statement  was made  by  such  person  in  the
               ordinary course  of business, and in particular when it
               consists of  any entry  or memorandum  made by  him  in
               books kept  in the  ordinary course  of business, or in
               the  discharge   of  professional   duty;  or   of   an
               acknowledgment written  or signed by him of the receipt
               of money, goods, securities or property of any kind; or
               of a  document used  in commerce  written or  signed by
               him; or  of the  date of  a letter  or  other  document
               usually dated, written or signed by him.
 
or against interest of maker;
 
          (3)  When   the  statement   is  against  the  pecuniary  or
               proprietary interest  of the person making it, or when,
               if true,  it would expose him or would have exposed him
               to a criminal prosecution or to a suit for damages.
 
or gives  opinion as  to public right or custom, or matters of general
interest;
 
          (4) When the statement gives the opinion of any such person,
               as to  the existence  of any  public right or custom or
               matter of  public or general interest, of the existence
               of which,  if it  existed, he would have been likely to
               be aware,  and when  such statement was made before any
               controversy as  to such  right, custom  or  matter  had
               arisen.
 
or relates to existence of relationship.-
 
          (5) When  the statement  relates to  the  existence  of  any
               relationship 1*[by blood, marriage or adoption] between
               persons as  to whose relationship 1*[by blood, marriage
               or adoption]
---------------------------------------------------------------------
1.   Ins. by Act 18 of 1872, s. 2.
---------------------------------------------------------------------
 
28
 
               the person  making the  statement had  special means of
               knowledge, and  when the  statement was made before the
               question in dispute was raised.
 
or is made in will or deed relating to family affairs;
 
          (6) When  the statement  relates to  the  existence  of  any
               relationship 1*[by blood, marriage or adoption] between
               persons deceased,  and is  made in  any  will  or  deed
               relating to the affairs of the family to which any such
               deceased person belonged, or in any family pedigree, or
               upon any  tombstone, family  portrait or other thing on
               which such  statements are  usually made, and when such
               statement was  made before  the question in dispute was
               raised.
 
or in document relating to transaction mentioned in section 13, clause
(a);
 
          (7) When  the statement  is contained  in any  deed, will or
               other document which relates to any such transaction as
               is mentioned in section 13, clause (a).
 
or is  made by  several persons  and expresses  feelings  relevant  to
matter in question.
 
          (8) When  the statement was made by a number of persons, and
               expressed  feelings   or  impressions   on  their  part
               relevant to the matter in question.
 
                            Illustrations.
 
     (a) The question is, whether A was murdered by B; or
 
     A dies  of injuries  received in  a transaction  in the course of
which she was ravished. The question is whether she was ravished by B;
or
     The  question   is,  whether   A  was  killed  by  B  under  such
circumstances that a suit would lie against B by A's widow.
 
     Statements made  by A  as to  the cause  of  his  or  her  death,
referring respectively  to the  murder, the  rape and  the  actionable
wrong under consideration, are relevant facts.
 
     (b) The question is as to the date of A's birth.
 
     An entry in the diary of a deceased surgeon regularly kept in the
course of  business, stating  that, on  a given  day he  attended  A's
mother and delivered her of a son, is a relevant fact.
 
     (c) The question is, whether A was in Calcutta on a given day.
 
     A statement  in the diary of a deceased solicitor, regularly kept
in the  course of business, that on a given day the solicitor attended
A at  a place  mentioned, in  Calcutta, for  the purpose of conferring
with him upon specified business, is a relevant fact.
 
     (d) The question is, whether a ship sailed from Bombay harbour on
a given day.
 
     A letter  written by  a deceased  member of  a merchant's firm by
which she was chartered to their correspondents in London, to whom the
cargo was  consigned, stating that the ship sailed on a given day from
Bombay harbour, is a relevant fact.
---------------------------------------------------------------------
1.   Ins. by Act 18 of 1872, s. 2
 
19
 
     (e) The question is, whether rent was paid to A for certain land.
 
     A letter  from A's  deceased agent  to  A,  saying  that  he  had
received the  rent on  A's account  and held  it at  A's orders,  is a
relevant fact.
 
     (f) The question is, whether A and B were legally married.
 
     The statement  of a deceased clergyman that he married them under
such circumstances that the celebration would be a crime, is relevant.
 
     (g) The  question is,  whether A,  a person  who cannot be found,
wrote a letter on a certain day. The fact that a letter written by him
is dated on that day is relevant.
 
     (h) The question is, what was the cause of the wreck of a ship.
 
     A protest  made  by  the  Captain,  whose  attendance  cannot  be
procured, is a relevant fact.
 
     (i) The question is, whether a given road is a public way.
 
     A statement  by A,  a deceased  headman of  the village, that the
road was public, is a relevant fact.
 
     (j) The question is, what was the price of grain on a certain day
in a particular market.
 
     A statement  of the  price, made  by  a  deceased  banya  in  the
ordinary course of his business, is a relevant fact.
 
     (k) The question is, whether A, who is dead, was the father of B.
 
     A statement by A that B was his son, is a relevant fact.
 
     (l) The question is, what was the date of the birth of A.
 
     A letter  from A's  deceased father  to a  friend, announcing the
birth of A on a given day, is a relevant fact.
 
     (m) The question is, whether, and when, A and B were married.
 
     An entry  in a memorandum-book by C, the deceased father of B, of
his daughter's marriage with A on a given date, is a relevant fact.
 
     (n) A  sues B  for a  libel expressed  in  a  painted  caricature
exposed in  a shop window. The question is as to the similarity of the
caricature and  its libellous  character. The  remarks of  a crowd  of
spectators on these points may be proved.
 
 
33.
 
 
Relevancy of  certain evidence  for proving, in subsequent proceeding,
the truth of facts therein stated.
 
 
     33. Relevancy  of certain  evidence for  proving,  in  subsequent
proceeding, the  truth of  facts therein  stated.-Evidence  given by a
witness in  a judicial  proceeding, or before any person authorized by
law to  take it,  is  relevant  for  the  purpose  of  proving,  in  a
subsequent judicial  proceeding, or  in a  later  stage  of  the  same
judicial proceeding,  the truth of the facts which it states, when the
witness is  dead or  cannot  be  found,  or  is  incapable  of  giving
evidence, or  is kept  out of  the way by the adverse party, or if his
presence cannot  be obtained  without an  amount of  delay or  expense
which, under  the circumstances  of  the  case,  the  Court  considers
unreasonable;
 
     Provided--
 
          that the  proceeding was  between the  same parties or their
               representatives in interest;
 
20
 
          that the adverse party in the first proceeding had the right
               and opportunity to cross-examine;
 
          that the  questions in  issue were substantially the same in
               the first as in the second proceeding.
 
     Explanation.--A criminal trial or inquiry shall be deemed to be a
proceeding between  the prosecutor  and the accused within the meaning
of this section.
 
             STATEMENTS MADE UNDER SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES
 
 
34.
 
 
Entries in books of account when relevant.
 
 
    34. Entries in books of account when relevant.-1* Entries in books
of account,  regularly kept  in the  course of  business, are relevant
whenever they  refer to  a matter into which the Court has to inquire,
but such  statements shall  not alone be sufficient evidence to charge
any person with liability.
 
                            Illustration
 
     A sues  B for  Rs. 1,000,  and shows entries in his account books
showing B  to be  indebted to  him to  this amount.  The  entries  are
relevant, but are not sufficient, without other evidence, to prove the
debt.
 
 
35.
 
 
Relevancy of entry in public record made in performance of duty.
 
 
     35. Relevancy  of entry  in public  record made in performance of
duty.-An  entry in  any public  or other  official book,  register  or
record, stating a fact in issue or relevant fact, and made by a public
servant in  the discharge of his official duty, or by any other person
in performance  of a duty specially enjoined by the law of the country
in which  such book,  register or record is kept, is itself a relevant
fact.
 
 
36.
 
 
Relevancy of statements in maps, charts and plans.
 
 
     36. Relevancy of statements in maps, charts and plans.-Statements
of facts  in issue or relevant facts, made in published maps or charts
generally offered  for public sale, or in maps or plans made under the
authority of 2*[the Central Government or any State Government], as to
matters usually  represented or  stated in such maps, charts or plans,
are themselves relevant facts.
 
 
37.
 
 
Relevancy of  statement as  to fact  of  public  nature  contained  in
certain Acts or notifications.
 
 
     37. Relevancy  of statement as to fact of public nature contained
in certain  Acts or  notifications.-When  the Court  has  to  form  an
opinion as  to the  existence of  any fact  of a  public  nature,  any
statement of  it, made in a recital contained in any Act of Parliament
3*[of the United Kingdom] or in
---------------------------------------------------------------------
1.   Cf. the  Code of  Civil Procedure,  1908 (Act 5 of 1908), Sch. I,
     Order VII,  Rule 17.  As to  admissibility  in   evidence    of
     certified copies of  entries in  Bankers' books, see the Bankers'
     Books Evidence Act, 1891 (18 of 1891), s. 4.
2.   Subs. by the A. O. 1948 for "any Govt. in British India".
3.   Ins by the A. O. 1950.
 
21
 
any 1*[Central  Act, Provincial  Act  or  2*[a  State  Act]  or  in  a
Government notification  or notification  by the  Crown Representative
appearing in  the Official  Gazette or in any printed paper purporting
to be  the London  Gazette or  the Government Gazette of any Dominion,
colony or possession of his Majesty is a relevant fact].
 
     3*              *              *              *                 *
 
 
 
38.
 
 
Relevancy of statements as to any law contained in law-books.
 
 
    38. Relevancy of statements as to any law contained in law-books.-
When the  Court has to form an opinion as to a law of any country, any
statement of  such law contained in a book purporting to be printed or
published under the authority of the Government of such country and to
contain any such law, and any report of a ruling of the Courts of such
country contained in a book purporting to be a report of such rulings,
is relevant.
 
               HOW MUCH OF A STATEMENT IS TO BE PROVED
 
 
39.
 
 
What evidence to be given when statement forms part of a conversation,
document, book or series of letters or papers.
 
 
     39. What  evidence to  be given  when statement  forms part  of a
conversation, document,  book or series of letters or papers.-When any
statement of which evidence is given forms part of a longer statement,
or of  a conversation or part of an isolated document, or is contained
in a  document which forms part of a book, or of a connected series of
letters or  papers, evidence  shall be given of so much and no more of
the statement,  conversation, document,  book or  series of letters or
papers as the Court considers necessary in that particular case to the
full understanding  of the  nature and effect of the statement, and of
the circumstances under which it was made.
 
             JUDGMENTS OF COURTS OF JUSTICE WHEN RELEVANT
 
 
40.
 
 
Previous judgments relevant to bar a second suit or trial.
 
 
     40. Previous  judgments relevant  to bar a second suit or trial.-
The existence  of any  judgment, order or decree which by law prevents
any Court  from taking  cognizance of  a suit or holding a trial, is a
relevant fact  when the  question is  whether such Court ought to take
cognizance of such suit or to hold such trial.
 
 
41.
 
 
Relevancy of certain judgments in probate, etc., jurisdiction.
 
 
     41.  Relevancy   of   certain   judgments   in   probate,   etc.,
jurisdiction.-A  final judgment, order or decree of a competent Court,
in the  exercise of  probate,  matrimonial,  admiralty  or  insolvency
jurisdiction,
---------------------------------------------------------------------
1.   The original  words were "Act of the Governor General of India in
     Council or of the Governors in Council of Madras or Bombay, or of
     the Lieutenant-Governor in Council of Bengal, or in a notification
     of the Govt. appearing in the  Gazette of India, or in the Gazette
     of  any L. G., or in any printed paper purporting to be the London
     Gazette  or  the Govt. Gazette  of any colony or possession of the
     Queen,  is  a  relevant  fact". This  was  amended  first  by  the
     Repealing and Amending Act, 1914 (10 of 1914), and then by the A.O.
     1937, the A. O. 1948 and the A. O. 1950 to read as above.
2.   Subs. by  Act 3  of 1951,  s. 3  and Sch.,  for "an  Act  of  the
     Legislature of a Part A State or a Part C State".
3.   The last paragraph omitted by Act 10 of 1914.
 
22
 
which confers  upon or takes away from any person any legal character,
or which  declares any person to be entitled to any such character, or
to be  entitled to  any specific  thing, not  as against any specified
person but  absolutely, is  relevant when  the existence  of any  such
legal character, or the title of any such person to any such thing, is
relevant.
 
     Such judgment, order or decree is conclusive proof-
 
          that any  legal character  which it  confers accrued  at the
               time when  such judgment,  order or  decree  came  into
               operation;
 
          that any  legal character,  to which  it declares  any  such
               person to  be entitled,  accrued to  that person at the
               time when such judgment 1*[order or decree] declares it
               to have accrued to that person;
 
          that any  legal character  which it takes away from any such
               person ceased  at the  time from  which such  judgment,
               1*[order or  decree] declared  that it  had  ceased  or
               should cease;
 
          and that  anything to  which it declares any person to be so
               entitled was  the property  of that  person at the time
               from which  such judgment, 1*[order or decree] declares
               that it had been or should be his property.
 
 
42.
 
 
Relevancy and effect of judgments, orders or decrees, other than those
mentioned in section 41.
 
 
     42. Relevancy  and effect  of judgments, orders or decrees, other
than those mentioned in section 41.-Judgments, orders or decrees other
than those  mentioned in  section 41  are relevant  if they  relate to
matters  of  a  public  nature  relevant  to  the  enquiry;  but  such
judgments, orders  or decrees  are not  conclusive proof of that which
they state.
 
                            Illustration
 
     A sues  B for  trespass on his land. B alleges the existence of a
public right of way over the land, which A denies.
 
     The existence  of a  decree in favour of the defendant, in a suit
by A against C for a trespass on the same land, in which C alleged the
existence of  the same  right of  way, is  relevant,  but  it  is  not
conclusive proof that the right of way exists.
 
 
43
 
 
Judgments, etc., other than those mentioned in sections 40 to 42, when
relevant.
 
 
     43. Judgments, etc., other than those mentioned in sections 40 to
42, when  relevant.-Judgments,  orders or  decrees, other  than  those
mentioned in  sections 40,  41 and  42,  are  irrelevant,  unless  the
existence of such
---------------------------------------------------------------------
1    Ins. by Act 18 of 1872, s. 3.
---------------------------------------------------------------------
 
33
 
judgment, order  or decree  is a  fact in  issue, or is relevant under
some other provision of this Act.
 
                            Illustrations
 
     (a) A and B separately sue C for a libel which reflects upon each
of them.  C in  each case says that the matter alleged to be libellous
is true,  and the  circumstances are  such that it is probably true in
each case, or in neither.
 
     A obtains  a decree  against C  for damages  on the ground that C
failed to  make out  his justification.  The  fact  is  irrelevant  as
between B and C.
 
     (b) A prosecutes B for adultery with C, A's wife.
 
     B denies  that C  is A's  wife,  but  the  Court  convicts  B  of
adultery.
 
     Afterwards, C  is prosecuted  for bigamy in marrying B during A's
lifetime. C says that she never was A's wife.
 
     The judgment against B is irrelevant as against C.
 
     (c) A prosecutes B for stealing a cow from him. B is convicted.
 
     A afterwards  sues C  for the cow, which B had sold to him before
his conviction.  As between  A  and  C, the   judgment  against  B  is
irrelevant.
 
     (d) A has obtained a decree for the possession of land against B.
C, B's son, murders A in consequence.
 
     The existence  of the judgment is relevant, as showing motive for
a crime.
 
     1*[(e) A  is charged  with theft  and with having been previously
convicted of  theft. The  previous conviction is relevant as a fact in
issue.
 
     (f) A  is tried for the murder of B. The fact that B prosecuted A
for libel  and that  A was  convicted and  sentenced is relevant under
section 8 as showing the motive for the fact in issue.]
 
 
44.
 
 
Fraud or  collusion in  obtaining judgment,  or incompetency of Court,
may be proved.
 
 
     44. Fraud  or collusion in obtaining judgment, or incompetency of
Court, may be proved.-Any party to a suit or other proceeding may show
that any  judgment, order  or decree  which is  relevant under section
40,41 or  42, and  which has  been proved  by the  adverse party,  was
delivered by  a Court  not competent to deliver it, or was obtained by
fraud or collusion.
 
               OPINIONS OF THIRD PERSONS WHEN RELEVANT
 
 
45.
 
 
Opinions of experts.
 
 
     45. Opinions  of  experts.-When the  Court has to form an opinion
upon a  point of foreign law, or of science, or art, or as to identity
of handwriting 2*[or finger impressions], the opinions upon that point
of persons  specially skilled  in such  foreign law,  science or  art,
3*[or in  questions  as  to  identity  of  handwriting]  2*[or  finger
impressions] are relevant facts.
 
     Such persons are called experts.
---------------------------------------------------------------------
1.  Ins. by Act 3 of 1891, s. 5.
2.  Ins. by  Act 5  of 1899,  s. 3.  For discussion  in Council as to
    whether " finger  impressions"  include  "thumb impressions," see
    Gazette of India, 1898, Pt. VI, p. 24.
3.  Ins. by Act 18 of 1872, s. 4.
 
24
 
                            Illustrations
 
     (a) The  questions is,  whether the  death of  A  was  caused  by
poison.
 
     The opinions of experts as to the symptoms produced by the poison
by which A is supposed to have died, are relevant.
 
     (b) The  question is,  whether A,  at the time of doing a certain
act, was,  by reason  of unsoundness of mind, incapable of knowing the
nature of  the act,  or that  he was  doing what  was either  wrong or
contrary to law.
 
     The opinions  of experts  upon the  question whether the symptoms
exhibited by  A commonly  show unsoundness  of mind,  and whether such
unsoundness of  mind usually  renders persons incapable of knowing the
nature of  the acts  which they do, or of knowing that what they do is
either wrong or contrary to law, are relevant.
 
     (c) The question is, whether a certain document was written by A.
Another document  is produced which is proved or admitted to have been
written by A.
 
     The opinions of experts on the question whether the two documents
were written by the same person or by different persons, are relevant.
 
 
46.
 
 
Facts bearing upon opinions of experts.
 
 
     46. Facts  bearing upon opinions of experts.-Facts, not otherwise
relevant, are  relevant if  they support  or are inconsistent with the
opinions of experts, when such opinions are relevant.
 
                            Illustrations
 
     (a) The question is, whether A was poisoned by a certain poison.
 
     The fact  that other  persons, who  were poisoned by that poison,
exhibited certain  symptoms which  experts affirm  or deny  to be  the
symptoms of that poison, is relevant.
 
     (b) The  question is,  whether an  obstruction to  a  harbour  is
caused by a certain sea-wall.
 
     The  fact   that  other  harbours  similarly  situated  in  other
respects, but  where  there  were  no  such  sea-walls,  began  to  be
obstructed at about the same time, is relevant.
 
 
47.
 
 
Opinion as to handwriting, when relevant.
 
 
     47. Opinion as to hand-writing, when relevant.-When the Court has
to form  an opinion  as to the person by whom any document was written
or signed,  the opinion  of any person acquainted with the handwriting
of the  person by  whom it is supposed to be written or signed that it
was or was not written or signed by that person, is a relevant fact.
 
     Explanation.--A  person   is  said  to  be  acquainted  with  the
handwriting of  another person  when he has seen that person write, or
when he has received documents purporting to be written by that person
in answer  to documents  written by himself or under his authority and
addressed to that person, or when, in the ordinary course of business,
documents purporting to be written by that person have been habitually
submitted to him.
 
25
 
                            Illustration
 
     The question  is, whether a given letter is in the handwriting of
A, a merchant in London.
 
     B is a merchant in Calcutta, who has written letters addressed to
A and  received letters  purporting to  be written  by him.  C, is B's
clerk, whose  duty it was to examine and file B's correspondence. D is
B's broker,  to whom  B habitually submitted the letters purporting to
be written by A for the purpose of advising with him thereon.
 
     The opinions  of B, C and D on the question whether the letter is
in the  handwriting of  A are relevant, though neither B, C nor D ever
saw A write.
 
 
48.
 
 
Opinion as to existence of right or custom, when relevant.
 
 
     48. Opinion as to  existence of  right or custom, when relevant.-
When  the  Court has  to form  an opinion  as to  the existence of any
general  custom  or right, the opinions, as to the existence  of  such
custom  or  right,  of  persons who would be likely  to  know  of  its
existence if it existed, are relevant.
 
     Explanation.--The expression  "general custom  or right" includes
customs or rights common to any considerable class of persons.
 
                            Illustration
 
     The right  of the  villagers of  a particular  village to use the
water of  a particular  well is  a general right within the meaning of
this section.
 
 
49.
 
 
Opinion as to usages, tenets, etc., when relevant.
 
 
     49. Opinion  as to  usages, tenets, etc., when relevant.-When the
Court has to form an opinion as to--
 
          the usages and tenets of any body of men or family,
 
          the  constitution   and  government   of  any  religious  or
               charitable foundation, or
 
          the meaning  of words  or terms used in particular districts
               or by particular classes of people,
 
the opinions of persons having special means of knowledge thereon, are
relevant facts.
 
 
50.
 
 
Opinion on relationship, when relevant.
 
 
     50. Opinion on relationship, when relevant.-When the Court has to
form an  opinion as  to the relationship of one person to another, the
opinion,  expressed   by  conduct,   as  to   the  existence  of  such
relationship, of  any person  who,  as  a  member  of  the  family  or
otherwise, has  special means  of  knowledge  on  the  subject,  is  a
relevant fact:
 
     Provided that  such opinion  shall not  be sufficient  to prove a
marriage in  proceedings under the Indian Divorce Act (4 of 1869),  or
in prosecutions  under sections  494, 495, 497 or  498   of the Indian
Penal Code (45 of 1860).
 
26
 
                            Illustrations
 
     (a) The question is, whether A and B, were married.
 
     The fact  that they  were usually  received and  treated by their
friends as husband and wife, is relevant.
 
     (b) The  question is,  whether A was the legitimate son of B. The
fact that  A was  always treated  as such by members of the family, is
relevant.
 
 
51.
 
 
Grounds of opinion, when relevant.
 
 
     51. Grounds  of opinion,  when relevant.-Whenever  the opinion of
any living  person is  relevant, the  grounds on which such opinion is
based are also relevant.
 
                            Illustration
 
     An expert may give an account of experiments performed by him for
the purpose of forming his opinion.
 
                       CHARACTER WHEN RELEVANT
 
 
52.
 
 
In civil cases character to prove conduct imputed, irrelevant.
 
 
     52.  In   civil  cases   character  to   prove  conduct  imputed,
irrelevant.-In  civil cases  the fact that the character of any person
concerned is  such as  to render  probable or  improbable any  conduct
imputed to  him is  irrelevant, except  in so  far as  such  character
appears from facts otherwise relevant.
 
 
53.
 
 
In criminal cases previous good character relevant.
 
 
     53. In  criminal  cases  previous  good   character  relevant.-In
criminal proceedings  the fact  that the  person accused  is of a good
character is relevant.
 
 
54.
 
 
Previous bad character not relevant, except in reply.
 
 
     1*[54. Previous  bad character  not relevant, except in reply.-In
criminal proceedings  the fact  that the  accused  person  has  a  bad
character is  irrelevant, unless evidence has been given that he has a
good character, in which case it becomes relevant.
 
     Explanation 1.--This section does not apply to cases in which the
bad character of any person is itself a fact in issue.
 
     Explanation 2.--A  previous conviction is relevant as evidence of
bad character.]
 
 
55.
 
 
Character as affecting damages.
 
 
     55. Character  as affecting damages.-In civil cases the fact that
the character of any person is such as to affect the amount of damages
which he ought to receive, is relevant.
 
     Explanation.--In sections 52, 53, 54 and 55, the word "character"
includes both  reputation and  disposition; but, 2*[except as provided
in section  54], evidence  may be given only of general reputation and
general disposition, and not of particular acts by which reputation or
disposition were shown.
---------------------------------------------------------------------
1.   Subs. by Act 3 of 1891, s. 6, for the original section.
2.   Ins. by s. 7, ibid.
 
27
 
 
PART II
 
 
ON PROOF
 
 
                               PART II
 
                               ON PROOF
 
 
CHAPTER III
 
 
FACTS WHICH NEED NOT BE PROVED
 
 
                             CHAPTER III.
 
                    FACTS WHICH NEED NOT BE PROVED
 
 
56.
 
 
Fact judicially noticeable need not be proved.
 
 
     56. Fact  judicially noticeable  need not  be proved.  No fact of
which the Court will take judicial notice need be proved.
 
 
57.
 
 
Facts of which Court must take judicial notice.
 
 
     57. Facts  of which  Court must  take judicial  notice. The Court
shall take judicial notice of the following facts:--
 
          1*[(1) All laws in force in the territory of India;]
 
          (2) All  public Acts  passed or  hereafter to  be passed  by
               Parliament 2*[of the United Kingdom], and all local and
               personal Acts  directed by  Parliament 2*[of the United
               Kingdom] to be judicially noticed;
 
          (3) Articles  of War  for 3*[the Indian] Army 4*[Navy or Air
               Force];
 
          5*[(4) The  course of proceeding of Parliament of the United
               Kingdom, of  the  Constituent  Assembly  of  India,  of
               Parliament and  of the  legislatures established  under
               any laws  for the  time being in force in a Province or
               in the States;]
 
          (5) The  accession and  the sign manual of the Sovereign for
               the time  being of  the United Kingdom of Great Britain
               and Ireland:
 
          (6) All  seals of which English Courts take judicial notice;
               the seals of all the 6*[Courts in 7*[India]] and of all
               Courts out of 7*[India] established by the authority of
               8*[the Central Government or the Crown Representative]:
               the  seals   of  Courts   of  Admiralty   and  Maritime
               Jurisdiction and  of Notaries  Public,  and  all  seals
               which any person
---------------------------------------------------------------------
1.   Subs. by the A. O. 1950 for the former para.
2.   Ins. ibid.
3.   Subs., ibid., for "Her Majesty's".
4.   Subs. by Act 10 of 1927, s. 2 and Sch. I, for "or Navy".
5.   Subs. by the A. O. 1950 for the former para. (4).
6.   Subs. by the A. O. 1948 for "Courts of British India".
7.   Subs. by Act 3 of 1951, s. 3 and Sch., for "the States".
8.   Subs. by the A. O. 1937 for "the G. G. or any L. G. in Council".
 
38
 
               is authorized  to use  by 1*[the Constitution or an Act
               of Parliament  of the  United Kingdom  or  an]  Act  or
               Regulation having the force of law in 2*[India];
 
          (7) The  accession to  office, names,  titles, functions and
               signatures of  the persons  filling for  the time being
               any public  office in  any State,  if the fact of their
               appointment  to  such  office  is  notified  in  3*[any
               Official Gazette];
 
          (8) The existence, title and national flag of every State or
               Sovereign recognized by 4*[the Government of India];
 
          (9) The divisions of time, the geographical divisions of the
               world,  and   public  festivals,   fasts  and  holidays
               notified in the Official Gazette;
 
          (10) The territories under the dominion of 4*[the Government
               of India];
 
          (11)  The   commencement,  continuance  and  termination  of
               hostilities between 4*[the Government of India] and any
               other State or body of persons;
 
          (12) The  names of the members and officers of the Court and
               of  their   deputies  and   subordinate   offices   and
               assistants,  and   also  of   all  officers  acting  in
               execution  of   its  process,  and  of  all  advocates,
               attorneys, proctors, vakils, pleaders and other persons
               authorized by law to appear or act before it;
 
          (13) The rule of the road 5*[on land or at sea].
 
     In all  these cases  and also  on all  matters of public history,
literature, science  or art,  the Court  may resort  for  its  aid  to
appropriate books or documents of reference.
 
     If the Court is called upon by any person to take judicial notice
of any  fact, it  may refuse  to do  so unless  and until  such person
produces any  such book  or document  as it  may consider necessary to
enable it to do so.
 
 
58.
 
 
Facts admitted need not be proved.
 
 
     58. Facts  admitted need not be proved. No fact need be proved in
any proceeding  which the  parties thereto their agents agree to admit
at the hearing, or which, before
---------------------------------------------------------------------
1.   Subs. by the A. O. 1950 for "any Act of Parliament or other".
2.   Subs. by Act 3 of 1951, s. 3 and Sch., for "the States".
3.   Subs. by  the A. O. 1937  for "the Gazette of  India or  in  the
     Official Gazette of any L. G."
4.   Subs. by the A. O. 1950 for "the British Crown".
5.   Ins. by Act 18 of 1872, s. 5.
 
29
 
the hearing,  they agree to admit by any writing under their hands, or
which by  any rule of pleading in force at the time they are deemed to
have admitted by their pleadings:
 
     Provided that the Court may, in its discretion, require the facts
admitted to be proved otherwise than by such admissions.
 
 
CHAPTER IV
 
 
OF ORAL EVIDENCE
 
 
                             CHAPTER IV.
 
                           OF ORAL EVIDENCE
 
 
59.
 
 
Proof of facts by oral evidence.
 
 
     59. Proof  of facts  by oral  evidence.  All  facts,  except  the
contents of documents, may be proved by oral evidence.
 
 
60.
 
 
Oral evidence must be direct.
 
 
     60. Oral  evidence must  be direct.  Oral evidence  must, in  all
cases whatever, be direct; that is to say--
 
          if it  refers to  a fact which could be seen, it must be the
               evidence of a witness who says he saw it;
 
          if it  refers to a fact which could be heard, it must be the
               evidence of a witness who says he heard it;
 
          if it refers to a fact which could be perceived by any other
               sense or  in any  other manner, it must be the evidence
               of a  witness who says he perceived it by that sense or
               in that manner;
 
          if it  refers to  an opinion or to the grounds on which that
               opinion is  held, it must be the evidence of the person
               who holds that opinion on those grounds:
 
     Provided that  the opinions  of experts expressed in any treatise
commonly offered  for sale, and the grounds on which such opinions are
held, may  be proved by the production of such treatises if the author
is dead  or cannot  be  found,  or  has  become  incapable  of  giving
evidence, or  cannot be called as a witness without an amount of delay
or expense which the Court regards as unreasonable:
 
     Provided also  that, if  oral evidence refers to the existence or
condition of  any material thing other than a document, the Court may,
if it  thinks fit,  require the  production of such material thing for
its inspection.
 
 
CHAPTER V
 
 
OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
 
 
                              CHAPTER V.
 
                       OF DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
 
 
61.
 
 
Proof of contents of documents.
 
 
     61. Proof of contents of documents. The contents of documents may
be proved either by primary or by secondary evidence.
 
30
 
 
62.
 
 
Primary evidence.
 
 
     62. Primary  evidence. Primary evidence means the document itself
produced for the inspection of the Court.
 
     Explanation 1.--Where  a document  is executed  in several parts,
each part is primary evidence of the document:
 
     Where a  document is  executed in  counterpart, each  counterpart
being executed by one or some of the parties only, each counterpart is
primary evidence as against the parties executing it.
 
     Explanation 2.--Where  a number  of documents are all made by one
uniform  process,   as  in   the  case  of  printing,  lithography  or
photography, each  is primary  evidence of  the contents  of the rest;
but, where  they are  all copies  of a  common original,  they are not
primary evidence of the contents of the original.
 
                            Illustration
 
     A person  is shown  to have  been in  possession of  a number  of
placards, all  printed at  one time  from one original. Any one of the
placards is  primary evidence of the contents of any other, but no one
of them is primary evidence of the contents of the original.
 
 
63.
 
 
Secondary evidence.
 
 
     63. Secondary evidence. Secondary evidence means and includes--
 
          (1) certified  copies given under the provisions hereinafter
               contained; 1*
 
          (2) copies  made from  the original  by mechanical processes
               which in  themselves insure  the accuracy  of the copy,
               and copies compared with such copies;
 
          (3) copies made from or compared with the original;
 
          (4) counterparts of documents as against the parties who did
               not execute them;
 
          (5) oral  accounts of  the contents  of a  document given by
               some person who has himself seen it.
 
                            Illustrations
 
     (a) A  photograph of  an original  is secondary  evidence of  its
contents, though  the two have not been compared, if it is proved that
the thing photographed was the original.
 
     (b) A  copy compared  with a  copy of  a letter made by a copying
machine is  secondary evidence of the contents of the letter, if it is
shown that  the copy  made by  the copying  machine was  made from the
original.
---------------------------------------------------------------------
1.   See s. 76, infra.
 
31
 
     (c) A  copy transcribed from a copy, but afterwards compared with
the original,  is secondary  evidence; but the copy not so compared is
not secondary  evidence of  the original, although the copy from which
it was transcribed was compared with the original.
 
     (d) Neither an oral account of a copy compared with the original,
nor an  oral account  of a photograph or machine-copy of the original,
is secondary evidence of the original.
 
 
64.
 
 
Proof of documents by primary evidence.
 
 
     64. Proof  of documents  by primary  evidence. Documents  must be
proved by primary evidence except in the cases hereinafter mentioned.
 
 
65.
 
 
Cases in which secondary evidence relating to documents may be given.
 
 
     65. Cases  in which  secondary evidence relating to documents may
be given.  Secondary evidence may be given of the existence, condition
or contents of a document in the following cases:--
 
          (a) when  the original  is shown  or appears  to be  in  the
               possession or power--
 
                    of the  person against whom the document is sought
               to be proved, or
 
                    of any  person out of reach of, or not subject to,
               the process of the Court, or
 
                    of any person legally bound to produce it,
 
                    and when,  after the  notice mentioned  in section
               66, such person does not produce it;
 
          (b)  when  the  existence,  condition  or  contents  of  the
               original have  been proved to be admitted in writing by
               the  person  against  whom  it  is  proved  or  by  his
               representative in interest;
 
          (c) when  the original  has been  destroyed or lost, or when
               the party offering evidence of its contents cannot, for
               any other  reason not  arising from  his own default or
               neglect, produce it in reasonable time;
 
          (d) when  the original  is of  such a  nature as  not to  be
               easily movable;
 
          (e) when  the original  is  a  public  document  within  the
               meaning of section 74;
 
          (f) when  the original  is a  document of  which a certified
               copy is  permitted by  this Act, or by any other law in
               force in 1*[India] to be given in evidence; 2*
---------------------------------------------------------------------
1.   Subs. by Act 3 of 1951, s. 3 and Sch., for "the States".
2.   Cf. the Bankers' Books Evidence Act, 1891 (18 of 1891), s. 4.
 
32
 
          (g) when the originals consist of numerous accounts or other
               documents which  cannot  conveniently  be  examined  in
               Court and  the fact  to be proved is the general result
               of the whole collection.
 
     In cases (a), (c) and (d), any secondary evidence of the contents
of the document is admissible.
 
     In case (b), the written admission is admissible.
 
     In case  (e) or  (f), a  certified copy  of the  document, but no
other kind of secondary evidence, is admissible.
 
     In case  (g), evidence  may be  given as to the general result of
the documents  by any person who has examined them, and who is skilled
in the examination of such documents.
 
 
66.
 
 
Rules as to notice to produce.
 
 
     66. Rules  as to  notice to  produce. Secondary  evidence of  the
contents of the documents referred to in section 65, clause (a), shall
not be  given unless  the  party  proposing  to  give  such  secondary
evidence has  previously given  to the  party in  whose possession  or
power the  document is, 1*[or to his attorney or pleader,] such notice
to produce  it as is prescribed by law; and if no notice is prescribed
by law,  then such  notice as the Court considers reasonable under the
circumstances of the case:
 
     Provided that  such notice  shall not  be required  in  order  to
render secondary evidence admissible in any of the following cases, or
in any other case in which the Court thinks fit to dispense with it:--
 
          (1) when the document to be proved is itself a notice;
 
          (2) when,  from the  nature of  the case,  the adverse party
               must know that he will be required to produce it;
 
          (3) when  it appears or is proved that the adverse party has
               obtained possession of the original by fraud or force;
 
          (4) when  the adverse party or his agent has the original in
               Court;
 
          (5) when  the adverse  party or  his agent  has admitted the
               loss of the document;
 
          (6) when  the person in possession of the document is out of
               reach of, or not subject to, the process of the Court.
 
 
67.
 
 
Proof of signature and handwriting of person alleged to have signed or
written document produced.
 
 
     67. Proof  of signature and handwriting of person alleged to have
signed or  written document  produced. If  a document is alleged to be
signed or  to have  been written  wholly or in part by any person, the
signature or the handwriting
---------------------------------------------------------------------
1.   Ins. by Act 18 of 1872, s. 6.
 
33
 
of so  much of  the document  as is  alleged to  be in  that  person's
handwriting must be proved to be in his handwriting.
 
 
68.
 
 
Proof of execution of document required by law to be attested.
 
 
     68. Proof  of  execution  of  document  required  by  law  to  be
attested. If  a document  is required  by law to be attested, it shall
not be  used as evidence until one attesting witness at least has been
called for  the purpose  of proving  its execution,  if  there  be  an
attesting witness  alive, and  subject to the process of the Court and
capable of giving evidence:
 
     1*[Provided that  it shall  not be necessary to call an attesting
witness in  proof of  the execution of any document, not being a will,
which has  been registered  in accordance  with the  provisions of the
Indian Registration  Act, 1908  (16 of 1908),  unless its execution by
the person  by whom  it purports to have been executed is specifically
denied.]
 
 
69.
 
 
Proof where no attesting witness found.
 
 
     69. Proof  where no attesting witness found. If no such attesting
witness can  be found,  or if  the  document  purports  to  have  been
executed in the United Kingdom, it must be proved that the attestation
of one  attesting witness at least is in his handwriting, and that the
signature of  the person  executing the document is in the handwriting
of that person.
 
 
70.
 
 
Admission of execution by party to attested document.
 
 
     70. Admission  of execution  by party  to attested  document. The
admission of  a party  to an  attested document  of its  execution  by
himself shall  be sufficient  proof of  its execution  as against him,
though it be a document required by law to be attested.
 
 
71.
 
 
Proof when attesting witness denies the execution.
 
 
     71. Proof  when attesting  witness denies  the execution.  If the
attesting witness  denies or  does not  recollect the execution of the
document, its execution may be proved by other evidence.
 
 
72.
 
 
Proof of document not required by law to be attested.
 
 
     72. Proof  of document  not required  by law  to be  attested. An
attested document  not required by law to be attested may be proved as
if it was unattested.
 
 
73.
 
 
Comparison of  signature, writing  or seal  with  others  admitted  or
proved.
 
 
     73. Comparison of signature, writing or seal with others admitted
or proved.  In order to ascertain whether a signature, writing or seal
is that  of the  person by  whom it  purports to  have been written or
made, any  signature, writing  or  seal  admitted  or  proved  to  the
satisfaction of  the Court to have been written or made by that person
may be  compared with  the one  which is  to be  proved, although that
signature, writing  or seal  has not  been produced  or proved for any
other purpose.
 
     The Court  may direct  any person  present in  Court to write any
words or figures for the purpose of enabling the Court to compare
---------------------------------------------------------------------
1.   Ins. by Act 31 of 1926, s. 2.
 
34
 
the words  or figures  so written with any words or figures alleged to
have been written by such person.
 
     1*[This section  applies also,  with any necessary modifications,
to finger-impressions.]
 
                           PUBLIC DOCUMENTS
 
 
74.
 
 
Public documents.
 
 
     74.  Public   documents.  The   following  documents  are  public
documents:--
          (1) documents forming the acts or records of the acts--
                    (i)  of the sovereign authority.
                    (ii) of official bodies and tribunals, and
                    (iii) of  public officers,  legislative,  judicial
                    and executive,  2*[of any  part of India or of the
                    Common-wealth], or of a foreign country;
 
          (2)   public  records  kept  3*[in  any  State]  of  private
               documents.
 
 
75.
 
 
Private documents.
 
 
     75. Private documents. All other documents are private.
 
 
76.
 
 
Certified copies of public documents.
 
 
     76. Certified copies of public documents. Every 4* public officer
having the  custody of a public document, which any person has a right
to inspect,  shall give  that person on demand a copy of it on payment
of the legal fees therefor, together with a certificate written at the
foot of  such copy  that it  is a  true copy  of such document or part
thereof, as  the case  may be, and such certificate shall be dated and
subscribed by  such officer  with his name and his official title, and
shall be  sealed, whenever  such officer  is authorized by law to make
use of  a seal; and such copies so certified shall be called certified
copies.
 
     Explanation.--Any officer who, by the ordinary course of official
duty, is  authorized to  deliver such  copies, shall be deemed to have
the custody of such documents within the meaning of this section.
 
 
77.
 
 
Proof of documents by production of certified copies.
 
 
     77. Proof  of documents  by production  of certified copies. Such
certified copies  may be  produced in  proof of  the contents  of  the
public documents  or parts  of the  public  documents  of  which  they
purport to be copies.
---------------------------------------------------------------------
1.  Ins. by Act 5 of 1899, s. 3.
2.  The original  words "whether  of British  India, or  of any other
    part of Her Majesty's Dominions" have successively been  amended
    by the A. O. 1948 and the A. O. 1950 to read as above.
3.  Subs. by the A. O. 1950 for "in any Province".
4.  A village-officer  in  the  Punjab  has  been  declared  for  the
    purposes of  this Act  to be  a public officer having the custody
    of  a  public document--see the Punjab Land-revenue Act, 1887 (17
    of 1887), s. 151 (2).
 
35
 
 
78.
 
 
Proof of other official documents.
 
 
     78. Proof  of other  official  documents.  The  following  public
documents may be proved as follows:--
 
          (1)  Acts,   orders  or   notifications  of  1*[the  Central
               Government] in  any of  its departments,  2*[or of  the
               Crown Representative] or of any State Government or any
               department of any State Government,--
 
                    by the  records of  the departments,  certified by
               the heads of those departments respectively,
 
                    or by  any document  purporting to  be printed  by
               order of any such Government 2*[or, as the case may be,
               of the Crown Representative];
 
          (2) the proceedings of the Legislatures,--
 
                    by the  journals of  those bodies respectively, or
               by published Acts or abstracts, or by copies purporting
               to be printed 3*[by order of the Government concerned];
 
          (3) proclamations,  orders or  regulations issued  by  4*Her
               Majesty or  by the  Privy Council, or by any department
               of 4*Her Majesty's Government,--
 
                    by copies  or extracts  contained  in  the  London
               Gazette, or  purporting to  be printed  by the  Queen's
               Printer;
 
          (4) the  Acts of  the Executive  or the  proceedings of  the
               Legislature of a foreign country,--
 
                    by  journals  published  by  their  authority,  or
               commonly received in that country as such, or by a copy
               certified under  the seal  of the country or sovereign,
               or by a recognition thereof in some 5*[Central Act]:
 
          (5) the proceedings of a municipal body in 6*[a State],--
 
                    by a  copy of  such proceedings,  certified by the
               legal keeper  thereof, or  by a printed book purporting
               to be published by the authority of such body;
---------------------------------------------------------------------
1.   Subs. by  the A.  O. 1937  for "the  Executive Govt,  of  British
     India".
2.   Ins. ibid.
3.   Subs., ibid., for "by order of Govt."
4.   The words  "Her Majesty"  shall stand  unmodified, vide the A. O.
     1950.
5.   Subs. by  the A.  O. 1937 for "public Act of the Governor General
     of India in Council".
6.   Subs. by the A. O. 1950. for "a Province".
 
36
 
          (6) public  documents  of  any  other  class  in  a  foreign
               country,--
 
                    by the  original, or  by a  copy certified  by the
               legal keeper thereof, with a certificate under the seal
               of a  Notary Public,  or of  1*[an  Indian  Consul]  or
               diplomatic agent,  that the  copy is  duly certified by
               the officer  having the  legal custody of the original,
               and  upon  proof  of  the  character  of  the  document
               according to the law of the foreign country.
 
                     PRESUMPTIONS AS TO DOCUMENTS
 
 
79.
 
 
Presumption as to genuineness of certified copies.
 
 
     79. Presumption  as to genuineness of certified copies. The Court
shall presume 2*[to be genuine] every  document  purporting  to  be  a
certificate,  certified  copy  or  other  document,  which  is  by law
declared to be admissible as evidence of any particular fact and which
purports to be  duly  certified  by  any  officer  3*[of  the  Central
Government or of a State Government, or by any officer 4*[in the State
of  Jammu  and  Kashmir] who is duly authorized thereto by the Central
Government]:
 
     Provided that  such document  is substantially  in the  form  and
purports to be executed in the manner directed by law in that behalf.
 
     The Court  shall also  presume that  any officer by whom any such
document purports  to be signed or certified, held, when he signed it,
the official character which he claims in such paper.
 
 
80.
 
 
Presumption as to documents produced as record of evidence.
 
 
     80. Presumption as to  documents produced as record of evidence.-
Whenever any document is produced before any Court, purporting to be a
record or  memorandum of the evidence, or of any part of the evidence,
given by  a witness  in a  judicial proceeding  or before  any officer
authorized by  law to  take such  evidence or  to be  a  statement  or
confession by any prisoner or accused person, taken in accordance with
law, and purporting to be signed by any Judge or Magistrate, or by any
such officer as aforesaid, the Court shall presume--
 
          that the  document is genuine; that any statements as to the
               circumstances under  which it  was taken, purporting to
               be made  by the  person signing  it, are true, and that
               such evidence, statement or confession was duly taken.
---------------------------------------------------------------------
1.   Subs. by the A. O. 1950 for "a British Consul".
2.   Ins. by the A. O. 1948.
3.   The original  words beginning  from "in British India" and ending
     with the words "to  be genuine" have been successively amended by
     the A. O. 1937, A. O. 1948 and A. O. 1950 to read as above.
4.   Subs. by Act 3 of 1951, s. 3 and Sch., for "in a Part B State".
 
37
 
 
81.
 
 
Presumption as to Gazettes, newspapers, private Acts of Parliament and
other documents.
 
 
     81. Presumption  as to  Gazettes,  newspapers,  private  Acts  of
Parliament  and   other   documents.-The   Court   shall  presume  the
genuineness of  every document  purporting to be the London Gazette or
1*[any Official  Gazette, or  the Government  Gazette] of  any colony,
dependency or possession of the British Crown, or to be a newspaper or
journal, or  to be  a copy  of a  private Act  of Parliament 2*[of the
United Kingdom]  printed by  the Queen's Printer and of every document
purporting to  be a  document directed  by any  law to  be kept by any
person, if such document is kept substantially in the form required by
law and is produced from proper custody.
 
 
82.
 
 
Presumption as to document admissible in England without proof of seal
or signature.
 
 
     82. Presumption  as to  document admissible  in  England  without
proof of  seal or  signature.-When any document is produced before any
Court, purporting  to be a document which, by the law in force for the
time being  in England or Ireland, would be admissible in proof of any
particular in  any Court  of Justice  in England  or Ireland,  without
proof of  the seal  or stamp  or signature authenticating it or of the
judicial or  official character  claimed by  the  person  by  whom  it
purports to  be signed,  the Court shall presume that such seal, stamp
or signature  is genuine,  and that the person signing it held, at the
time when  he signed  it, the  judicial or official character which he
claims,
 
     and the  document shall  be admissible  for the  same purpose for
which it would be admissible in England or Ireland.
 
 
83.
 
 
Presumption as to maps or plans made by authority of Government.
 
 
     83. Presumption  as  to  maps  or  plans  made  by  authority  of
Government.-The  Court shall  presume that maps or plans purporting to
be made  by the  authority of  3*[the Central  Government or any State
Government] were  so made,  and are  accurate;  but maps or plans made
for the purposes of any cause must be proved to be accurate.
 
 
84.
 
 
Presumption as to collections of laws and reports of decisions.
 
 
     84.  Presumption  as  to  collections  of  laws  and  reports  of
decisions.-The  Court shall  presume the  genuineness  of  every  book
purporting  to  be  printed or published under the  authority  of  the
Government  of  any  country, and to contain any of the laws  of  that
country,
 
     and of  every book  purporting to contain reports of decisions of
the Courts of such country.
 
 
85.
 
 
Presumption as to powers-of-attorney.
 
 
     85. Presumption as to powers-of-attorney.-The Court shall presume
that every  document purporting to be a power-of-attorney, and to have
been executed before, and
---------------------------------------------------------------------
1.   Subs. by  the A.  O. 1937 for "the Gazette of India. or the Govt.
     Gazette of any L. G., or".
2.   Ins. by the A. O. 1950.
3.   The original  word "Government"  has successively been amended by
     the A.  O. 1937, A. O. 1948, Act 40 of 1949 and the A. O. 1950 to
     read as above.
 
38
 
authenticated by,  a Notary  Public, or  any Court, Judge, Magistrate,
1*[Indian]  Consul   or  Vice-Consul,  or  representative 2*** of  the
3*[Central Government], was so executed and authenticated.
 
 
86.
 
 
Presumption as to certified copies of foreign judicial records.
 
 
     86. Presumption  as  to  certified  copies  of  foreign  judicial
records.-The  Court may  presume that  any document purporting to be a
certified copy of any judicial record of 4*[5***  any   country    not
forming  part  of  India or] of Her Majesty's Dominions is genuine and
accurate,  if  the document purports  to be  certified in  any  manner
which  is  certified by any representative  of  6***  the   3*[Central
Government] 7*[in or for]  8*[such country]  to be the manner commonly
in use in 9*[that country] for the certification of copies of judicial
records.
 
    10*[An officer who, with respect to  11***  any territory or place
not forming part of  12*[India  or]  Her  Majesty's  Dominions,  is  a
Political  Agent  therefor, as defined in section 3, 13*[clause (43)],
of the General Clauses Act, 1897 (10 of 1897), shall, for the purposes
of this section, be deemed to be a representative  of  the  3*[Central
Government]  14*[in  and for the country] comprising that territory or
place].
 
 
87.
 
 
Presumption as to books, maps and charts.
 
 
     87. Presumption  as to  books, maps  and  charts.-The  Court  may
presume that any book to which it may refer for information on matters
of public  or general  interest, and  that any published map or chart,
the  statements of which are relevant facts and which is produced  for
its  inspection,  was written and published by the person and  at  the
time  and place, by whom or at which it purports to have been  written
or published.
---------------------------------------------------------------------
1.   Subs. by the A. O. 1950 for "British".
2.   The words "of Her Majesty, or" rep., ibid.
3.   Subs. by the A. O. 1937 for "G. of I.".
4.   Subs. by the A. O. 1950 for "any country not forming part".
5.   The words  "a Part  B State or of" omitted by Act 3 of 1951, s. 3
     and Sch.
6.   The Words "Her Majesty or of" rep. by the A. O. 1950.
7.   Subs. by Act 3 of 1891, s. 8 for "resident in".
8.   Subs. by  Act 3 of 1951, s. 3 and Sch., for "such Part B State or
     country".
9.   Subs. by s. 3 and Sch., ibid., for "that State or country".
10.  Subs,  by  Act  5 of 1899, s.4, for the para, added by Act  3  of
     1891, s.  3.
11.  The words  "a Part B State or "ins. by the A. O.. 1950 omitted by
     Act 3 of 1951, s. 3 and Sch.
12.  Ins. by the A. O. 1950.
13.  Subs., ibid., for "clause (40)".
14.  Subs. by  Act 3  of 1951, s. 3, Sch., for "in and for that Part B
     State or country".
 
39
 
 
88.
 
 
Presumption as to telegraphic messages.
 
 
     88. Presumption as to telegraphic messages.-The Court may presume
that a  message, forwarded  from a  telegraph office  to the person to
whom such message purports to be addressed, corresponds with a message
delivered for  transmission at  the  office  from  which  the  message
purports to  be sent;  but the Court shall not make any presumption as
to the person by whom such message was delivered for transmission.
 
 
89.
 
 
Presumption as to due execution, etc., of documents not produced.
 
 
     89. Presumption  as to  due execution,  etc.,  of  documents  not
produced.-The  Court shall presume that every document, called for and
not produced  after notice  to  produce,  was  attested,  stamped  and
executed in the manner required by law.
 
 
90.
 
 
Presumption as to documents thirty years old.
 
 
     90. Presumption  as to  documents thirty   years  old.-Where  any
document, purporting  or proved  to be  thirty years  old, is produced
from any  custody which  the Court  in the  particular case  considers
proper, the  Court may presume that the signature and every other part
of such  document, which  purports to  be in  the handwriting  of  any
particular person,  is in  that person's handwriting, and, in the case
of a  document executed  or attested,  that it  was duly  executed and
attested by  the persons  by whom  it  purports  to  be  executed  and
attested.
 
     Explanation.--Documents are  said to be in proper custody if they
are in the place in which, and under the care of the person with whom,
they would naturally be; but no custody is improper if it is proved to
have  had  a  legitimate  origin,  or  if  the  circumstances  of  the
particular case are such as to render such an origin probable.
 
     This explanation applies also to section 81.
 
                            Illustrations.
 
     (a) A  has been in possession of landed property for a long time.
He produces  from his  custody deeds  relating to the land showing his
titles to it. The custody is proper.
 
     (b) A  produces deeds  relating to landed property of which he is
the mortgagee. The mortgagor is in possession. The custody is proper.
 
     (c) A, a connection of B, produces deeds relating to lands in B's
possession which  were deposited  with him  by B for safe custody. The
custody is proper.
 
 
CHAPTER VI
 
 
OF THE EXCLUSION OF ORAL BY DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
 
 
                             CHAPTER VI
 
           OF THE EXCLUSION OF ORAL BY DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE
 
 
91.
 
 
Evidence of  terms of  contracts, grants  and  other  dispositions  of
property reduced to form of document.
 
 
     91. Evidence of terms of contracts, grants and other dispositions
of property reduced to form of document.-When the terms of a contract,
or of  a grant,  or of  any other  disposition of  property, have been
reduced to  the form  of a  document, and  in all  cases in  which any
matter is required by law to be
 
40
 
reduced to  the form  of a  document, no evidence 1* shall be given in
proof of  the terms  of such  contract, grant  or other disposition of
property, or  of such matter, except the document itself, or secondary
evidence of  its contents  in cases  in which  secondary  evidence  is
admissible under the provisions hereinbefore contained.
 
     Exception 1.--When  a public  officer is  required by  law to  be
appointed in  writing, and when it is shown that any particular person
has acted  as such  officer, the writing by which he is appointed need
not be proved.
 
     Exception 2.--Wills  2*[admitted to  probate in 3*[India]] may be
proved by the probate.
 
     Explanation 1.--This  section applies  equally to  cases in which
the contracts,  grants or  dispositions of  property referred  to  are
contained in  one document and to cases in which they are contained in
more documents than one.
 
     Explanation 2.--Where  there are  more originals  than  one,  one
original only need be proved.
 
     Explanation 3.--The  statement, in  any document  whatever, of  a
fact other  than the  facts referred  to in  this section,  shall  not
preclude the admission of oral evidence as to the same fact.
 
                            Illustrations
 
     (a) If  a contract  be contained  in  several  letters,  all  the
letters in which it is contained must be proved.
 
     (b) If a contract is contained in a bill of exchange, the bill of
exchange must be proved.
 
     (c) If  a bill  of exchange  is drawn in a set of three, one only
need be proved.
 
     (d) A  contracts, in  writing, with B, for the delivery of indigo
upon certain  terms. The  contract mentions the fact that B had paid A
the price of other indigo contracted for verbally on another occasion.
 
     Oral evidence  is offered  that no payment was made for the other
indigo. The evidence is admissible.
 
     (e) A gives B a receipt for money paid by B.
 
     Oral evidence is offered of the payment.
 
     The evidence is admissible.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
1.   Where, however, a Criminal Court finds that a confession or other
     statement an accused person has not been recorded in  the  manner
     prescribed, evidence may be taken that the recorded statement was
     duly  made-see  the  Code  of  Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act 5 of
     1898), s. 533.
 
2.   Subs. by  Act 18  of 1872, s. 7, for "under the Indian Succession
     Act".
3.   Subs. by Act 3 of 1951, s. 3 and Sch., for "the States".
 
41
 
 
92.
 
 
Exclusion of evidence of oral agreement.
 
 
     92. Exclusion  of evidence  of oral  agreement.-When the terms of
any such  contract, grant  or other  disposition of  property, or  any
matter required  by law  to be reduced to the form of a document, have
been proved  according to  the last  section, no  evidence of any oral
agreement or  statement shall  be admitted,  as between the parties to
any such  instrument or  their representatives  in interest,  for  the
purpose of contradicting, varying, adding to, or subtracting from, its
terms:
 
     Proviso (1).--Any  fact may  be proved which would invalidate any
document, or  which would  entitle any  person to  any decree or order
relating thereto; such as fraud, intimidation, illegality, want of due
execution, want  of capacity  in any  contracting  party,  1*[want  or
failure] of consideration, or mistake in fact or law.
 
     Proviso (2).--The  existence of any separate oral agreement as to
any  matter   on  which  a  document  is  silent,  and  which  is  not
inconsistent with  its terms, may be proved. In considering whether or
not this proviso applies, the Court shall have regard to the degree of
formality of the document.
 
     Proviso (3).--The  existence  of  any  separate  oral  agreement,
constituting a  condition precedent to the attaching of any obligation
under any  such contract,  grant or  disposition of  property, may  be
proved.
 
     Proviso (4).--The  existence  of  any  distinct  subsequent  oral
agreement to rescind or modify any such contract, grant or disposition
of property,  may be  proved, except  in cases in which such contract,
grant or  disposition of property is by law required to be in writing,
or has  been registered  according to  the law  in force  for the time
being as to the registration of documents.
 
     Proviso  (5).--Any   usage  or  custom  by  which  incidents  not
expressly mentioned  in any  contract are usually annexed to contracts
of that description, may be proved:
 
     Provided  that  the  annexing  of  such  incident  would  not  be
repugnant to, or inconsistent with, the express terms of the contract.
 
     Proviso (6).--Any  fact may  be proved which shows in what manner
the language of a document is related to existing facts.
 
                            Illustrations
 
     (a) A  policy of  insurance is  effected on  goods "in ships from
Calcutta to  London". The goods are shipped in a particular ship which
is lost.  The fact  that particular  ship was orally excepted from the
policy cannot be proved.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
1.   Subs. by Act 18 of 1872, s. 8, for "want of failure".
 
42
 
     (b) A  agrees absolutely  in writing  to pay  B Rs.  1,000 on the
first March  1873. The  fact that,  at the same time an oral agreement
was made that the money should not be paid till the thirty-first March
cannot be proved.
 
     (c) An  estate called  "the Rampore tea estate" is sold by a deed
which contains  a map  of the  property sold.  The fact  that land not
included in the map had always been regarded as part of the estate and
was meant to pass by the deed cannot be proved.
 
     (d) A  enters into  a written  contract with  B to  work  certain
mines, the  property of  B, upon certain terms. A was induced to do so
by a  misrepresentation of  B's as  to their  value. This  fact may be
proved.
 
     (e) A institutes a suit against B for the specific performance of
a contract, and also prays that the contract may be reformed as to one
of its  provisions, as that provision was inserted in it by mistake. A
may prove  that such a mistake was made as would by law entitle him to
have the contract reformed.
 
     (f) A  orders goods  of B by a letter in which nothing is said as
to the  time of  payment, and  accepts the goods on delivery. B sues A
for the price. A may show that the goods were supplied on credit for a
term still unexpired.
 
     (g) A  sells B a horse and verbally warrants him sound. A gives B
a paper  in these words: "Bought of A a horse of Rs. 500". B may prove
the verbal warranty.
 
     (h) A  hires lodgings  of B,  and gives  B a  card  on  which  is
written--"Rooms, Rs. 200 a month." A may prove a verbal agreement that
these terms were to include partial board.
 
     A hires  lodgings of  B for  a  year,  and  a  regularly  stamped
agreement, drawn up by an attorney, is made between them. It is silent
on the  subject of  board. A  may not prove that board was included in
the term verbally.
 
     (i) A  applies to  B for a debt due to A by sending a receipt for
the money.  B keeps the receipt and does not send the money. In a suit
for the amount, A may prove this.
 
     (j) A  and B  make a  contract in writing to take effect upon the
happening of  a certain  contingency. The  writing is left with B, who
sues A  upon it.  A may  show the  circumstances under  which  it  was
delivered.
 
 
93.
 
 
Exclusion of evidence to explain or amend ambiguous document.
 
 
    93. Exclusion of evidence to explain or amend ambiguous document.-
When the  language used  in a  document is,  on its face, ambiguous or
defective, evidence  may not  be given  of facts  which would show its
meaning or supply its defects.
 
                            Illustrations
 
     (a) A  agrees, in writing, to sell a horse to B for "Rs. 1,000 or
Rs. 1,500".
 
     Evidence cannot be given to show which price was to be given.
 
     (b) A  deed contains  blanks. Evidence  cannot be  given of facts
which would show how they were meant to be filled.
 
 
94.
 
 
Exclusion of  evidence against  application of  document  to  existing
facts.
 
 
     94. Exclusion  of evidence  against application  of  document  to
existing facts.-When  language  used in a document is plain in itself,
and when  it applies accurately to existing facts, evidence may not be
given to show that it was not meant to apply to such facts.
 
43
 
                            Illustration
 
     A sells  to B,  by deed,  "my estate  at  Rampur  containing  100
bighas". A has an estate at Rampur containing 100 bighas. Evidence may
not be  given of  the fact  that the  estate meant  to be sold was one
situated at a different place and of a different size.
 
 
95.
 
 
Evidence as to document unmeaning in reference to existing facts.
 
 
     95. Evidence  as to  document unmeaning  in reference to existing
facts.-When  language used  in a  document is  plain in itself, but is
unmeaning in  reference to  existing facts,  evidence may  be given to
show that it was used in a peculiar sense.
 
                            Illustration
 
     A sells to B, by deed, "my house in Calcutta".
 
     A had no house in Calcutta, but it appears that he had a house at
Howrah, of  which B  had been in possession since the execution of the
deed.
 
     These facts  may be  proved to  show that the deed related to the
house at Howrah.
 
 
96.
 
 
Evidence as  to application of language which can apply to one only of
several persons.
 
 
     96. Evidence as to application of language which can apply to one
only of  several persons.-When  the  facts are  such that the language
used might  have been  meant to  apply to  any one, and could not have
been meant  to apply  to more  than one, of several persons or things,
evidence may  be given  of facts  which show which of those persons or
things it was intended to apply to.
 
                            Illustrations
 
     (a) A agrees to sell to B, for Rs. 1,000, "my white horse". A has
two white  horses. Evidence  may be  give of facts which show which of
them was meant.
 
     (b) A  agrees to accompany B to Haidarabad. Evidence may be given
of facts  showing whether  Haidarabad in  the Dekkhan or Haiderabad in
Sind was meant.
 
 
97.
 
 
Evidence as to application of language to one of two sets of facts, to
neither of which the whole correctly applies.
 
 
     97. Evidence  as to application of language to one of two sets of
facts, to  neither of  which the  whole  correctly  applies.-When  the
language used  applies partly to one set of existing facts, and partly
to another  set of  existing facts, but the whole of it does not apply
correctly to either, evidence may be given to show to which of the two
it was meant to apply.
 
                            Illustration
 
     A agrees  to sell  to B  "my land at X in the occupation of Y". A
has land  at X, but not in the occupation of Y, and he has land in the
occupation of  Y but  it is  not at  X. Evidence may be given of facts
showing which he meant to sell.
 
 
98.
 
 
Evidence as to meaning of illegible characters, etc.
 
 
     98. Evidence as to meaning of illegible characters, etc.-Evidence
may be  given to  show  the  meaning  of  illegible  or  not  commonly
intelligible  characters, of foreign, obsolete, technical,
 
44
 
local and  provincial expressions,  of abbreviations and of words used
in a peculiar sense.
 
                            Illustration
 
     A, sculptor,  agrees to  sell to  B, "all  my mods".  A has  both
models and  modelling tools.  Evidence may  be given  to show which he
meant to sell.
 
 
99.
 
 
Who may give evidence of agreement varying terms of document.
 
 
    99. Who may give evidence of agreement varying terms of document.-
Persons who are not parties to a document, or their representatives in
interest,  may   give  evidence   of  any  facts  tending  to  show  a
contemporaneous agreement varying the terms of the document.
 
                            Illustration
 
     A and  B make  a contract  in writing that B shall sell A certain
cotton, to be paid for on delivery. At the same time they make an oral
agreement that three months credit shall be given to A. This could not
be shown  as between  A and  B, but  it might  be shown  by C,  if  it
affected his interests.
 
 
100.
 
 
Saving of provisions of Indian Succession Act relating to wills.
 
 
     100. Saving  of provisions  of Indian  Succession Act relating to
wills.-Nothing  in this Chapter contained shall be taken to affect any
of the  provisions of  the Indian  Succession Act, 1865 (10 of 1865)1*
as to the construction of wills.
 
 
PART III
 
 
PRODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE
 
 
                               PART III
 
                  PRODUCTION AND EFFECT OF EVIDENCE
 
 
CHAPTER VII
 
 
OF THE BURDEN OF PROOF
 
 
                             CHAPTER VII
 
                        OF THE BURDEN OF PROOF
 
 
101.
 
 
Burden of proof.
 
 
     101. Burden  of proof.-Whoever desires any Court to give judgment
as to any legal right or liability dependent on the existence of facts
which he asserts, must prove that those facts exist.
 
     When a  person is bound to prove the existence of any fact, it is
said that the burden of proof lies on that person.
 
                            Illustrations
 
     (a) A  desires a  Court to give judgment that B shall be punished
for a crime which A says B has committed.
 
     A must prove that B has committed the crime.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
1.   See now the Indian Succession Act, 1925 (39 of 1925), Pt. VI, Ch.
     VI.
 
45
 
     (b) A  desires a  Court to  give judgment  that he is entitled to
certain land  in the  possession of  B, by  reason of  facts which  he
asserts, and which B denies, to be true.
 
     A must prove the existence of those facts.
 
 
102.
 
 
On whom burden of proof lies.
 
 
     102. On  whom burden of proof lies.-The burden of proof in a suit
or proceeding lies on that person who would fail if no evidence at all
were given on either side.
 
                            Illustrations
 
     (a) A  sues B for land of which B is in possession, and which, as
A asserts, was left to A by the will of C, B's father.
 
     If no  evidence were given on either side, B would be entitled to
retain his possession.
 
     Therefore the burden of proof is on A.
 
     (b) A sues B for money due on a bond.
 
     The execution  of the  bond is  admitted, but  B says that it was
obtained by fraud, which A denies.
 
     If no evidence were given on either side, A would succeed, as the
bond is not disputed and the fraud is not proved.
 
     Therefore the burden of proof is on B.
 
 
103.
 
 
Burden of proof as to particular fact.
 
 
     103. Burden  of proof  as to particular fact.-The burden of proof
as to  any particular fact lies on that person who wishes the Court to
believe in  its existence,  unless it  is provided by any law that the
proof of that fact shall lie on any particular person.
 
                            Illustration
 
     1*[(a)] A prosecutes B for theft, and wishes the Court to believe
that B admitted the theft to C. A must prove the admission.
 
     B wishes  the Court  to believe that, at the time in question, he
was elsewhere. He must prove it.
 
 
104.
 
 
Burden of proving fact to be proved to make evidence admissible.
 
 
     104. Burden  of proving  fact  to  be  proved  to  make  evidence
admissible.-The  burden of  proving any fact necessary to be proved in
order to  enable any  person to  give evidence of any other fact is on
the person who wishes to give such evidence.
 
                            Illustrations
 
     (a) A  wishes to prove a dying declaration by B. A must prove B's
death.
 
     (b) A  wishes to  prove, by secondary evidence, the contents of a
lost document.
 
     A must prove that the document has been lost.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
1.   Sic. In  the Act  as published in Gazette of India, 1872, pt. IV,
     p. 1, there is no illustration (b).
 
46
 
 
105.
 
 
Burden of proving that case of accused comes within exceptions.
 
 
     105.  Burden  of  proving  that  case  of  accused  comes  within
exceptions.-When  a person  is accused  of any  offence, the burden of
proving the existence of circumstances bringing the case within any of
the General  Exceptions in  the Indian  Penal Code,  (45 of  1860)  or
within any special exception or proviso contained in any other part of
the same  Code, or  in any  law defining the offence, is upon him, and
the Court shall presume the absence of such circumstances.
 
                            Illustrations
 
     (a) A,  accused of murder, alleges that, by reason of unsoundness
of mind, he did not know the nature of the act.
 
     The burden of proof is on A.
 
     (b) A,  accused of  murder, alleges  that, by  grave  and  sudden
provocation, he was deprived of the power of self-control.
 
     The burden of proof is on A.
 
     (c) Section  325 of  the Indian  Penal Code (45 of 1860) provides
that whoever,  except  in  the  case  provided  for  by  section  335,
voluntarily  causes   grievous  hurt,  shall  be  subject  to  certain
punishments.
 
     A is charged with voluntarily causing grievous hurt under section
325.
 
     The burden  of proving  the circumstances bringing the case under
section 335 lies on A.
 
 
106.
 
 
Burden of proving fact especially within knowledge.
 
 
     106. Burden of proving fact especially within knowledge.-When any
fact is  especially within  the knowledge of any person, the burden of
proving that fact is upon him.
 
                            Illustrations
 
     (a) When a person does an act with some intention other than that
which the  character and  circumstances of the act suggest, the burden
of proving that intention is upon him.
 
     (b) A  is charged  with travelling on a railway without a ticket.
The burden of proving that he had a ticket is on him.
 
 
107.
 
 
Burden of  proving death  of person  known to  have been  alive within
thirty years.
 
 
     107. Burden  of proving  death of person known to have been alive
within thirty  years.-When  the question  is whether a man is alive or
dead, and  it is  shown that  he was  alive within  thirty years,  the
burden of proving that he is dead is on the person who affirms it.
 
 
108.
 
 
Burden of  proving that  person is alive who has not been heard of for
seven years.
 
 
     108. Burden  of proving  that person  is alive  who has  not been
heard of  for seven  years.-1*[Provided  that when]  the  question  is
whether a  man is alive or dead, and it is proved that he has not been
heard of  for seven  years by  those who would naturally have heard of
him if  he had  been alive,  the burden of proving that he is alive is
2*[shifted to] the person who affirms it.
----------------------------------------------------------------------
1.   Subs. by Act 18 of 1872, s. 9, for "When".
2.   Subs. by s. 9, ibid., for "on".
 
47
 
 
109.
 
 
Burden of  proof as to relationship in the cases of partners, landlord
and tenant, principal and agent.
 
 
     109. Burden of proof as to relationship in the cases of partners,
landlord and tenant, principal and agent.-When the question is whether
persons are partners, landlord and tenant, or principal and agent, and
it has  been shown  that they  have been acting as such, the burden of
proving that they do not stand, or have ceased to stand, to each other
in those relationships respectively, is on the person who affirms it.
 
 
110.
 
 
Burden of proof as to ownership.
 
 
     110. Burden  of  proof  as to  ownership.-When  the  question  is
whether any  person is owner of anything of which he is shown to be in
possession, the  burden of  proving that he is not the owner is on the
person who affirms that he is not the owner.
 
 
111.
 
 
Proof of  good faith in transactions where one party is in relation of
active confidence.
 
 
     111. Proof  of good  faith in  transactions where one party is in
relation of  active confidence.-Where  there  is a  question as to the
good faith of a transaction between parties, one of whom stands to the
other in  a position  of active  confidence, the burden of proving the
good faith  of the transaction is on the party who is in a position of
active confidence.
 
                            Illustrations
 
     (a) The  good faith  of a  sale by  a client to an attorney is in
question in  a suit  brought by  the client. The burden of proving the
good faith of the transaction is on the attorney.
 
     (b) The  good faith  of a  sale by  a son  just come  of age to a
father is  in question  in a  suit brought  by the  son. The burden of
proving the good faith of the transaction is on the father.
 
 
111A.
 
 
Presumption as to certain offences.
 
 
     1*[111A. Presumption  as to  certain offences.-(1) Where a person
is accused  of having  committed any  offence specified in sub-section
(2), in--
 
          (a)  any area  declared to  be a  disturbed area  under  any
     enactment, for  the time being in force, making provision for the
     suppression of disorder and restoration and maintenance of public
     order; or
 
          (b)  any area in which there has been, over a period of more
     than one month, extensive disturbance of the public peace,
 
and it is shown that such person had been at a place in such area at a
time when  firearms or  explosives were  used at or from that place to
attack or resist the members of any armed forces or the forces charged
with the  maintenance of public order acting in the discharge of their
duties, it  shall be presumed, unless the contrary is shown, that such
person had committed such offence.
 
     (2)  The   offences  referred  to  in  sub-section  (1)  are  the
following, namely:--
 
          (a)  an offence under section 121, section 121A, section 122
     or section 123 of the Indian Penal Code (45 of 1860);
 
     (b)  criminal conspiracy or attempt to commit, or abetment of, an
     offence under  section 122  or section  123 of  the Indian  Penal
     Code (45 of 1860).
 
 
112.
 
 
Birth during marriage, conclusive proof of legitimacy.
 
 
     112. Birth  during marriage,  conclusive proof of legitimacy.-The
fact that  any person  was born  during the  continuance  of  a  valid
marriage between  his mother  and any  man, or  within two hundred and
eighty days  after its  dissolution, the  mother remaining  unmarried,
shall be  conclusive proof  that he is the legitimate son of that man,
unless it  can be shown that the parties to the marriage had no access
to each other at any time when he could have been begotten.
 
 
113.
 
 
 
Proof of cession of territory.
 
 
     113.   Proof of  cession  of  territory.-A  notification  in  the
Official Gazette  that any  portion of British territory has 2*[before
the commencement of Part III of the Government of India Act, 1935  (26
Geo. 5,  e. 2)] been ceded to any Native State, Prince or Ruler, shall
be conclusive  proof that a valid cession of such territory took place
at the date mentioned in such notification.
 
 
113A.
 
 
Presumption as to abetment of suicide by a married woman.
 
 
     3*[113A. Presumption  as to  abetment of  suicide  by  a  married
woman.-When  the question  is whether  the commission  of suicide by a
woman had  been abetted  by her husband or any relative of her husband
and it  is shown  that she  had committed  suicide within  a period of
seven years from the date of her marriage and that her husband or such
relative of  her husband  had subjected  her to cruelty, the court may
presume, having  regard to  all the  other circumstances  of the case,
that such  suicide had been abetted by her husband or by such relative
of her husband.
 
     Explanation.--For the  purposes of  this section, "cruelty" shall
have  the  same  meaning  as  in section 498A of the Indian Penal Code
(45 of 1860).]
 
 
113B.
 
 
Presumption as to dowry death.
 
 
     4*[113B. Presumption  as to  dowry  death.-When the  question  is
whether a  person has  committed the  dowry death of a woman and it is
shown that soon before her death such woman had been subjected by such
person to cruelty or harassment for, or in connection with, any demand
for dowry,  the court  shall presume  that such  person had caused the
dowry death.
 
     Explanation.--For the  purposes of  this section,  "dowry  death"
shall have  the same  meaning as  in section  304B of the Indian Penal
Code.]
 
 
114.
 
 
Court may presume existence of certain facts.
 
 
     114. Court  may presume existence of certain facts. The Court may
presume the  existence of  any fact  which it  thinks likely  to  have
happened, regard being had to the common
---------------------------------------------------------------------
1.  Ins.  by Act 61 of 1984, s.  20 (w.e.f.  14.7.1984).
2.   Ins. by the A. O. 1937, Part III of the Govt. of India Act, 1935,
     came into force on the 1st April, 1937.
3.   Ins. by Act 46 of 1983, s. 7
4.   Ins. by Act 43 of 1986, s. 12 (w.e.f. 19.11.1986).
 
48
 
course of  natural  events,  human  conduct  and  public  and  private
business, in their relation to the facts of the particular case.
 
                            Illustrations
 
     The Court may presume--
 
          (a) that  a man  who is  in possession  of stolen goods soon
               after the theft is either the thief or has received the
               goods knowing  them to be stolen, unless he can account
               for his possession;
 
          (b) that  an accomplice  is unworthy of credit, unless he is
               corroborated in material particulars;
 
          (c) that  a bill  of exchange,  accepted  or  endorsed,  was
               accepted or endorsed for good consideration;
 
          (d) that  a thing or state of things which has been shown to
               be in  existence within  a  period  shorter  than  that
               within which  such things  or states  of things usually
               cease to exist, is still in existence;
 
          (e) that  judicial and  official acts  have  been  regularly
               performed;
 
          (f) that  the common course of business has been followed in
               particular cases;
 
          (g) that  evidence which could be and is not produced would,
               if  produced,   be  unfavourable   to  the  person  who
               withholds it;
 
          (h) that  if a  man refuses to answer a question which he is
               not compelled  to answer  by law, the answer, if given,
               would be unfavourable to him;
 
          (i) that  when a  document creating  an obligation is in the
               hands  of   the  obligor,   the  obligation   has  been
               discharged.
 
     But the  Court shall  also have  regard  to  such  facts  as  the
following, in  considering whether  such maxims  do or do not apply to
the particular case before it:--
 
     as to  illustration (a)--a  shop-keeper has  in his till a marked
rupee soon  after it was stolen, and cannot account for its possession
specifically, but is continually receiving rupees in the course of his
business:
 
     as to  illustration (b)--A,  a person of the highest character is
tried for  causing a  man's death by an act of negligence in arranging
certain machinery.  B, a  person of  equally good  character, who also
took part  in the  arrangement, describes precisely what was done, and
admits and explains the common carelessness of A and himself:
 
     as to  illustration (b)--a crime is committed by several persons.
A, B  and C, three of the criminals, are captured on the spot and kept
apart from  each other. Each gives an account of the crime implicating
D, and  the accounts  corroborate each  other in  such a  manner as to
render previous concert highly improbable:
 
     as to  illustration (c)--A, the drawer of a bill of exchange, was
a man  of business.  B, the acceptor, was a young and ignorant person,
completely under A's influence:
 
     as to  illustration (d)--it  is proved  that a  river  ran  in  a
certain course  five years  ago, but  it is known that there have been
floods since that time which might change its course:
 
49
 
     as to  illustration (e)--a  judicial act, the regularity of which
is in question, was performed under exceptional circumstances:
 
     as to  illustration (f)--the  question is,  whether a  letter was
received. It is shown to have been posted, but the usual course of the
post was interrupted by disturbances:
 
     as to illustration (g)--a man refuses to produce a document which
would bear  on a contract of small importance on which he is sued, but
which might also injure the feelings and reputation of his family:
 
     as to  illustration (h)--a man refuses to answer a question which
he is not compelled by law to answer, but the answer to it might cause
loss to  him in  matters unconnected  with the  matter in  relation to
which it is asked:
 
     as to  illustration (i)--a  bond is in possession of the obligor,
but the circumstances of the case are such that he may have stolen it.
 
 
114A.
 
 
Presumption as to absence of consent in certain prosecutions for rape.
 
 
     1*[114A.  Presumption   as  to  absence  of  consent  in  certain
prosecutions for  rape.-In  a prosecution for rape under clause (a) or
clause (b)  or clause (c) or clause (d) or clause (e) or clause (g) of
sub-section (2)  of section 376 of the Indian Penal Code, where sexual
intercourse by  the accused  is proved  and the question is whether it
was without  the consent  of the  woman alleged to have been raped and
she states  in her evidence before the Court that she did not consent,
the Court shall presume that she did not consent.]
 
 
CHAPTER VIII
 
 
ESTOPPEL
 
 
                            CHAPTER VIII.
 
                               ESTOPPEL
 
 
115.
 
 
Estoppel.
 
 
     115. Estoppel.-When  one  person has,  by his declaration, act or
omission, intentionally  caused or permitted another person to believe
a thing  to be  true and  to act  upon such belief, neither he nor his
representative shall  be allowed,  in any  suit or  proceeding between
himself and  such person  or his  representative, to deny the truth of
that thing.
 
                             Illustration
 
     A intentionally  and falsely leads B to believe that certain land
belongs to A, and thereby induces B to buy and pay for it.
 
     The land afterwards becomes the property of A, and A seeks to set
aside the  sale on the ground that, at the time of the sale, he had no
title. He must not be allowed to prove his want of title.
 
 
116.
 
 
Estoppel of tenant; and of licensee of person in possession.
 
 
    116. Estoppel of tenant; and of licensee of person in possession.-
No tenant  of immovable  property, or  person  claiming  through  such
tenant, shall,  during the continuance of the tenancy, be permitted to
deny that  the landlord  of such  tenant had,  at the beginning of the
tenancy, a  title to  such immovable  property; and no person who came
upon any immovable property by the licence of the person in possession
thereof shall  be permitted  to deny  that such  person had a title to
such possession at the time when such licence was given.
 
 
117.
 
 
Estoppel of acceptor of bill of exchange, bailee or licensee.
 
 
     117.  Estoppel  of  acceptor  of  bill  of  exchange,  bailee  or
licensee.-No acceptor of a bill of exchange shall be permitted to deny
that the  drawer had authority to draw such bill or to endorse it; nor
shall any  bailee or  licensee be permitted to deny that his bailor or
licensor had,  at the  time when  the bailment  or licence  commenced,
authority to make such bailment or grant such licence.
---------------------------------------------------------------------
1.   Ins. by Act 43 of 1983, s. 6.
 
50
 
     Explanation (1).--The  acceptor of  a bill  of exchange  may deny
that the  bill was  really drawn  by the person by whom it purports to
have been drawn.
 
     Explanation (2).--If  a bailee  delivers the  goods bailed  to  a
person other  than the  bailor, he  may prove  that such  person had a
right to them as against the bailor.
 
 
CHAPTER IX
 
 
OF WITNESSES
 
 
                             CHAPTER IX
 
                             OF WITNESSES
 
 
118.
 
 
Who may testify.
 
 
     118. Who  may testify.-All  persons shall be competent to testify
unless the  Court considers that they are prevented from understanding
the questions  put to  them, or  from giving rational answers to those
questions, by  tender years, extreme old age, disease, whether of body
or mind, or any other cause of the same kind.
 
     Explanation.--A lunatic  is not incompetent to testify, unless he
is prevented by his lunacy from understanding the questions put to him
and giving rational answers to them.
 
 
119.
 
 
Dumb witnesses.
 
 
     119. Dumb  witnesses.-A  witness who  is unable to speak may give
his evidence in any other manner in which he can make it intelligible,
as by  writing or  by signs;  but such writing must be written and the
signs made in open Court. Evidence so given shall be deemed to be oral
evidence.
 
 
120.
 
 
Parties to civil suit, and their wives or husbands. Husband or wife of
person under criminal trial.
 
 
     120. Parties  to civil suit, and their wives or husbands. Husband
or wife  of person  under criminal trial.-In all civil proceedings the
parties to the suit, and the husband or wife of any party to the suit,
shall be  competent witnesses.  In criminal  proceedings  against  any
person, the  husband or  wife of such person, respectively, shall be a
competent witness.
 
 
121.
 
 
Judges and Magistrates.
 
 
     121. Judges and Magistrates.-No Judge or Magistrate shall, except
upon the  special order  of some  Court to which he is subordinate, be
compelled to  answer any  questions as  to his own conduct in Court as
such Judge  or Magistrate,  or  as  to  anything  which  came  to  his
knowledge in Court as such Judge or Magistrate; but he may be examined
as to  other matters  which occurred  in his presence whilst he was so
acting.
 
                            Illustrations
 
     (a) A,  on his  trial before  the Court  of Session,  says that a
deposition was  improperly taken  by B,  the Magistrate.  B cannot  be
compelled to  answer questions  as to  this, except  upon the  special
order of a superior Court.
 
51
 
     (b) A  is accused  before the  Court of  Session of  having given
false evidence  before B, a Magistrate. B cannot be asked what A said,
except upon the special order of the superior Court.
 
     (c) A  is accused  before the  Court of  Session of attempting to
murder a  police-officer whilst  on his  trial before  B,  a  Sessions
Judge. B may be examined as to what occurred.
 
 
122.
 
 
Communications during marriage.
 
 
     122. Communications during marriage.-No person who is or has been
married shall  be compelled  to disclose any communication made to him
during marriage  by any  person to whom he is or has been married; nor
shall he  be permitted  to disclose any such communication, unless the
person who  made it,  or his  representative  in  interest,  consents,
except in  suits between  married persons, or proceedings in which one
married person  is prosecuted  for any  crime  committed  against  the
other.
 
 
123.
 
 
Evidence as to affairs of State.
 
 
     123. Evidence  as to  affairs of State.-No one shall be permitted
to  give  any  evidence  derived  from  unpublished  official  records
relating to  any affairs  of State,  except with the permission of the
officer at  the head  of the  department concerned,  who shall give or
withhold such permission as he thinks fit.
 
 
124.
 
 
Official communications.
 
 
     124.  Official   communications.-No   public   officer  shall  be
compelled  to   disclose  communications   made  to  him  in  official
confidence, when  he considers  that the public interests would suffer
by the disclosure.
 
 
125.
 
 
Information as to commission of offences.
 
 
     1*[125. Information  as to  commission of offences.-No Magistrate
or police-officer  shall  be  compelled  to  say  whence  he  got  any
information as  to the  commission of  any offence,  and  no  revenue-
officer shall  be compelled to say whence he got any information as to
the commission of any offence against the public revenue.
 
     Explanation.--"Revenue-officer" in this section means any officer
employed in  or about  the  business  of  any  branch  of  the  public
revenue.]
 
 
126.
 
 
Professional communications.
 
 
     126. Professional communications.-No barrister, attorney, pleader
or vakil  shall at  any time  be permitted,  unless with  his client's
express consent,  to disclose  any communication  made to  him in  the
course and  for the  purpose of  his  employment  as  such  barrister,
pleader, attorney or vakil, by or on behalf of his client, or to state
the contents  or condition  of any  document with  which he has become
acquainted in  the course  and for  the purpose  of  his  professional
employment, or to disclose any advice
---------------------------------------------------------------------
1.   Subs. by Act 3 of 1887, s. 1, for the original s. 125.
 
52
 
given by  him to  his client in the course and for the purpose of such
employment:
 
     Provided  that   nothing  in  this  section  shall  protect  from
disclosure--
 
          (1)  any such  communication  made  in  furtherance  of  any
               1*[illegal] purpose:
 
          (2)  any fact  observed by  any barrister, pleader, attorney
               or vakil,  in the  course of  his employment  as  such,
               showing that  any crime  or fraud  has  been  committed
               since the commencement of his employment.
 
     It  is  immaterial  whether  the  attention  of  such  barrister,
2*[pleader], attorney or vakil was or was not directed to such fact by
or on behalf of his client.
 
     Explanation.--The obligation  stated in  this  section  continues
after the employment has ceased.
 
                            Illustrations
 
     (a) A,  a client,  says to  B,  an  attorney--"I  have  committed
forgery and I wish you to defend me."
 
     As the  defence of  a man  known to  be guilty  is not a criminal
purpose, this communication is protected from disclosure.
 
     (b) A,  a client,  says to  B, an  attorney--"I  wish  to  obtain
possession of  property by the use of a forged deed on which I request
you to sue."
 
     This communication,  being made  in  furtherance  of  a  criminal
purpose, is not protected from disclosure.
 
     (c) A,  being charged  with embezzlement, retains B, an attorney,
to defend  him. In  the course  of the proceedings, B observes that an
entry has  been made in A's account book, charging A with the sum said
to have  been embezzled,  which entry  was not  in  the  book  at  the
commencement of his employment.
 
     This being  a fact observed by B in the course of his employment,
showing that  a fraud has been committed since the commencement of the
proceedings, it is not protected from disclosure.
 
 
127.
 
 
Section 126 to apply to interpreters, etc.
 
 
     127. Section 126 to apply to interpreters, etc.-The provisions of
section 126 shall apply to interpreters, and the clerks or servants of
barristers, pleaders, attorneys and vakils.
 
 
128.
 
 
Privilege not waived by volunteering evidence.
 
 
     128. Privilege  not waived by volunteering evidence.-If any party
to a  suit gives evidence therein at his own instance or otherwise, he
shall not be deemed to have consented thereby to such disclosure as is
mentioned in section 126; and if any
---------------------------------------------------------------------
1.   Subs. by Act 18 of 1872, s. 10, for "criminal".
2.   Ins. by s. 10, ibid.
 
53
 
party to  a suit  or proceeding calls any such barrister, 1*[pleader],
attorney or  vakil as  a witness, he shall be deemed to have consented
to such  disclosure only  if he  questions such barrister, attorney or
vakil on  matters which,  but for  such question,  he would  not be at
liberty to disclose.
 
 
129.
 
 
Confidential communications with legal advisers.
 
 
     129. Confidential  communications  with  legal  advisers.-No  one
shall  be   compelled  to  disclose  to  the  Court  any  confidential
communication  which  has  taken  place  between  him  and  his  legal
professional adviser, unless he  offers himself as a witness, in which
case he  may be  compelled to  disclose any such communications as may
appear to  the Court  necessary to  be known  in order  to explain any
evidence which he has given, but no others.
 
 
130.
 
 
Production of title-deeds of witness not a party.
 
 
     130. Production of title-deeds of witness not a party.-No witness
who is  not a party to a suit shall be compelled to produce his title-
deeds to any property, or any document in virtue of which he holds any
property as  pledgee or  mortgagee or  any document  the production of
which might  tend to criminate him, unless he has agreed in writing to
produce them  with the  person seeking the production of such deeds or
some person through whom he claims.
 
 
131.
 
 
Production of documents which another person, having possession, could
refuse to produce.
 
 
     131.  Production   of  documents  which  another  person,  having
possession, could  refuse to  produce.-No  one shall  be compelled  to
produce documents  in his  possession, which any other person would be
entitled to  refuse to  produce if they were in his possession, unless
such last-mentioned person consents to their production.
 
 
132.
 
 
Witness  not  excused  from  answering  on  ground  that  answer  will
criminate.
 
 
     132. Witness  not excused  from answering  on ground  that answer
will  criminate.-A witness  shall not  be excused  from answering  any
question as  to any matter relevant to the matter in issue in any suit
or in  any civil  or criminal  proceeding, upon  the ground  that  the
answer to  such question  will criminate,  or  may  tend  directly  or
indirectly to criminate, such witness, or that it will expose, or tend
directly or indirectly  to  expose,  such  witness  to  a  penalty  or
forfeiture of any kind:
 
Proviso.
 
     Provided that  no such answer, which a witness shall be compelled
to give,  shall subject him to any arrest or prosecution, or be proved
against him  in any  criminal proceeding,  except  a  prosecution  for
giving false evidence by such answer.
---------------------------------------------------------------------
1.   Ins. by Act 18 of 1872, s. 10.
 
54
 
 
133.
 
 
Accomplice.
 
 
     133. Accomplice.-An  accomplice  shall  be  a  competent  witness
against an  accused person;  and a  conviction is  not illegal  merely
because  it   proceeds  upon   the  uncorroborated   testimony  of  an
accomplice.
 
 
134.
 
 
Number of witnesses.
 
 
     134. Number of witnesses.-No particular number of witnesses shall
in any case be required for the proof of any fact.
 
 
CHAPTER X
 
 
OF THE EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES
 
 
                              CHAPTER X
 
                   OF THE EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES
 
 
135.
 
 
Order of production and examination of witnesses.
 
 
     135. Order  of production and examination of witnesses.-The order
in which witnesses are produced and examined shall be regulated by the
law and  practice for  the time  being relating  to civil and criminal
procedure respectively,  and, in  the absence  of any such law, by the
discretion of the Court.
 
 
136.
 
 
Judge to decide as to admissibility of evidence.
 
 
     136. Judge to decide as to admissibility of evidence.-When either
party proposes  to give  evidence of  any fact,  the Judge may ask the
party proposing  to give the evidence in what manner the alleged fact,
if proved,  would be  relevant; and the Judge shall admit the evidence
if he  thinks that  the fact,  if proved,  would be  relevant, and not
otherwise.
 
     If the  fact proposed  to be  proved is  one of which evidence is
admissible only  upon proof  of some  other fact,  such last-mentioned
fact must  be proved  before evidence  is  given  of  the fact  first-
mentioned, unless the party undertakes to give proof of such fact, and
the Court is satisfied with such undertaking.
 
     If the relevancy of one alleged fact depends upon another alleged
fact being  first proved,  the Judge  may, in  his discretion,  either
permit evidence  of the  first fact to be given before the second fact
is proved,  or require  evidence to be given of the second fact before
evidence is given of the first fact.
 
                            Illustrations
 
     (a) It  is proposed to prove a statement about a relevant fact by
a person alleged to be dead, which statement is relevant under section
32.
 
     The fact  that the  person is  dead must  be proved by the person
proposing to  prove the  statement, before  evidence is  given of  the
statement.
 
     (b) It  is proposed  to prove,  by a  copy,  the  contents  of  a
document said to be lost.
 
     The fact  that the  original is lost must be proved by the person
proposing to produce the copy, before the copy is produced.
 
     (c) A  is accused of receiving stolen property knowing it to have
been stolen.
 
55
 
     It is  proposed to  prove that  he denied  the possession  of the
property.
 
     The relevancy  of the  denial depends  on  the  identity  of  the
property. The  Court  may,  in  its  discretion,  either  require  the
property to  be identified  before the  denial of  the  possession  is
proved, or permit the denial of the possession to be proved before the
property is identified.
 
     (d) It is proposed to prove a fact (A) which is said to have been
the  cause or effect of  fact in issue. There are several intermediate
facts (B,  C and  D) which  must be shown to exist before the fact (a)
can be regarded as the cause or effect of the fact in issue. The Court
may either  permit  A to  be proved before B, C or D is proved, or may
require proof of B, C and D before permitting proof of A.
 
 
137.
 
 
Examination-in-chief.
 
Cross-examination.
 
Re-examination.
 
 
     137. Examination-in-chief.-The  examination  of  witness  by  the
party who calls him shall be called his examination-in-chief.
 
Cross-examination.-The  examination of a witness by the adverse  party
shall be called his cross-examination.
 
Re-examination.-The  examination  of  a  witness,  subsequent  to  the
cross-examination  by  the party who called him, shall be  called  his
re-examination.
 
 
138.
 
 
Order of examinations.
 
 
     138. Order of examinations.-Witnesses shall be first examined-in-
chief, then (if the adverse party so desires) cross-examined, then ( if
the party calling him so desires) re-examined.
 
     The examination  and cross-examination  must relate  to  relevant
facts but the cross-examination  need not  be confined to the facts to
which the witness testified on his examination-in-chief.
 
Direction of re-examination.
 
     The re-examination  shall  be  directed  to  the  explanation  of
matters referred  to in  cross-examination; and,  if new matter is, by
permission of  the Court,  introduced in  re-examination, the  adverse
party may further cross-examine upon that matter.
 
 
139.
 
 
Cross-examination of person called to produce a document.
 
 
     139. Cross-examination  of person called to produce a document.-A
person summoned to produce a document does not become a witness by the
mere fact  that he produces it and cannot be cross-examined unless and
until he is called as a witness.
 
 
140.
 
 
Witnesses to character.
 
 
     140. Witnesses to character.-Witnesses to character may be cross-
examined and re-examined.
 
 
141.
 
 
Leading questions.
 
 
     141. Leading  questions.-Any question suggesting the answer which
the person putting it wishes or expects to receive is called a leading
question.
 
 
142.
 
 
When they must not be asked.
 
 
     142. When  they must not be asked.-Leading questions must not, if
objected to  by the adverse party be asked in an examination-in-chief,
or in a re-examination, except with the permission of the Court.
 
56
 
     The Court  shall permit leading questions as to matters which are
introductory or  undisputed, or  which  have,  in  its  opinion,  been
already sufficiently proved.
 
 
143.
 
 
When they may be asked.
 
 
     143. When  they may be asked.-Leading questions  may  be asked in
cross-examination.
 
 
144.
 
 
Evidence as to matters in writing.
 
 
   144. Evidence as to matters in writing.-Any witness may  be  asked,
whilst  under   examination  whether  any  contract,  grant  or  other
disposition of  property, as  to which  he is giving evidence, was not
contained in a document, and if he says that it was, or if he is about
to make  any statement  as to  the contents of any document, which, in
the opinion  of the Court, ought to be produced, the adverse party may
object to  such evidence  being given until such document is produced,
or until facts have been proved which entitle the party who called the
witness to give secondary evidence of it.
 
     Explanation.--A witness may give oral evidence of statements made
by other  persons about  the contents  of documents if such statements
are in themselves relevant facts.
 
                             Illustration
 
     The question is, whether A assaulted B.
 
     C deposes that he heard A say to D--"B wrote a letter accusing me
of theft,  and I will be revenged on him." This statement is relevant,
as showing  A's motive  for the  assault, and evidence may be given of
it, though no other evidence is given about the letter.
 
 
145.
 
 
Cross-examination as to previous statements in writing.
 
 
     1*145. Cross-examination  as to previous statements in writing.-A
witness may be cross-examined as to previous statements made by him in
writing or  reduced into writing, and relevant to matters in question,
without such  writing being  shown to him, or being proved; but, if it
is intended  to contradict  him by  the writing,  his attention  must,
before the writing can be proved, be called to those parts of it which
are to be used for the purpose of contradicting him.
 
 
146.
 
 
Questions lawful in cross-examination.
 
 
     146. Questions  lawful in  cross-examination.-When  a witness  is
cross-examined, he  may, in  addition to  the  questions  hereinbefore
referred to, be asked any questions which tend-
 
          (1)  to test his veracity,
 
          (2)  to discover who he is and what is his position in life,
               or
---------------------------------------------------------------------
1.   As to  the application  of s. 145 to police-diaries, see the Code
     of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act 5 of 1998), s. 172.
 
57
 
          (3) to shake his credit, by injuring his character, although
               the answer  to such  questions might  tend directly  or
               indirectly to  criminate him  or might  expose or  tend
               directly or  indirectly to  expose him  to a penalty or
               forfeiture.
 
 
147.
 
 
When witness to be compelled to answer.
 
 
     147. When witness to be compelled to answer.-If any such question
relates to a matter relevant to the suit or proceeding, the provisions
of section 132 shall apply thereto.
 
 
148.
 
 
Court to  decide  when  question  shall  be  asked  and  when  witness
compelled to answer.
 
 
     148. Court  to decide  when question  shall  be  asked  and  when
witness compelled  to answer.-If any such question relates to a matter
not relevant to the suit or proceeding, except in so far as it affects
the credit  of the  witness by injuring his character, the Court shall
decide whether or not the witness shall be compelled to answer it, and
may, if  it thinks  fit, warn  the witness  that he  is not obliged to
answer it.  In exercising  its discretion, the Court shall have regard
to the following considerations:--
 
          (1) such  questions are  proper if they are of such a nature
               that the truth of the imputation conveyed by them would
               seriously affect  the opinion  of the  Court as  to the
               credibility of  the witness  on the  matter to which he
               testifies:
 
          (2) such questions are improper if the imputation which they
               convey relates to matters so remote in time, or of such
               a character, that the truth of the imputation would not
               affect, or would affect in a slight degree, the opinion
               of the  Court as  to the  credibility of the witness on
               the matter to which he testifies:
 
          (3)  such  questions  are  improper  if  there  is  a  great
               disproportion between  the importance of the imputation
               made against the witness's character and the importance
               of his evidence:
 
          (4) the  Court may, if it sees fit, draw, from the witness's
               refusal to  answer, the  inference that  the answer  if
               given would be unfavourable.
 
 
149.
 
 
Question not to be asked without reasonable grounds.
 
 
     149. Question not to be asked without reasonable grounds.-No such
question as  is referred  to in  section 148 ought to be asked, unless
the person  asking it  has reasonable  grounds for  thinking that  the
imputation which it conveys is well-founded.
 
                            Illustrations
 
     (a) A  barrister is  instructed by  an attorney  or vakil that an
important witness  is a dakait. This is a reasonable ground for asking
the witness whether he is a dakait.
 
58
 
     (b) A  pleader is informed by a person in Court that an important
witness is  a dakait.  The  informant,  on  being  questioned  by  the
pleader, gives  satisfactory reasons  for his  statement.  This  is  a
reasonable ground for asking the witness whether he is a dakait.
 
     (c) A  witness, of  whom nothing  whatever is  known is  asked at
random whether he is a dakait. There are here no reasonable ground for
the question.
 
     (d)  A   witness,  of  whom  nothing  whatever  is  known,  being
questioned as  to  his  mode  of  life  and  means  of  living,  gives
unsatisfactory answers. This may be a reasonable ground for asking him
if he is a dakait.
 
 
150.
 
 
Procedure of  Court in case of question being asked without reasonable
grounds.
 
 
     150. Procedure  of Court  in case of question being asked without
reasonable  grounds.-If the Court is of opinion that any such question
was asked  without reasonable  grounds, it may, if it was asked by any
barrister, pleader, vakil or attorney, report the circumstances of the
case to  the High  Court or  other authority  to which such barrister,
pleader,  vakil  or  attorney  is  subject  in  the  exercise  of  his
profession.
 
 
151.
 
 
Indecent and scandalous questions.
 
 
     151. Indecent  and scandalous questions.-The Court may forbid any
questions or  inquiries which  it regards  as indecent  or scandalous,
although such  questions or  inquiries may  have some  bearing on  the
questions before the Court unless they relate to facts in issue, or to
matters necessary to be known in order to determine whether or not the
facts in issue existed.
 
 
152.
 
 
Questions intended to insult or annoy.
 
 
     152. Questions  intended to  insult  or  annoy.-The  Court  shall
forbid any  question which  appears to  it to be intended to insult or
annoy, or  which, though  proper  in  itself,  appears  to  the  Court
needlessly offensive in form.
 
 
153.
 
 
Exclusion of  evidence to  contradict  answers  to  questions  testing
veracity.
 
 
     153. Exclusion  of evidence  to contradict  answers to  questions
testing  veracity.-When a  witness has been asked and has answered any
question which  is relevant  to the inquiry only in so far as it tends
to shake  his credit  by injuring  his character, no evidence shall be
given to contradict him; but, if he answers falsely, he may afterwards
be charged with giving false evidence.
 
     Exception  1.--If   a  witness  is  asked  whether  he  has  been
previously convicted of any crime and denies it, evidence may be given
of his previous conviction.
 
     Exception 2.--If  a witness  is asked  any  question  tending  to
impeach  his   impartiality- and  answers  it  by  denying  the  facts
suggested, he may be contradicted.
 
                            Illustrations
 
     (a) A  claim against  an underwriter is resisted on the ground of
fraud.
 
     The claimant  is asked  whether, in  a former transaction, he had
not made a fraudulent claim. He denies it.
 
     Evidence is offered to show that he did make such a claim.
 
     The evidence is inadmissible
 
59
 
     (b) A  witness is  asked whether  he was  not  dismissed  from  a
situation for dishonesty.
 
     He denies it.
 
     Evidence is offered to show that he was dismissed for dishonesty.
 
     The evidence is not admissible.
 
     (c) A affirms that on a certain day he saw B at Lahore.
 
     A is asked whether he himself was not on that day at Calcutta. He
denies it.
 
     Evidence is offered to show that A was on that day at Calcutta.
 
     The evidence  is admissible,  not as  contradicting A  on a  fact
which affects his credit, but as contradicting the alleged fact that B
was seen on the day in question in Lahore.
 
     In each  of these  cases the  witness might,  if his  denial  was
false, be charged with giving false evidence.
 
     (d) A  is asked  whether his  family has not had a bloodfeud with
the family of B against whom he gives evidence.
 
     He denies  it. He  may be  contradicted on  the ground  that  the
question tends to impeach his impartiality.
 
 
154.
 
 
Question by party to his own witness.
 
 
     154. Question  by party to his own witness.-The Court may, in its
discretion, permit the person who calls a witness to put any questions
to him which might be put in cross-examination by the adverse party.
 
 
155.
 
 
Impeaching credit of witness.
 
 
     155. Impeaching credit of witness.-The credit of a witness may be
impeached in  the following  ways by  the adverse  party, or, with the
consent of the Court, by the party who calls him:-
 
          (1) by  the evidence  of persons who testify that they, from
               their knowledge  of the  witness,  believe  him  to  be
               unworthy of credit;
 
          (2) by  proof that  the witness  has  been  bribed,  or  has
               1*[accepted] the  offer of  bride, or  has received any
               other corrupt inducement to give his evidence;
 
          (3) by proof of former statements inconsistent with any part
               of his evidence which is liable to be contradicted;
 
          (4) when  a man  is prosecuted  for rape  or an  attempt  to
               ravish, it  may be  shown that  the prosecutrix  was of
               generally immoral character.
 
     Explanation.--A witness  declaring another witness to be unworthy
of credit may not, upon his examination-in-chief, give reasons for his
belief, but  he may be asked his reasons in cross-examination, and the
answers which  he gives  cannot be  contradicted, though,  if they are
false, he may afterwards be charged with giving false evidence.
---------------------------------------------------------------------
1.    Subs. by Act 18 of 1872, s. 11, for "had".
---------------------------------------------------------------------
 
60
 
                            Illustrations
 
           (a)  A sues B for the price of goods sold and  delivered to
     B. C says that he delivered the goods to B.
 
     Evidence is offered to show that, on a previous occasion, he said
that he had not delivered goods to B.
 
     The evidence is admissible.
 
     (b) A is indicted for the murder of B.
 
     C says  that B, when dying, declared that A had given B the wound
of which he died.
 
     Evidence is  offered to show that, on a previous occasion, C said
that the wound was not given by A or in his presence.
 
     The evidence is admissible.
 
 
156.
 
 
Questions  tending   to  corroborate   evidence  of   relevant   fact,
admissible.
 
 
     156. Questions  tending to corroborate evidence of relevant fact,
admissible.-When  a witness  whom it  is intended to corroborate gives
evidence of  any relevant  fact, he  may be questioned as to any other
circumstances which  he observed  at or  near to  the time or place at
which such  relevant fact  occurred, if  the Court  is of opinion that
such circumstances,  if proved, would corroborate the testimony of the
witness as to the relevant fact which he testifies.
 
                             Illustration
 
     A, an  accomplice, gives an account of a robbery in which he took
part. He  describes various  incidents unconnected  with  the  robbery
which occurred  on his  way  to  and  from  the  place  where  it  was
committed.
 
     Independent evidence  of these  facts may  be given  in order  to
corroborate his evidence as to the robbery itself.
 
 
157.
 
 
Former statements  of witness  may  be  proved  to  corroborate  later
testimony as to same fact.
 
 
     157. Former  statements of  witness may  be proved to corroborate
later testimony as to same fact.-In order to corroborate the testimony
of a  witness, any  former statement  made by such witness relating to
the same fact at or about the time when the fact took place, or before
any authority  legally competent  to  investigate  the  fact,  may  be
proved.
 
 
158.
 
 
What matters  may  be  proved  in  connection  with  proved  statement
relevant under section 32 or 33.
 
 
     158. What  matters  may  be  proved  in  connection  with  proved
statement relevant  under section  32 or  33.-Whenever  any statement,
relevant under  section 32 or 33, is proved, all matters may be proved
either in  order to  contradict or  to corroborate  it, or in order to
impeach or confirm the credit of the person by whom it was made, which
might have been proved if that person had been called as a witness and
had denied upon cross-examination the truth of the matter suggested.
 
 
159.
 
 
Refreshing memory.
 
When witness may use copy of document to refresh memory.
 
 
     159. Refreshing  memory. A  witness may, while under examination,
refresh his  memory by referring to any writing made by himself at the
time of  the transaction concerning which he is questioned, or so soon
afterwards that
 
61
 
the  Court  considers it likely that the transaction was at that  time
fresh  in his memory.  The witness may also refer to any such  writing
made  by  any  other person, and read by the witness within  the  time
aforesaid, if when he read it he knew it to be correct.
 
When witness may use copy of document to refresh memory.
 
     Whenever a  witness may  refresh his  memory by  reference to any
document, he may, with the permission of the Court, refer to a copy of
such document:
 
     Provided the  Court be  satisfied that there is sufficient reason
for the non-production of the original.
 
     An expert  may refresh  his memory  by reference  to professional
treatises.
 
 
160.
 
 
Testimony to facts stated in document mentioned in section 159.
 
 
     160. Testimony  to facts  stated in document mentioned in section
159.-A  witness may  also testify  to  facts  mentioned  in  any  such
document as  is mentioned  in section 159, although he has no specific
recollection of  the facts  themselves, if  he is  sure that the facts
were correctly recorded in the document.
 
                             Illustration
 
     A book-keeper  may testify  to facts  recorded by  him  in  books
regularly kept  in the  course of business, if he knows that the books
were  correctly   kept,  although  he  has  forgotten  the  particular
transactions entered.
 
 
161.
 
 
Right of adverse party as to writing used to refresh memory.
 
 
     1*161. Right  of adverse  party as  to writing  used  to  refresh
memory.-Any  writing referred  to under the provisions of the two last
preceding sections  must be produced and shown to the adverse party if
he requires  it; such  party may,  if he  pleases,  cross-examine  the
witness thereupon.
 
 
162.
 
 
Production of documents.
 
Translation of documents.
 
 
     162. Production  of documents.-A  witness  summoned to  produce a
document shall,  if it  is in  his possession  or power,  bring it  to
Court, notwithstanding  any  objection  which  there  may  be  to  its
production or to its admissibility. The validity of any such objection
shall be decided on by the Court.
 
     The Court,  if it  sees fit,  may inspect the document, unless it
refers to  matters of  State, or  take other  evidence to enable it to
determine on its admissibility.
 
Translation  of  documents.-If for such a purpose it is  necessary  to
cause  any document to be translated, the Court may, if it thinks fit,
direct the translator to keep the contents secret, unless the document
is to be given in
---------------------------------------------------------------------
1.   As to  the application  of s. 161 to police-diaries, see the Code
     of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Act 5 of 1898), s. 172.
---------------------------------------------------------------------
 
62
 
evidence: and, if the interpreter disobeys such direction, he shall be
held to  have committed  an offence  under section  166 of  the Indian
Penal Code (45 of 1860).
 
 
163.
 
 
Giving, as evidence, of document called for and produced on notice.
 
 
     163. Giving,  as evidence, of document called for and produced on
notice.-When a party calls for a document which he has given the other
party notice  to produce,  and such document is produced and inspected
by the  party calling  for its  production, he  is bound to give it as
evidence if the party producing it requires him to do so.
 
 
164.
 
 
Using, as  evidence, of  document production  of which  was refused on
notice.
 
 
     164. Using,  as evidence,  of document  production of  which  was
refused on notice.-When a party refuses to produce a document which he
has had  notice to  produce, he  cannot afterwards use the document as
evidence without  the consent  of the  other party or the order of the
Court.
 
                             Illustration
 
     A sues B on an agreement and gives B notice to produce it. At the
trial A  calls for  the document  and B refuses to produce it. A gives
secondary evidence  of its  contents. B  seeks to produce the document
itself to contradict the secondary evidence given by A, or in order to
show that the agreement is not stamped. He cannot do so.
 
 
165.
 
 
Judge's power to put questions or order production.
 
 
     165. Judge's  power to  put questions  or  order  production.-The
Judge may,  in order to discover or to obtain proper proof of relevant
facts, ask  any question  he pleases, in any form, at any time, of any
witness, or  of the parties about any fact relevant or irrelevant; and
may order  the production  of any  document or  thing: and neither the
parties nor  their agents  shall be  entitled to make any objection to
any such  question or  order, nor,  without the leave of the Court, to
cross-examine any  witness upon  any answer given in reply to any such
question:
 
     Provided that  the judgment  must be based upon facts declared by
this Act to be relevant, and duly proved:
 
     Provided also  that this section shall not authorize any Judge to
compel any  witness to  answer any question or to produce any document
which such  witness would  be entitled  to refuse to answer or produce
under sections  121 to 131, both inclusive, if the question were asked
or the  document were  called for  by the adverse party; nor shall the
Judge ask any question which it would be improper for any other person
to ask  under section  148 or  149; nor shall he dispense with primary
evidence of any document, except in the cases hereinbefore excepted.
 
 
166.
 
 
Power of jury or assessors to put questions.
 
 
     166. Power  of jury or assessors to put questions.-In cases tried
by jury or with assessors, the jury or assessors may put any questions
to the witnesses, through or leave of the
 
63
 
Judge, which  the Judge  himself might  put  and  which  he  considers
proper.
 
 
CHAPTER XI
 
 
OF IMPROPER ADMISSION AND REJECTION OF EVIDENCE
 
 
                              CHAPTER XI
 
           OF IMPROPER ADMISSION AND REJECTION OF EVIDENCE
 
 
167.
 
 
No new trial for improper admission or rejection of evidence.
 
 
     167.  No  new  trial  for  improper  admission  or  rejection  of
evidence.-The improper admission or rejection of evidence shall not be
ground of  itself for  a new  trial or reversal of any decision in any
case, if  it shall  appear to the Court before which such objection is
raised that,  independently of  the evidence objected to and admitted,
there was sufficient evidence to justify the decision, or that, if the
rejected evidence  had been  received, it ought not to have varied the
decision.
 
 
SCHEDULE I
 
 
Enactments repealed.
 
 
     THE SCHEDULE.--[Enactments  repealed.] Rep. by the Repealing Act,
1938 (1 of 1938), s. 2 and Sch.
 






























































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