Thursday, January 17, 2008
Thursday, January 17, 2008
Islam has used psychological terrorism for criminal intimidation since the time of Shivaji_1627 wherein they believe that if mentally a person is weakened he is totally destroyed.
The modus operandi is to use similar faces ,symbolic numbers and colors,as also destroy Hindu temples.
Similarity in faces is not only used for psychological terrorism and criminal intimidation but also serves the purpose of open jihad wherein the terrorist groups take responsibility of all their terror acts.They also serve the purpose of maintaining a link with each other or replicating deeds of each other.
If you open the older posts you will see that
1.Digvijay Singh is a copy of Arya Samaj Agnivesh ,whom he replictes in deeds and killer Arya Samaj Act of 1937,
2.Kushal Pal Singh is a duplicate of I.C.Sethi in DLF Group and Ganga Ram Psychiatric Department respectively,
3.Queen Elizabeth has planted her duplicates in all government hierarchy as also Latika Rana trying to become civil judge through bedrooms,
4.PT. Usha has a duplicate in Nalini of Rajiv Gandhi murder,
5.Pandher of Nithari a duplicate of Salahuddin terrorist of Hizbul,
6.Mukta Gupta ,the sarkari counsel ,a replica of the first British PM as also my next door neighbor’s wife,
7.Osama Bin Laden is a replica of Kent –Thomas Beckett,and so on.
The main point however is all this has been happening since even before independence and was the handiwork of Islam conniving with the British regime for severe persecution of the Hindu Masses.
Hindus believe in the preservation of human life and seek to protect it as it is achieved after many births of lower category animals .
Muslims on the other hand believe in killing all those who do not believe in Islam as well as torture themselves in fanatic frenzy as well as give their lives for religious jihad and establishing the rule of Islam on this earth.That is why they tell fellow muslims to die in any acts of terror which might kill the public at large as is in an atomic explosion ,for the sake of their religion.
A petition was filled in the Calcutta High Court against this terror advocated by Islam ,called “Calcutta Koran Petition” by Sitaram Goel and Chandanmal Chopra .Here it was demanded that all the copies of Koran must be confisticated and the Quran banned ;as it preaches violence and terror.
Islam has killed many people in the name of Jihad.Nearly 1 lakh people have lost their lives in
On behest of heinous builder groups like DLF, EMAAR-MGF, Reliance, ANSALS who supply terror money ; as they employ the killers of Organized crime to do their dirty work of killing people who do not comply with their dictates, as well as route their dirty money through Hawala routes,homes of middle class families are being broken up by criminal connivance,to put in Islam.This is being done by the unauthorized muslims living in the slums of Delhi who have taken up menial jobs all over Delhi as well as regular poverty stricken muslims in the locales of Jama Masjid
Sunday, March 16, 2008
Severe conditions are created in homes,then hungry poor women of easy virtue with good young bodies as their only assets,and no brains are not only passed in the civil judiciary and UPSC exams as well as other competitive exams, but also introduced in the beds of senior officers ,who steal from their organizations to maintain two families and succumb to blackmail as also revealing all secrets of their organizations , some killing first wife to become arya samajhis and selling the organs of their wife to killer hospitals like Gangaram ,where the entire Middle East and Pakistan comes to get organs replaced. Organs are also sent out of the country in preserving liquids for war struck regimes of Iraq.
Any severe catastrophe signals a good reap for the organ mongers who in this age of advanced technology ,take them out of the country.This is the medical tourism of India.
My grandfather, Mr.Nathu Shah Dhody was a senior Accounts officer in the Army Ordnance Corps Jabalpur ,AOC,who knew about the strategic interests of the country, as also how terror organizations procure ammunition from the Ordnance depots only.He had to convert from Singh to Shah at Tirupati as he refused to comply with the dictates of Khalistani outfits who had started their killings in 1946 itself with the Muslim League.
India is a global entity and terrorism is traveling from Palestine Liberation Organization of London supported-Osama Bin Laden group of Builders industry and companies.India also has a sizeable Muslim population many of whom are religious fanatics and would love too see Hinduism destroyed by Arya samaj ,whom they openly support,as also their modus operandi of introducing second wives in Hindu homes, through psychological terrorism.Both the husband and new wife are then utilized for crime and explicit hold over the judiciary and executive of the country.
Psychological terrorism creates unhappiness in homes which serves to advocate the basic principles/tenets of Islam – that is to inflict PAIN.
Wives being beaten in Domestic violence ,people grieving over killed kin ,loss of body parts –anything which creates pain ,creates victory for Islam.They neither procure happiness for themselves nor for others and their lives are spent in creating maximum amount of wealth,terror for the world and severe grief as part of their mourning rituals.
The sad part of the story is that the police and the army pay heavily if they cheat on their organizations .They are highly underpaid and many have been falsely implicated in Court martials for walking on the path of duty.One prime example of this is the Shivani Bhatnagar case,Jessica Lal murder case and above all the famous INA trial whose proceedings are displayed in the Shaheed Smarak museum of Red Fort.Valiant soldiers of Kashmir are not only implicated in false court martials but also criminally intimidated by such charge sheets as follows.
Sharukh Khan is a product of the same and thus acted in Fauji
CRIMINAL INTIMIDATION OF THE ARMED FORCES TO KEEP
DOOMS DAY CHARGE SHEET OF THE FAMOUS INA TRIAL DATED
1.The accused No.IC 58 Capt.Shah Nawaz Khan -1/14 ,
1st Charge I.A.A. Section 41 against all three jointly accused
Committing a Civil offence that is to say waging war against the King. Contrary to section 121 of the Indian Penal Code-in that they together at Singapore ,in Malaya ,at Rangoon ,in the vicinity of Kyaukpadaung,and elsewhere in Burma between the month of September 1962 and 28th day of April 1945 did wage war against His Majesty the King Emperor of India.
2nd Charge I.A.A. Section 41 against the said Lt. Gurbakhsh Singh Dhillion alone
Committing a Civil Offence that is to say, Murder contrary to Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code-in that he at or near Popa Hill in
3rd Charge I.A.A Section 41 against the said Capt.P.K.Sehgal alone..
Committing a civil offence ,that is to say ABETMENT contrary to section 109 0f the Indian Penal Code,of an offence ,punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code,of an offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code
Is That He
At or near Popa Hill,on or about 6th March 1945 did abet the offence of the Murder of Hari Singh as specified in the 2nd charge hereof, which offence was committed in consequence of such abetment.
4th Charge I.A.A. Section 41 against the said Lt. Gurbaksh Singh Dhillion alone
Committing a civil offence that is to say Murder contrary to section 302 of the Indian Penal Code
Is that He
At or near Popa Hill in
5th Charge I.A.A. Section 41 against the said Capt.P.K.Sehgal alone .
Committing a Civil Offence that is to say Abetment contrary to section 109 of the Indian Penal code ,of an offence punishable under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code
Is that he
At or near Popa Hill on or about 6th March 1945 did abet the offence of Murder of Duli Chand as specified in the 4th charge hereof which offence was committed in consequence of such abetment.
6th Charge I.A.A Section 41 against the said Gurbakhsh Singh Dhillion alone
Committing a civil offence that is to say Murder ,Contrary to section 302 of the Indian Penal Code
In that he
At or near Popa Hill in
7th Charge I.A.A Section 41 against the said Capt.P.K.Sehgal alone
Committing a civil offence that is to say abetment ;contrary to section 109 of the Indian Penal Code of an offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code
In that he
At or near Popa Hill on or about 6th March 1945 did abet the offence of the murder of Daryo Singh as specified in the 6th charge hereof,which offence was committed in consequence of such abetment.
8th Charge I.A.A.Section 41 against the said Lt. Gurbaksh Singh Dhillion alone
Committing a civil offence that is to say Murder contrary to section 302 of the Indian Penal Code
In that he
At or near Popa Hill in
9th Charge ,I.A.A. Section 41 against the said capt P.K.Sehgal alone
Committing a civil offence that is to say Abetment contrary to section 109 of the Indian Penal Code of an offence punishable under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code
In That he
At or near Popa Hill on or about 6th March 1945 did abet the offence of the murder of Dharam Singh as specified in the 8th charge hereof which offence was committed in consequence of such abetment.
10th Charge I.A.A. Section 41 against the said Capt.Shah Nawaj Khan alone
Committing a civil offence that is to say ,Abetment contrary to section 109 of the Indian Penal Code,of an offence punishable under section 302 of the Indian Penal Code
In that he
Sarah leading Hagar to Abraham
According to the Muslim tradition, Muhammad was a descendant of Ishmael through his son Kedar.
The Opium Bazaar 1863
of Gunner Mohammad Hussain of the HKSRA(The Hong Kong and Singapore Royal Artillery (HKSRA) ,which offence was committed in consequence of such abetment.
( Combined Services Detailed Interrogation Centre )
CHARGE SHEET ISSUED TO:-
1.From Captain to MAJOR GENERAL SHAH NAWAZ KHAN
2.From Captain to COLONEL PREM KUMAR SEHGAL
3. From Lieutenant to COLONEL GURBAKSH SINGH DHILLION
A SEVERE AGITATION WAS TAKEN UP BY THE CISF WHICH WAS A PEACEFUL ENDEAVOR OF HARTALS,IN BOKHARO BUT TURNED BLOODY DUE TO THE POLITICAL INOPPORTUNE CALLING OF THE ARMED FORCES.CISF Unit at Bokaro Steel Plant of the Bokaro Steel Limited situated at Bokaro in the State of
MY FATHER MR.JAGDISH CHANDRA DHODY OF UIIC HAD A MAJOR ROLE IN THIS AGITATION WHICH WAS PLANNED AS A PEACEFUL ENDEAVOR SO THAT THE PAY SCALES OF BOTH THE POLICE AND THE ARMED FORCES COULD BE BROUGHT AT PAR ,GIVE MORE SECURITY TO THE FAMILIES OF THE ARMED FORCES AND OTHER SECURITY PERSONNEL AND ALL GOOD FACILITIES ,SO THAT THEY COULD EFFECTIVELY DEAL WITH TERROR WITHOUT SUCCUMBING TO HAFTA MENTALITY.THE DREAM WAS OF COURSE KASHMIR AND APPLICATION OF THE
TO FIGHT AGAINST ORGANISED CRIME -MAINTAINED BY HAWALA INDUSTRIALISTS AND POLITICIANS.
My father and grandfather were also deeply committed for
TULSIRAM PATEL AND OTHERS
DATE OF JUDGMENT11/07/1985
CHANDRACHUD, Y.V. ((CJ)
THAKKAR, M.P. (J)
1985 AIR 1416 1985 SCR Supl. (2) 131
1985 SCC (3) 398 1985 SCALE (2)133
CITATOR INFO :
RF 1986 SC 335 (1,2,3,4,6)
RF 1986 SC 555 (4,5,6,7,8,9,15,16)
R 1986 SC 617 (3,7)
R 1986 SC1173 (13,13A,14,21,22,24)
RF 1986 SC1272 (79)
R 1986 SC1571 (99,105)
E&D 1987 SC 593 (25)
R 1987 SC1137 (3,5)
F 1987 SC1919 (9)
F 1987 SC2106 (8)
R 1988 SC 285 (1)
R 1988 SC2245 (11)
F 1989 SC 662 (8,9,10)
R 1989 SC1185 (29)
R 1990 SC 987 (10)
R 1990 SC1480 (110)
R 1991 SC 101 (14,19,31,32,35,40,41,62,67,68
RF 1991 SC 385 (4)
RF 1992 SC 1 (133)
Central Civil Services (Classification Control &
Appeal) Rules 1965 Rules 19, 22,23, 25, 27(2),29, 29A.
Central Industrial Security Force Rules 1969 Rules
37,42, 42A, 47(2) and 49.
Railway Servants (Discipline & Appeal) Rules 1968,
Rules 14, 17, 20, 22(2), 25, 25A.
Doctrine of Pleasure-Scope of in Art.311 - Whether an
exception to Art.310(1).
Laws made under Art.309 whether to be subject to
Art.310(1) and 311 and Part III.
Art. 311(2) second proviso - Principle of natural
justice whether excluded Mala fide action of disciplinary
authority - Whether can be assailed - Conduct of government
servant must justify dismissal or removal or reduction in
rank - Condition precedent to applicability of the provision
- Approach of the disciplinary authority - The situations
when it is not reasonably practicable to hold inquiry - What
are - Reasons to be recorded in writing for not holding the
inquiry - Communication of reasons to the aggrieved
government servant - Necessity of - Remedies available to
the aggrieved government servant.
'Security of State'- What is - How affected - When not
expedient to hold inquiry in interest of 'security of
state'-subjective satisfaction of President or Governor -
Though pre-decisional hearing excluded post decisional
departmental hearing available - Judicial review open on
grounds of mala fides or non-application of mind.
Government Servant convicted for causing grevious head
injury - Punishment of compulsory retirement- Whether proper
Railway employees - Participating in all-India strike -
En masse dismissal of participants - Whether proper and
Members of CISF - Creating riotous situation - Break
down of discipline in the force - Members becoming security
risk - Dismissal - Whether proper and justified.
Member of State Police Force - Creating violent public
disorder - Inciting others members to do so - Dismissal
whether proper and justified.
Natural Justice - Principles of Natural Justice - What
are - Origin of principle - 'audi alteram partem' - When can
be excluded - Post decisional hearing whether sufficient
compliance of the rule.
Statutory Interpretation - Provision of Constitution
whether mandatory or directory - 'expressum facit cessare
tacitum' - maxim - external aids to interpretation - use of
- mandatory constitutional prohibition strict construction
of -whether necessary.
WORDS AND PHRASES - MEANING OF
'Acts of the appropriate legislature' - Art. 309.
'Except as expressly provided by this Constitution' - Art.
'Not expedient' - 'Security of State' - 'Reasonably
practicable' - 'This clause shall not apply' - Art. 311(2).
Subordinate legislation - Executive instructions
whether have force of statutory rule.
The Respondents in Civil Appeal No. 3484 of 1982 are dismissed members of the CISF Unit at Bokaro Steel Plant ofthe Bokaro Steel Limited situate at Bokaro in the State of
"3. The said persons were arrested at
subsequently released on bail. At Bokaro Steel
Plant, the agitation which was going on assumed
aggravated from on and from
1900 persons belonging to CISF Unit, Bokaro Steel
Plant, Bokaro about 1000 persons participated in
the processions and violent demonstrations. The
said employees indulged in agitational acts and
violent indiscipline. The said personnel unleashed
a reign of terror in the unit lines and openly
incited others to disobey the lawful orders. The
said persons indulged in several acts of violence
and created a very serious law & order problem and
an atmosphere of collective violence and
intimidation. The said agitation and the violent
activity reached a very serious proportion in the
last week of June, 1979 with the result that Army
had to be called by the State Authorities on
23.6.1979. Annexed hereto and marked Annexure AFD-
I is the request from the Home Commissioner,
the deployment of the Army so as to restore
normalcy in the area. The State Government had
also deployed 9 Magistrates to assist the Army
authorities as also the CRPF for restoring the
normal conditions at the Bokaro Steel Plant. A
copy of the order is enclosed herewith and market
as Annexure AFD-II
4. On 24.6.1979, on seeing the arrival of the
Army, the agitators started making preparations
for armed resistance by putting up sand bags,
flood lights and barricades in the CISF Lines.
They had gained the control of CISF Lines and the
Officers were not allowed to have any access to
the Lines or to other ranks of CISF.
5. On 25.6.1979, the Army along with 9 Magistrates
took up positions round the CISF Lines in the
early hours and called upon the agitators to give
up charge of the Armoury. Inspite of giving
repeated warnings by the authorities to give up
charge of the Armoury, the agitators did not give
up arms, but, instead, resorted to violence. The
agitators started firing at 0320 hours at the
Army. The Army returned the fire. The said
exchange of fire continued for 3 hours before the
Army could spell out the violent retaliation of
the agitators. The said violent exchange of fire
resulted in the instant death of one Army Major
and 2 more Army personnel were also killed as a
result of firing by the CISF personnel.
6. It may also be stated that there were 22 death
in the course of the said pitched battle, which
went on for three hours between the violent armed
agitators and the Army.
7. In regard to the aforesaid violent activities
and the commission of offences, about 800
personnel were rounded up by the Army and later on
arrested by the local police. It is pertinent to
mention here that at the relevant time, about 1900
personnel were deployed in CISF Unit, Bokaro Steel
Plant, Bokaro. More than 1000 personnel
participated in the aforesaid agitational
activities. Besides the persons arrested by the
authorities concerned, a substantial number of
agitators were at large. Most of them either fled
away or went underground and large number of arms
and ammunitions were also with them. The search
and seizure of arms and ammunition were going on
and as a result thereof up till 1.7.1979, 65
rifles along with large quantity of ammunitions,
11 Molotov cooktails, 20 kgs. of sulphur, 20 kgs
of glass chips and other explosives and 1048
empties of .303 ammunition were recovered from the
area after the Army action. A copy of the FIR
lodged in connection with aforesaid commission of
offences is annexed herewith and marked as
8. Notwithstanding the arrest of the said about
800 employees, as aforesaid, atmosphere at the
Bokaro Steel Plant continued to be vitiated due to
terror and collective fear and the functioning of
the CISF Unit and its administration at Bokaro had
completely broken down. It was only Army which
could control the situation by its continued
presence. The Army was withdrawn from the Bokaro
Steel Plant only on or about 2.7.1979, however it
may not be out of place to mention here that
although the Army was withdrawn in the early July,
1979 but atmosphere of terror and tension
continued for a couple of months. The CRPF
continued performing security duties till Nov. 79.
Bihar Military Police took charge of armoury from
army and continued to perform some of armed duties
of CISF as CISF Unit was not in a position to
function normally for a considerable time. Even
the State authority apprehended a dangerous
situation after the Army action including threat
to lives of senior officers of CISF.
9. In the meanwhile, having regard to the violent
and disturbed situation which prevailed in the
Bokaro Steel Plant as also the collective actions
of violence, mass terror and intimidation and
threats to supervisory and loyal staff, it was
reasonably believed that any inquiry in accordance
with the provisions of the Rules 34, 35 and 36 of
CISF Rules, 1969 or in accordance with the
requirements of Article 311(2) would be dangerous,
counter productive and would aggravate the already
existing dangerous situation. It was also
reasonably believed that the circumstances were
such as would make the holding of any inquiry
self-defeating, subversive or would result in
consequent detriment to public interest. It was in
these circumstances that the concerned authorities
formed reasonable nexus that any inquiry in
accordance with the rules was reasonably
impracticable and impugned orders were passed in
We see no reason to doubt the above statements made by Shri Madan Gopal in the Supplementary Return for these statements are supported by documents which have been annexed to the Supplementary Return. The facts set out in the above paragraphs of the Supplementary Return are eloquent and speak for themselves. They are also reflected in the impugned order. All the impugned orders are in the same terms apart from the mention of the name and service
number of the particular member of the said CISF Unit against whom the order is made. By way of a specimen we set out below the impugned order dated
"Whereas a large group of members of Central
Industrial Security Force (hereinafter referred to
as the Force) of CISF Unit, Bokaro Steel Ltd.,
Bokaro have indulged and still continue to indulge
in acts of insubordination and indiscipline,
dereliction of duty, absenting from PT and parade,
taking out processions
and raising slogans such as 'INQULAB ZINDABAD'.
'VARDI VARDI VARDI BHAI BHAI LARKE LENGE PAI PAI'
'JO HAMSE TAKRAYEGE CHOOR CHOOR HO JAYEGA'and
participating in the gherao of Supervisory
Officers, participating hunger strike and 'dharna'
near the Quarter Guard and
of CISF Unit, Bokaro Steel Ltd., since 27th May
1979 in violation of the provisions of CISF Act,
1968 and instructions of the Superior Officers and
in complete disregard of their duties as members
of the Force;
And whereas the aforesaid group also indulged in
threats of violence, bodily harm and other acts of
intimation to Supervisory Officers and loyal members of the
And whereas by the aforesaid collective action, the
members of the Force have created a situation whereby the
normal functioning of the Force at the aforesaid CISF Unit
has been rendered difficult and impossible;
And whereas 7205199 Security Guard Sada Nand Jha as an
active participant of the aforesaid group has been extremely
remiss and negligent in the discharge of his duty and has
proved totally unfit for the same by absenting himself from
parade unauthorisedly and indulging in various acts of
extreme indiscipline and mis-conduct, as aforesaid;
And whereas I am satisfied that in the facts and
circumstances, any attempt to hold departmental inquiry by
serving a written charge-sheet and following other
procedures in the manner provided in rules 35 and 36 of the
CISF Rules, 1969 will be frustrated by the collective action
on the part of the aforesaid group and hence it is not
reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry;
And whereas on a consideration of the facts and
circumstances of the case I am satisfied that the penalty of
dismissal from service should be imposed on 7205199 Security
Guard Sada Nand Jha;
Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred by
sub-rule (b) of the rule 37 of the CISF Rules, 1969 read
with clause (b) of the second proviso to clause (2) of
Article 311 of the
Constitution, I hereby order that 7205199 Security Guard
Sada Nand Jha be dismissed from service with immediate
The CIS Force has been constituted under the CISF Act for the better protection and security of industrial undertakings owned by the Government. Under section 14 of the Act, the Inspector-General of the CIS Force may on a request in that behalf from the Managing Director of an Industrial undertaking in public sector, showing the necessity thereof, depute such number of supervisory officers and members of the CIS Force as the Inspector- General may consider necessary for the protection and security of that industrial undertaking and any installation attached thereto. The purpose of constituting the CIS Force is set out in the Statement of Objects and Reasons to the Bill which when enacted became the CISF Act. The said Statement of Objects and Reasons is published in the Gazette of India Extraordinary dated
Section 2, at page 435, and is as follows :
"At present security arrangements at important
industrial undertakings in the public sector are
handled by the Watch and Ward staff of the
Organization concerned. The Watch and Ward staff
is generally engaged in guarding the entrances or
the perimeter of the industrial undertaking and in
preventing entries of unauthorized persons.
Unplanned recruitment, inadequate supervision,
training and discipline have made the existing
watch and ward staff ill equipped to discharge its
responsibilities. It is considered necessary to
strengthen the security arrangements in vital
industrial undertakings. For that purpose it is
proposed to constitute a centrally recruited,
organised and trained Industrial Security Force.
The Force will primarily be responsible for the
watch and ward of industrial undertakings owned by
the Central Government and may be deployed at the
request and cost of managements, for security
duties of industrial undertakings in public
The CIS Force is an Armed Force and the security duties to be performed by the CIS Force are of vital importance to the industrial production of the country. The CIS Force has been conferred very wide powers. Under Section 11 of the CISF Act, any supervisory officer or member of the Force may, without any order from a against whom a reasonable suspicion exists of his having been concerned in or who is
found taking precautions to conceal his presence under circumstances which afford reason to believe that he is taking such precautions with a view to committing a cognizable offence relating to the property belonging to any industrial undertakingor other installations. Similarly, under section 12 for the same purpose a supervisory officer or member of the CIS Force, not below the prescribed rank, has the power to search the person and belongings of anyperson whom he has reason to believe to have committed any such offence as is referred to in section 11. From what is stated above, it is obvious that in a Force entrusted with such large responsibility, maintenance of discipline is most essential and this is made clear by section 18(1) of the
CISF Act which provides as follows :
"18. Penalties for neglect of duty, etc.-
(1) Without prejudice to the provisions contained
in Section 8, every member of the Force who shall
be guilty of any violation of duty or wilful
breach or neglect of any rule or regulation or
lawful order made by a supervisory officer, or who
shall withdraw from the duties of his office
without permission, or who, being absent on leave,
fails, without reasonable cause, to report himself
for duty on the expiration of the leave or who
engages himself without authority in any
employment other than his duty as a member of the
Force, or who shall be guilty of cowardice, shall,
on conviction, be punished with imprisonment for a
term which may extend to six months."
Under section 19 of the CISF Act, the Police (Incitement to Disaffection) Act, 1922, applies to supervisory officers and members of the CIS Force as it applies to members of a Police Force. Under section 20, neither the Payment of Wages Act, 1936, nor the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, nor the Factories Act, 1948, nor any corresponding State Act applies to the member of the CIS Force.The facts set out in the Supplementary Return of Shri Mohan Gopal and in the impugned orders show that there was a total breakdown of discipline in the CIS Force. There was a wilful and deliberate disobedience of orders of the supervisory officers and 'gherao' of such officers. There was a hunger strike, dharna, shouting of revellious slogans and threats of violence and bodily harm to supervisory officers and acts tending to intimidate the supervisory officers and loyal members of the staff. There were acts of insubordination and deliberate neglect and wilful violation of their duties by a very large section of the members of the CIS Force stationed at Bokaro. All these acts virtually amounted to a mutiny and how grave
the situation was can be judge from the fact that the army had to be called out and a pitched battle took place between the army and the members of the Force. No person with any reason or sence of responsibility can say that in such a situation the holding of an inquiry was reasonably practicable.It was said that the impugned orders did not set out the particular acts done by each of the members of the CIS Force in respect of whom the dismissal orders was made, and these were merely cyclostyled orders with the names of individual members of the CIS Force filled in. Here was a
case very much like a case under section 149 of the Indian Penal Code. The acts alleged were not of any particular individual acting by himself. These were acts of a large group acting collectively with the common object of coercing those in charge of the administration of the CIS Force and the Government in order to obtain recognition for their association and to concede their demands. It is not possible
in a situation such as this to particularize the acts of
each individual members who participated in the commission
of these acts. The participation of each individual may be of greater or lesser degree but the acts of each individual contributed to the creation of a situationin which a security force itself became a security risk.
It was submitted at the Bar that the real reason for passing the orders impugned in Civil Appeal No. 1484 of 1982 was the encounter with the army on June 25, 1979, and this real reason as not mentioned in the impugned order because the Respondents had been arrested and were being prosecuted and, therefore, before passing the impugned orders, the disciplinary authority would have had to wait till the prosecutions were over. Such an allegation has not been made in the writ petition filed in the High Court. In fact, there is no mention in the writ petition of the help of the army being sought or of the encounter with the army. The impugned orders mentioned the reasons why they were passed. Then Supplementary Returns bears out these reasons. We have, therefore, no hesitation in accepting what is stated in the impugned orders. In our opinion, clause (b) of Rule 37 of the CISF Rules and clause (b) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) were properly applied to the cases of the Respondents.
Finally, a grievance was made at the Bar that the dismissed members of the CIS Force had filed departmental appeals and the appeals of those who had been discharged by the Magistrate were allowed and these appellants were reinstated. Wedo not know how far this is correct nor the reasons for allowing such appeals, but if what is stated is ture, it is not fair and the remaining appeals should be disposed of as early as possible.
The impugned order in Civil Appeal No. 3512 of 1982 is in the same terms as the impugned orders in Civil Appeal No. 3484 of 1982. The situation at Hoshangabad was very much the same as at Bokaro and in our opinion clause (b) of Rule 37
of the CISF Rules and clause (b) of the second proviso to clause (2) of Article 311 were properly applied to the case of the Respondent.
Both these Appeals, therefore, require to be allowed.
CONTINUING MY WORK AGAINST PSYCHOLOGICAL TERRORISM AND CARRYING FORTH THE WORK OF MY ANCESTORS I DID MY POST GRADUATION IN PURE PSYCHOLOGY WON GOLD MEDALS; AND SUBMITTED AT THE DELHI UNIVERSITY ON 10-10-2005 -A SYNOPSIS ON THE INTRODUCTION OF FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY TO THE LAW AND JUDICIARY OF INDIA BY THE INDIAN EVIDENCE ACT OF 1872 ,CLAUSE 45 “OPINION OF EXPERTS “ WHEREIN PSYCHOLOGICAL INTERVENTION IS GIVEN FOR MENS REA IN CRIMINAL CASES AND MITIGATION OF SENTENCE SOUGHT,BY AFFIDAVIT OR EXPERT EVIDENCE IN COURTS OF LAW.
IN CIVILIAN CASES THE EXPERTS IN THE RESPECTIVE FIELDS SHOULD BE CALLED UPON TO SERVE AS EXPERT WITNESSES
ONLY THIS CAN PURGE
Risin' up, back on the street
Did my time, took my chances
Went the distance, now I'm back on my feet
Just a man and his will to survive
So many times, it happens too fast
You change your passion for glory
Don't lose your grip on the dreams of the past
You must fight just to keep them alive
It's the eye of the tiger, it's the cream of the fight
Risin' up to the challenge of our rival
And the last known survivor stalks his prey in the night
And he's watchin' us all in the eye of the tiger
Face to face, out in the heat
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They stack the odds 'til we take to the street
For we kill with the skill to survive
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Have the guts, got the glory
Went the distance, now I'm not gonna stop
Just a man and his will to survive
The eye of the tiger (repeats out)...
The hottest songs from Survivor
PLEASE ALSO READ and judge WHETHER THESE VALIANT SOLDIERS OF KASHMIR WANTED TO FORM A UNION FOR THEMSELVES ALONE?
A.K. KAUL & ANR
UNION OF INDIA & ANR
DATE OF JUDGMENT19/04/1995
AGRAWAL, S.C. (J)
AGRAWAL, S.C. (J)
FAIZAN UDDIN (J)
1995 AIR 1403 1995 SCC (4) 73
JT 1995 (4) 1 1995 SCALE (2)755
S.C. AGRAWAL, J.:
1. Leave granted.
2. The appellants were employed as Deputy Central Intelligence Officers in the Intelligence Bureau in the Ministry of Home Affairs of the Government of India.
On July 23, 1979,
the employees of the Intelligence Bureau formed an Association called "the Intelligence Bureau employees Association" (IBEA) for the purpose of ventilating their grievances.
Appellants, A.K.Kaul and Verghese Joseph,
were elected as the General Secretaries of IBEA and
appellant, B.B. Raval, was elected as the President.
On May 3, 1980, the Joint Director of the Intelligence Bureau issued, a Circular Memorandum declaring that the formation of the IBEA was in violation of the Civil Services (Conduct) Rules and that those who take part in the activities of the IBEA will attract disciplinary action.
(Civil) Nos. 1117-1119 were filed in this Court challenging the said circular. This Court, on July 21, 1980, issued an order for issue of rule nisi on the said writ petitions and also passed an interim order directing that during the pendency of the writ petitions in this Court no disciplinary action shall be taken against any member of the IBEA for reasons mentioned in the circular. On December 26, 1980, orders were passed dismissing the appellants from service.
One such order regarding the dismissal of appellant, A.K. Kaul, is in the
following terms :
"Shri A.K. Kaul,
Deputy Central Intelligence Officer,
Whereas the President is satisfied under
sub-clause (c) of the proviso to clause(2) of
Article 311 of the Constitution that in the
interest of the security of the State it is
not expedient to hold an inquiry in the case
of Shri A. K. Kaul.
And whereas the President is satisfied that on
the basis of the information available, the
activities of Shri A.K. Kaul are such as to
warrant his dismissal from service.
Accordingly, the President hereby dismisses
Shri A.K. Kaul from service with immediate
(By order and in the name of President
Under Secretary to the Govt. of
India Ministry of Home Affairs."
3. The orders for dismissal of appellants, Verghese Joseph and B.B. Raval are in the same terms.
The appellants filed separate writ petitions (Nos. 205-207/81 1) in this Court under Article 32 of the Constitution to challenge the said orders of dismissal.
After the constitution of the Central Administrative Tribunal under the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, (hereinafter referred to as 'the Tribunal') the
said writ petitions were transferred to the Tribunal for adjudication and they were registered as T.A. Nos. 1,2 and 3 of 1992.
4. Before the Tribunal the case put for-ward by the appellants was that they have been picked and chosen for punitive action for dismissal from service for the reason that they were important members of the IBEA, being office bearers as General Secretaries and the President, and that the real motive to pass the orders of dismissal was to penalise them for the active part they had taken in ventilating the grievances of the employees through the IBEA. The appellants also pleaded that they had an
excellent record of service and that they had not conducted themselves in such manner as to warrant their dismissal from service.
It was submitted that they were recipients of commendation certificates, appreciation letters and cash awards from time to time.
It was also stated in the applications that they had not acted contrary to the interest of national security at any time. The said applications were contested by the respondents who pleaded that the orders of dismissal had been passed by the President on being satisfied on the basis of the material available that the activities of the appellants were such as to warrant their dismissal from service by dispensing with the requirements of Article 311(2) of the Constitution in the interest of security of the State.
It was also pleaded on behalf of the respondents that the details of the material on the basis of which the satisfaction had been reached cannot be disclosed without detriment to public interest.
It was denied that the authorities of the Intelligence Bureau have a hostile attitude towards IBEA and it was stated that punitive action was taken on merits of each case and not because of the participation of the appellants in the activities of the IBEA.
During the pendency of the applications before the. Tribunal the ap-pellants moved Misc. Petitions Nos. 1897/ 92 in T.A. Nos. 1 and 2/92 and Miscellaneous Petition No. 732/92 in T.A.-No. 3/92 whereby they prayed for directions to the respondents to produce the records specified in the said applications for inspection of the Tribunal and/or by the appellants and their counsel.The said applications were opposed by the respondents who claimed privilege invoking Article 74(2) of the Constitution and Sections 123 and 124 of the Evidence Act and for that purpose affidavit of Mr.
Madhav Godbole, Secretary to the Government of India, Ministry of Home Affairs, New Delhi (the Head of the Department) was filed before the Tribunal.
Without prejudice to the said claim of privilege, the respondents had, however, stated that they had no objection whatsoever to the said documents relating to the dismissal of the appellants and those portions of documents that relate to the said dismissal orders being produced for perusal of the Tribunal in order to satisfy it that the claim of privilege against disclosure of the said official records is bona fide and genuine.
5. By judgment dated December 18, 1993 the Tribunal, after perusing the records that were placed for perusal of the Tribunal, upheld the claim of privilege and dismissed ,the applications filed by the appellants for inspection and production of the documents. On the basis of the said records the Tribunal has further found that the material considered by the President relate to the activities of the appellants which would prejudicially affect the security of the State and that the materials relied upon or the satisfaction of the President have nothing to do with the appellants' activities in relation to the IBEA.
The Tribunal has held that there is no substance in the case of the appellants that the orders of the dismissal were not bona fide and they have been passed to victimise the appellants for promoting and participating in the activities of the IBEA.
The Tribunal was of the view that the satisfaction had been arrived at after application of mind to the relevant materials without taking into consideration
irrelevant factors and that the impugned orders of dismissal from service dated December 26, 1980 arc not liable for interference.
The Tribunal, therefore, dismissed the applications of the appellants. Hence these appeals.
On behalf of the appellants it has been urged that the exercise of power under clause (c) of the second proviso to Article 3 11(2) of the Constitution is subject to judicial review and that an order passed under the said provisions is open to challenge before the courts on the ground that the satisfaction of the President or the Governor is vitiated by malafides or is based on considerations which have no relevance to the interest of the security of the State.
In this connection, Shri Sorabjee has submitted that in a case where the employee assails the action taken against him under Article 311(2)(c) it is obligatory on the part of the concerned Government to place before the court the relevant material on the basis of which the action was taken and such material can only be withheld from the court in cases where the claim of privilege is found to be justified under the
provisions of Sections 123 and 124 of the Evidence Act.
Shri Sorabjee has urged that the said claim of privilege does not extend to the disclosure of the nature of the activities on the basis of which the alleged satisfaction has been arrived at and the privilege can only relate to the material which has been relied upon in support of the said activities.
7. The learned Additional Solicitor General, appearing for the respondents, has, however, submitted that an order under clause (c) of second proviso to Article 311(2) of the Constitution is to be passed by the President or the Governor on the basis of his subjective satisfaction.
The material which forms the basis for arriving at the said satisfaction is not required to be disclosed both in view of Article 74(2) as well as under Sections 123 and 124 of the Evidence Act.
The learned Additional Solicitor General has, in this context, pointed out that while under clause (b) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) the competent authority is required to record in writing the reason for its satisfaction that it is not reasonably practicable to hold an inquiry, there is no such requirement for recording the reason in clause (c) and, therefore, there is no requirement to disclose the reasons for arriving at the satisfaction for taking action under clause (c) of second proviso to Article 311(2).
8. Article 311(2), as amended by the Constitution
(Fifteenth Amendment) Act, 1963, provides as follows :
"(2) No such persons aforesaid shall be
dismissed or removed or reduced in rank except
after an inquiry in which he has been informed
of the charges against him and given a
reasonable opportunity of being heard in
respect of those charges :
Provided that where it is proposed after such
inquiry to impose upon him any such penalty,
such penalty may be imposed on the basis of
the evidence adduced during such inquiry and
it shall not be necessary to give such person
any opportunity of making representation on
the penalty proposed
Provided further that this clause shall not
(a) where a person is dismissed or removed
or reduced in rank on the ground of conduct
which has led to his conviction on a criminal
(b) when the authority empowered to dismiss
or remove a person or to reduce him in rank is
satisfied that for some reason, to be recorded
by that authority in writing it is not practi-
cable to hold such inquiry; or
(c) where the President or Governor, as the
case may be, is satisfied that in the interest
of the security of the State it is not
expedient to hold such inquiry. "
9. The provision of the second proviso came up for consideration before the Constitution Bench of this Court in Union of India & Anr. v. Tulsiram Patel & Ors., 1985 Supp.
(2) SCR 13 1, Madon, J., speaking for the majority, has observed that clause (2) of Article 311 gives a constitutional mandate to the principles of natural justice and audi alteram pattern rule by providing that a person employed in a civil capacity under the Union or a State shall not be dismissed or removed from service or reduced in rank until after an inquiry in which he has been informed of the charges against him and has been given a reasonable opportunity of being heard in respect of those charges and that this safeguard provided for a government, servant by clause (2) of Article 311(2) is, however, taken away when the second proviso to that clause becomes applicable. (Page 202). The Court has also pointed out that the paramount thing to bear in mind is that the second proviso will apply only where the conduct of a government servant is such as he deserves the punishment of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank and that before denying a government servant his constitutional right to an inquiry, the first consideration would be whether the conduct of the concerned government servant is such as justifies the penalty of dismissal, removal or reduction in rank and once that conclusion is
reached and the condition specified in the relevant clause of the second proviso is satisfied, that proviso becomes applicable and the government servant is not entitled to an inquiry. (Pages 204-205).
While dealing with clause (c) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) it has been stated :
"The question under clause (c), however, is
not whether the security of the State has been
affected or not, for the expression used in
clause (c) is "in the interest of the security
of the State". The interest of the security
of the state may be affected by actual acts or
even the likelihood of such acts taking place.
Further, what is required under clause (c) is
not the satisfaction of the President or the
Governor, as the case may be, that the
interest of the security of the State is or
will be affected but his satisfaction that in
the interest of the security of the State, it
is not expedient to hold an inquiry as
contemplated by Article 311(2). The sat-
isfaction of the President or Governor must,
therefore, be with respect to the expediency
or inexpediency of holding an inquiry in the
interest of the security of the State. " (p.
"The satisfaction so reached by the President
or the Governor must necessarily be a
subjective satisfaction. Expediency involves
matters of policy. Satisfaction may be
arrived at as a result of secret information
received by the Government about the brewing
danger to the interest or the security of the
State and like matters. There may be other
factors which may be required to be
considered, weighed and balanced in order to
reach the requisite satisfaction whether
holding an inquiry would be expedient or not.
If the requisite satisfaction has been reached
as a result of secret information received by
the Government, making, known such information
may very often result in disclosure of the
source of such information. Once known, the
particular source from which the information
was received would no more be available to the
Government. The reasons for the satisfaction
reached by the President or the Governor under
clause (c) cannot, therefore, be required to
be recorded in the order of dismissal, removal
or reduction in rank nor can they be made
public." (p. 278)
10.The learned Judge did not consider it necessary to deal with the contention that the power of judicial review is not excluded where the satisfaction of the President or the Governor has been reached mala fide or is based on wholly extraneous or irrelevant grounds and that in such a case, in law there would be no satisfaction of the President or the Governor at all for the reason that in the matters under consideration before this court all the materials, including the advice tendered by the Council of Ministers, had been produced and they clearly showed that the satisfaction of the Governor was neither reached malafide nor was it based on any extraneous or irrelevant ground. (Page 279). In the light of the provisions contained in Article 74(2) and Article 163(3) it was submitted before the Court that leaving aside the advice given by the Ministers to the President or the Governor, the Government is bound to disclose at least the materials upon which the advice of Council of Ministers was based so that the court can examine whether the satisfaction of the President or the Governor, as the case may be, was arrived at mala fide or is based on wholly extraneous or irrelevant grounds so that such satisfaction would in law amount to no satisfaction at all and that if the Government does not voluntarily disclose such materials it can be compelled by the Court to do so.
Dealing with the said submission it was observed :
"Whether this should be done or not would
depend upon whether the documents in question
fall within the class of privileged documents
and whether in respect of them privilege has
been properly claimed or not. It is
unnecessary to examine this question any
further because in the cases under clause (c)
before us though at first privilege was
claimed, at the hearing privilege was waived
and the materials as also the advice given by
the Ministers to the Governor of Madhya
Pradesh who has passed the impugned orders in
those cases were disclosed." (p. 280)
11.It would thus appear that in Tulsiram Patel (supra) though the question whether the satisfaction of the President or the Governor under Article 311(2) is amenable to judicial review and the Government can be required to disclose the materials upon which the advice of the Council of Ministers was based so as to enable the court to exercisethe power of judicial review has been left open, the Court,after considering the said material, has recorded the finding that the satisfaction of the Governor was neither recorded malafide nor was it based on any extraneous or irrelevant ground.
12.It is, therefore, necessary to deal with this question in the instant case., We may, in this context, point out that a distinction has to be made between judicial review and justiciability of a particular action. In a written constitution the powers of the various organs of the State,are limited by the provisions of the Constitution.
The extent of those limitations on the powers has to be determined on an interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Constitution. Since the task of interpreting the provisions of the Constitution is entrusted to the Judiciary, it is vested with the power to test the validity of an action of every authority functioning under the Constitution on the touch stone of the constitution in order to ensure that the authority exercising the power conferred by the constitution does not transgress the limitations
placed by the Constitutions on exercise of that power. This power of judicial review is, therefore, implicit in a written constitution and unless expressly excluded by a provision of the Constitution, the power of judicial review is available in respect of exercise of powers under any ofthe provisions of the Constitution. Justiciability relates to a particular field falling within the purview of the power of judicial review. On account of want of judicially manageable standards, there may be matters which are not susceptible to the judicial process. In other words, during the course of exercise of the power of judicial review it may be found that there are certain aspects of the exercise of that power which are not susceptible to judicial process on account of want of judicially manageable standards and
are, therefore, not justiciable.
13. In the Slate of Rajasthan & Ors. v.
Union of India Etc. Etc., (1978) 1 SCR 1, one of the questions failing for consideration was whether satisfaction of the President in the matter of exercise of the power to make a Proclamation conferred under Article 356(1) of the Constitution is amenable to judicial review. At the relevant time when the impugned Proclamations were made there was an express provision in clause (5) of Article 356 which prescribed that "the satisfaction of the President
mentioned in clause (1) shall be final and conclusive and shall not be questioned in any Court on any ground."
In spite of such an express provision P.N. Bhagwati J. (as the learned Chief Justice then was) speaking for himself
A.C. Gupta J., has held that "if the satisfaction is mala
fides or is based on wholly extraneous or irrelevant
grounds, the Court would have the jurisdiction to examine it, because in that case there would be no satisfaction of the President in regard to the matter which he is required to be satisfied." (p.82).
Other learned Judges, with some variance, have adopted a similar approach. Beg CJ. has held that if it is revealed "that a constitutionally or legally prohibited or extraneous or collateral purpose is sought to be achieved by a proclamation under Article 356 of the Constitution, this Court will not shirk its duty to act in the manner in which the law may then oblige it to act."(p.46).
Chandrachud J. (as the learned Chief Justice then
was) has observed that if reasons given are wholly extraneous to the formation of the satisfaction, the Proclamation would be open to the attack that it is vitiated by legal mala fides." (p.60).
Goswami J. has held that the Court "would not refuse to consider when there may be sufficient materials to establish that the Proclamation under Article 356(1) is tainted with mala fides."(p.92).
Untwalia J. has said that the Court is not powerless to interfere with an order that is ultra vires, wholly illegal or passed malafide. (p. 95).
Fazal Ali J. has held that "on the reasons given by the President in his order if the Courts find that they are absolutely extraneous and irrelevant and based onpersonal and illegal considerations the Courts are not powerless to strike down the order on the ground of malafide if proved." (p. 120).
14. Clause (5) of Article 356 was deleted by the
Constitution (Forty Fourth Amendment) Act, 1978. In S.R.Bommai (supra) Sawant J. after noticing the observations in A.K. Roy v. Union of India 1982 (2) SCR 272, has observed that after deletion of clause (5) the judicial review of the Proclamation issued under Article 356 has become wider than indicated in the State of Rajasthan (supra).
Similarly,Jeevan Reddy J. has said : "Surely the deletion of clause(5) has not restricted the scope of judicial review.
Indeed, it has removed the cloud cast on the said power.The Court should, if anything, be more inclined to examine the constitutionality of the Proclamation after such deletion." (p. 255)
15. In S.R. Bommai (supra) differing views were expressed by the learned Judges on the scope and extent of the judicial review and justiciability of the action taken by the President in exercise of power conferred under Article 356(1). Sawant J., speaking for himself and Kuldip Singh J., had held that material on the basis of which the advice is given by the Council of Ministers and the President forms his satisfaction has to be scrutinised by Court within the acknowledged parameters of judicial review, viz., illegality, irrationality and mala fides. (p. 112).
Referring to the expression "if the President .... is satisfied" in Article
356(1) the learned Judge has said :
"Hence, it is not the personal whim wish, view
or opinion or the ipse dixit of the President
dehors the material but a legitimate inference
drawn from the material placed before him
which is relevant for the purpose. In other
words, the President has to be convinced of or
has to have sufficient proof of information
with regard to or has to be free from doubt or
uncertainly about the state of things indi-
cating that the situation in question has
arisen. Although, therefore, the sufficiency
or otherwise of the material cannot be
questioned the legitimacy of inference drawn
from such material is certainly open to
judicial review. " (p. 103)
16. According to the learned Judge, "Many of the parameters of judicial review developed in the field of administrative law are not antithetical to the field of constitutional law and they can equally apply to the domain covered by the constitutional law." (p.94). The learned Judge has applied the tests laid down by this Court in Barium Chemicals Ltd.v. Company Law Board. 1966 Supp. SCR. 311.
17. Jeevan Reddy J., speaking for himself and one of us(Agrawal J.), did not, however, give such a wide scope to the power of judicial review in respect of a proclamation made under Article 356 (1). After pointing out that Barium Chemicals (supra) is a decision concerning subjective satisfaction of an authority created by a statute, the learned Judge has held that the principles enshrined in that case "cannot ipso facto be extended to the exercise of
constitutional power under Article 35 of the Constitution and that "having regard to the fact that this is a high Constitutional functionary in the Nation, it may not be appropriate to adopt the tests applicable in the case of action taken by statutory or administrative authorities nor, at any rate, in their entirety." (p.267).
He preferred to adopt the formulation that "if a Proclamation is found to be mala fide or is found to be based wholly on extraneous or irrelevant grounds, it is liable to be struck down." (p.268). The teamed Judge has observed: "The truth orcorrectness of the material cannot be questioned by the court nor will it go into the adequacy of the material.
It will also not substitute its opinion for that of the President. Even if some of the material on which the action is taken is found to be irrelevant, the court would still not interfere so long as there is some relevant material sustaining the action.
The ground of mala fides takes in inter alia situations-where the Proclamation is found to be a clear case of abuse of power, or what is sometimes called fraud on power cases where this power is invoked for achieving oblique ends." (p. 268).
The learned Judge has further stated: "The court will not lightly presume abuse or misuse. The court would, as it should, tread wearily, making allowance for the fact that the President and the Union Council of Ministers are the best judges of the situation, that they alone are in possession of information and material sensitive in nature sometimes and that the Constitution has trusted their judgment in the matter. But all this does not mean that the President and Union Council of Ministers are the final arbiters in the matter or that
their opinion is conclusive." (pp.268 269).
Pandian J. has expressed his agreement with the judgment of Jeevan Reddy J.
Ahmadi J. (as the learned Chief Justice then was),while expressing his agreement with the view expressed in the State of Rajasthan (supra) has held that a proclamation issued under Article 356(1) of the Constitution can be challenged on the limited ground that the action is mala fide or ultra vires Article 356 itself and has held that the test laid down in Barium Chemicals (supra) and subsequent decisions for adjudging the validity of administrative action can have no application for testing the satisfaction of the President under Article 356. (p.82)
19. Verma J., speaking for himself and Yogeshwar Dayal J., has taken the same view. The learned Judge has held though the Proclamation under Article 356 is subject to judicial review the area of justiciability is narrow. While holding that the test for adjudging the validity of an administrative action and the grounds of its invalidity indicated in Barium Chemicals "(Supra) and other cases of that category have no application for testing and invalidating a Proclamation issued under Article 356, the learned
Judge has said that the grounds of invalidity are those mentioned in State of Rajasthan (supra). (p. 85)
20. K. Ramaswamy J. has held: "The decision can be tested on the ground of legal mala fides, or high irrationality in the exercise of the discretion to issue Presidential Proclamation and the traditions parameters of judicial review, therefore cannot be extended to the area of exceptional and extraordinary power exercise under Article 356". The learned Judge has also held that the "doctrine of proportionality cannot be extended to the power exercised under Article 356." (p. 209)
21. It would thus appear that in S.R Bommai (supra) though all the learned Judges have held that the exercise of power under Article 356 (1) is subject to judicial review but in the matter of justiciability of the satisfaction of the President, the view of the majority (Pandian, Ahmadi, Verma,Agrawal, Yogeshwar Dayal and Jeevan Reddy JJ.) is that the principles evolved in Barium Chemicals (supra) for adjudging the validity of an action based on the subjective satisfaction of the authority created by statute do not, in their entirety, apply to the exercise of a constitutional power under Article 356.
On the basis of the judgment of Jeevan Reddy J., which takes a narrower view than that taken by Sawant J., it can be said that the view of the majority
(Pandian, Kuldip Singh, Sawant, Agrawal and Jeevan Reddy JJ.) is that :
(i) the satisfaction of the President while
making Proclamation under Article 356(1) is
(ii) it would be open to challenge on the
ground of mala fides or being based wholly on
extraneous and/or irrelevant grounds;
(iii)even if some of the materials on which
the action is taken is found to be irrelevant,
the court would still not interfere so long as
there is some relevant material sustaining the
(iv) the truth or correctness of the material
cannot be questioned by the Court nor will it
go into the adequacy of the material and it
will also not substitute its opinion for that
of the President;
(v) the ground of mala fide takes in inter
alia situations where the proclamation is
found to be a clear case of abuse of power or
what is sometimes called fraud on power;
(vi) the court will not lightly presume abuse
or misuse of power and will make allowance for
the fact that the President and the Union
Council of Ministers are the best judge of the
situation and that they are also in possession
of information and material and that the
Constitution has trusted their judgment in the
(vii) this does not mean that the President
and the Council of Ministers arc the final
arbiters in the matter or that their opinion
22.As to the bar to an inquiry by the court imposed under Article 74(2) of the Constitution, all the Judges in S.R. Bommai (supra) have held that the said bar under Article 74(2) is confined to the advice tendered by the Council of Ministers to the President and it does not extend to the material on the basis of which the advice was tendered and, therefore, Articles 74(2) does not bar the production of the material on which the advice of the Council of Ministers is based. This is, however, subject to the right to claim privilege against the production of the said material under Section 123 of the Evidence Act.
23.Is there anything in the provisions of clause (c) of the second proviso to Article 311 (2) which compels a departure fro the principles laid down in S.R. Bommai (supra) governing justiciability of the satisfaction of the President in the matter of exercise of power under Article 356? We have not been able to discern any reason for making a departure. As compared the clause (c) of the second proviso to Article 311 (2), which deals with an individual employee, the power conferred by Article 356, resulting in displacement of the elected government of a State and imposition of President's rule in the State, is of much greater significance a. effecting large number of persons.
We may, in this context, refer to clause (b) of the second proviso to Article 311 (2) whereunder it is permissible to dispense with the requirements of Article 311 (2) if the authority empowered to dismiss or remove a person or to reduce him in rank is satisfied that for some reason, to be recorded by that authority in writing, it is not reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry. Clause (3) of Article 311 makes the said decision of the authority final.
In spite of the said provision attaching finality to the decision this Court, in Tulsiram Patel (supra), has held :
"The finality given by clause (3) of Article
311 to the disciplinary authority's decision
that it was not reasonably practicable to hold
the inquiry is not binding upon the court.
The court will also examine the charge of mala
fides, if any, made in the writ petition. In
examining the relevancy of the reasons, the
court will consider the situation which
according to the disciplinary authority made
it come to the conclusion that it was not
reasonably practicable to hold the inquiry.
If the court finds that the reasons are ir-
relevant, then the recording of its satis-
faction by the disciplinary authority would
be, an abuse of power conferred upon it by
clause (b) and would take the case out of the
purview of that clause and the impugned order
of penalty would stand invalidated." (p.274)
24.Clause (b) differs from clause (c) in as much as under clause (b) the competent authority is required to record in writing the reasons for its satisfaction and there is no such requirement in clause (c). This difference, in our opinion, does not mean that the satisfaction of the President or the Governor under clause (c) is immune from judicial review and is not justiciable. It only means that the provisions contained in clause (c) are more akin to those contained in Article 356(1) which also does not contain any requirement to record the reasons for the satisfaction of the President. Since the satisfaction of the President in the matter of making a proclamation under Article 356(1) is justiciable within the limits indicated in S.R. Bommai (supra) the satisfaction of the President or the Governor, which forms the basis for passing an order under clause (c) of the second proviso to Article 311 (2), can also be justiciable within the same limits.
25.Under clause (c) of the second proviso to Article 311(2) the President or the Governor has to satisfy himself about the expediency in the interests of the security of the State to hold an enquiry as prescribed under Article 311 (2). Are the considerations involving the interests of the security of the State of such a nature as to exclude the satisfaction arrived at by the President or the Governor in respect of the matters from the field of justiciability? We do not think so.
Article 19(2) of the Constitution permits the State to impose, by law, reasonable restrictions in the interests of the security of the State on the exercise of the right to freedom of speech and expression conferred by subclause (a) of clause (1) of Article 19.
The validity of the law imposing such restrictions under Article 19(2) is open to judicial review on the ground that the restrictions are not reasonable or they are not in the interests of the security of the State. The Court is required to adjudicate on the question whether a particular restriction on the
right to freedom of speech and expression is reasonable in the interests of the security of the State and for that purpose the Court takes into consideration the interests of the security of the State and the need of the restrictions for protecting those interests. If the Courts are competent to adjudicate on matters relating to the security of the State in respect of restrictions on the right to freedom of speech and expression under Article 19 (2) there appears to be no reason why the Courts should not be competent to go into the question whether the satisfaction of the President or the Governor for passing an order under Article 311 (2)
(c) is based on considerations having a bearing on the interests of the security of the State. While examining the validity of a law imposing restrictions on the right to freedom of speech and expression this Court has emphasised the distinction between security of the State and maintenance of public order and has observed that only serious and aggravated forms of public order which are calculated to endanger the security of the State would fall within the ambit of clause (2) of Article 19. (See : Romesh Thappar v. The
State of Madras, 1950 SCR 594, at p. 601).
So also in Tulsiram Patel (supra) the Court has pointed out the distinction between the expressions 'security of the State', 'public order' and 'law and order' and has stated that situations which affect public order are graver than those which affect law and order and situations which affect security of the State are graver than those which affect public order.
The President or the Governor while exercising the power under Article 311 (2) (c) has to bear in mind this distinction between situations which affect the security of the State and the situations which affect public order or law and order and for the purpose of arriving at his satisfaction for the purpose of passing an order under Article 311 (2) (c) the President or the Governor can take into consideration only those circumstances which have a bearing on the interests of the security of the State and not on situations having a bearing on law and order or public order. The satisfaction of the President or the Governor would be vitiated if it is based on circumstances having no bearing on the security of the State. If an order passed under Article 311(2) (c) is assailed before a court of law
on the ground that the satisfaction of the President or the Governor is not based on circumstances which have a bearing on the security of the State the Court can examine the circumstances on which the satisfaction of the President or the Governor is based and if it finds that the said circumstances have no bearing on the security of the State the court can hold that the satisfaction of the President or the Governor which is required for passing such an order has been vitiated by wholly extraneous or irrelevant considerations.
26. It would be useful, in this context, to take note of the decision of the House of Lords in Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Services, 1985 (1) AC 374, which related to the Government Communications Head Quarters (GCHQ). The main functions of GCHQ were to ensure the security of military and official communications and to provide the government with signals intelligence which involved the handling of secret information vital to the national security.
Since 1947 staff employed at GCHQ had been permitted to belong to national trade unions and most had done so. There was a well-established practice of consultation between the official and trade union sides about important alterations in the terms and conditions of service of the staff.
On December 22, 1983 the Minister for the Civil Service gave an instruction for the immediate variation of the terms and conditions of service of the staff with the effect that they would no longer be permitted to belong to national trade unions.
There had been no consultation with the trade unions or with the staff at GCHQ prior to the issuing of that instruction. The said instruction was challenged by a trade union and six individuals who sought judicial review of the said instruction.
Immunity from judicial review was claimed on the ground that the said instruction had been issued in exercise of the prerogative power of the Crown. The House of Lords held that executive action was not immune from judicial review merely because it was carried out in pursuance of the power derived from a common law or prerogative, rather than a statutory source, and a minister acting under a prerogative power might, depending upon its subject matter, be under the same duty to act fairly as in the case of action under a statutory power. On behalf of the Minister it was submitted that prior consultation would involve a real risk that it would occasion the very kind of disruption that was threat to national security and which it was intended to avoid.
While recognising that the decision on whether the requirements of national security outweigh the duty of fairness in any particular case, is for the Government and not for the courts, Lord Fraser of Tully belton said
"But if the decision is successfully chal-
lenged on the ground that it has been reached
by a process which is unfair then the
Government is under an obligation to produce
evidence that the decision was, in fact, based
on grounds of national security," (p. 402)
According to Lord Scarman
"The point of principle in the appeal is as to
the duty of the court when in proceedings
properly brought before it a question arises
as to what is required in the interest of
national security. The question may arise in
ordinary litigation between private persons as
to their private rights and obligations: and
it can arise as in this case in proceedings
for judicial review of a decision by a public
"But, however it arises, it is a matter to be
considered by the court in the circumstances
and context of the case. Though there, are
limits dictated by law and common sense which
the court must observe in dealing with the
question the court does 'not abdicate its
judicial functions. If the question arises as
a matter of fact, the court requires evidence
to be given. If it arises as a factor to be
considered in reviewing the exercise of a
discretionary power, evidence is also needed
so that the court may determine whether it
should intervene to correct excess or abuse of
the power," [p. 404]
27. Similarly Lord Roskill has said:
"The courts have long shown themselves
sensitive to the assertion by the executive
that considerations of national security must
preclude judicial investigation of a
particular individual grievance. But even in
that field the courts will not act on a mere
assertion that questions of national security
were involved. Evidence is required that the
decision under challenge was in fact founded
on those grounds. 'Mat that principle exists
is 1 beyond doubt.?' [p. 420]
28.On the basis of the evidence that was adduced in that case it was held that the evidence established that the minister had considered, with reason, that prior consultation about her instruction would have involved a risk of precipitating disruption at GCHQ and revealing vulnerable areas of operation, and, accordingly, she had shown that her decision had in fact been based on considerations of national security that out weighed the applicants' legitimate expectation of prior consultation.
29. In Bakshi Sardari Lal (Dead) through LRs Ors. v.Union of India & Anr., 1987 (4) SCC 114, in a challenge to orders of dismissal passed under clause (c) of the second. proviso to Article 311 (2) it was contended on behalf of the appellants that the High Court was wrong in holding that the sufficiency of satisfaction of the President was not justiciable.
While dealing with the said contention, the court, after referring to the decision in
Tulsiram Patel (supra), has observed :
"The record of the case produced before us
clearly indicates that the reason has been
recorded though not communicated. That would
satisfy, the requirements of the law as
indicated in Tulsiram Patel Case . The plea of
mala fides as had been contended before the
High Court and causally reiterated before us
arises out of the fact that typed orders dated
June 3, 1971, were already on record in the
file when the papers were placed before the
President; such a contention is without any
substance." [p. 121]
30.This would show that the court did go into the question whether the impugned orders were vitiated by mala, fides. As noticed earlier in Tulsiram Patel (supra) also the Court, while dealing with the Madhya Pradesh Police Forces matters, did examine the question whether the impugned orders of dismissal passed under Article 311(2)(c) were vitiated by mala fides or were based on irrelevant considerations and after considering all the materials that were produced before the Court by the State Government, the Court recorded the finding that the facts leave no doubt that the situation was such that prompt and urgent action was necessary and the holding of inquiry into the conduct of each of the petitioners would not have been expedient in the interests of the security of the State.
31.We are, therefore, of the opinion that an order passed under clause (c) of the second proviso to Article 311 (2) is subject to judicial review and its validity can be examined by the court on the ground that the satisfaction of the President or the Governor is vitiated by mala fides or is based on wholly extraneous or irrelevant grounds within the limits laid down in S.R Bommai (supra).
32.In order that the Court is able to exercise this power of judicial review effectively it must have the necessary material before it to determine whether the satisfaction of the President or the Governor as the case may be, has been arrived at in accordance with the law and is not vitiated by mala fides or extraneous or irrelevant factors. This brings us to the question whether the Government is obligated to place such material before the Court. It is no doubt true that unlike clause (b) of the second proviso to Article 311
(2) which requires the authority to record in writing the reason for its satisfaction that it is not reasonably practicable to hold such inquiry clause (c) of the second proviso does not prescribe for the recording of reasons for the satisfaction. But the absence of such a requirement to record reason for the satisfaction does not dispense with the obligation on the part of the concerned Government to satisfy the court or the Tribunal if an order passed under clause (c) of the second proviso to Article 311 (2) is challenged before such court or tribunal that the satisfaction was arrived at after taking into account relevant facts and circumstances and was not vitiated by mala fides and was not based on extraneous or irrelevant considerations. In the absence of the said circumstances being placed before the court or the Tribunal it may be possible for the concerned employee to establish his case that the satisfaction was vitiated by mala fides or was based on extraneous or irrelevant considerations.
While exercising the power under Article 311 (2) (c) the President or the Governor acts in accordance with the advice tendered by the Council of
Ministers. (See : Samsher Singh v. State of Punjab, 1975 (1) SCR 814). Article 74(2) and Article 163 (3) which preclude the court from inquiring into the question whether any, and if so, what advice was tendered by the Ministers to the President or the Governor enable the concerned Government to withhold from the court the advice that was tendered by the Ministers to the President or the Governor. But, as laid down in S.R. Bommai (supra), the said provisions do not permit the Government to withhold production in the Court of the material on which the advice of the Ministers was based.
This is, however, subject to the claim of privilege under Sections 123 and 124 of the Evidence Act in respect of a particular document or record. The said claim of privilege will have to be considered by the court or tribunal on its own merit. But the upholding of such claim for privilege would not stand in the way of the concerned Government being required to disclose the nature of the activities of the employee on the basis of which the satisfaction of the President or the Governor was arrived at for the purpose of passing an order under clause (c) of the second proviso to Article 311 (2) so that the court or tribunal may be able to determine whether the said activities could be regarded as having a reasonable nexus with the interest of the security of the State.
In the absence of any indication about the nature of the activities it would not be possible for the court or tribunal to determine whether the satisfaction was arrived at on the basis of relevant considerations. The nature of activities in which employee is said to have indulged in must be distinguished from the material which supports his having indulged in such activities. The non-disclosure of such material would be permissible if the claim of privilege is
upheld. The said claim of privilege would not extend to the disclosure of the nature of the activities because such disclosure would not involve disclosure of any information connecting the employee with such activities or the source of such information.
33.In our opinion, therefore, in a case where the validity of an order passed under clause (c) of the second proviso to Article 111(2) is assailed before a court or a Tribunal it is open to the court or the Tribunal to examine whether the satisfaction of the President or the Governor is vitiated by mala fides or is based on wholly extraneous or irrelevant grounds and for that purpose the Government is obliged to
place before the court or tribunal the relevant material on the basis of which the satisfaction was arrived at subject to a claim of privilege under Sections 123 and 124 of the Evidence Act to withhold production of a particular document or record. Even in cases where such a privilege is claimed the Government concerned must disclose before the Court or tribunal the nature of the activities in which the Government employee is said to have indulged in.
34.In the present case the appellants had sought production
and inspection of the following documents:
(a) The records and files containing the
"information" on the basis of which the
President was "satisfied " for the purpose of
exercising his powers under clause (c) of the
second proviso to Article 311 (2).
(b) The records and files containing the
description of "activities of the petitioners
which warranted their 'dismissal' from
(c) The records and files containing the
details of "misconduct" attributed to the
petitioners, as covered in CCS (Conduct)
(d) A copy of the charge of misconduct and
the statement of allegation in support thereof
framed by the Competent Authority against the
petitioners before coming to the conclusion
that "it is not expedient to hold an inquiry
in the case of Shri B.B. Raval (petitioners)."
(e) A copy of the original order passed by
the President of India under Article 311
(2)(c) on the basis of which Shri R.
Mahadevan, Under Secretary to the Government
of India, Ministry of Honic Affairs issued the
impugned order dated 26th December, 1980 "By
order and in the name of the
(f) A copy of the order of delegation of
powers of the President of India authorising
Shri R. Mahadevan, Under Secretary to
authenticate the order of the President and
issue the same in his name.
(g) Records and files containing the de-
liberations, recommendations and findings of
the Committee of Advisors (as envisaged in
O.M. dated 26th July, 1980) advising the
President of India to exercise powers under
Article 311 (2)(c) of the Constitution.
(h) Copies of any other records, files,
notification or recommendations relevant to
the issue of the impugned order, that the
Hon'ble Tribunal may direct the respondents to
produce for rendering full and effective
assistance to the Hon'ble Tribunal in the
interest of justice and for adjudication of
35. Dr. Madhav Godbole in his affidavit claimed privilege under Article 74(2) as well as under Sections 123 and 124 of the Evidence Act. The Tribunal after referring the decision of this Court in S.P. Gupta & Ors., etc. etc. v. Union of India & Ors. etc. etc., 1982
(2) SCR 365, has observed that
the following classes of documents are protected from disclosure :
"(i) Cabinet minutes, minutes of discussions
between heads of departments, high level
inter-departmental communications and
dispatches from ambassadors abroad.
(ii) Papers brought into existence for the
purpose of preparing a submission to cabinet.
(iii) Documents which relate to the framing of
the Government policy at a high level.
(iv) Notes and minutes made by the respective
officers on the relevant files, information
expressed or reports made and gist of official
(v) Documents concerned with policymaking
within departments including minutes and the
like by junior officials and correspondence
with outside bodies."
36.The Tribunal, after examining the records produced before it, has observed that the records contain cabinet minutes, papers brought into existence for the purpose of preparing submission to the cabinet, notes made by the respective officers, information expressed and the gist of official decisions. Having regard to the fact that the appellants were working in a highly sensitive Organisation entrusted with the delicate job of gathering, collecting and analysing intelligence necessary to maintain the unity, integrity and sovereignty of the country and that secrecy is the essence of the organisation and exposure may tend to demolish the organisation and aggravate the hazards in gathering informa tion and dry up the sources that provide essential and sensitive information needed to protect public interest, the Tribunal has held that it will not be in public interest to permit disclosure of such documents. The Tribunal has, therefore, upheld the claim of privilege. We do not find any ground to take a different view in the matter.
37.After looking into the records the Tribunal has recorded the finding that the materials considered by the President relate to the activities of the appellants which would prejudicially affect the security of the State and that the materials relied upon for the satisfaction of the President have nothing to do with the activities of the appellants in relation to IBEA and that the impugned orders have not been passed in violation of the interim order passed by this Court in W.P. O Nos. 1119 of 1980 and that there is no substance in the appellants' case that the orders of dismissal are not bona fide and had been passed to victimise the appellants for promoting and participating in the activities of IBEA.
The learned Additional Solicitor General has submitted that the Tribunal has not committed any error in adopting this course and has placed reliance on the decision of this Court in Jamaat-e-Islamdi Hind v. Union of India, 1995 (1) SCC 428.
38.In Jamaat-e-Islamdi Hind (supra) a notification had been issued by the Government of India under Section 3 of the Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967 declaring that the Jamaat-e-Islami Hind was an unlawful Association. The said notification was referred for adjudication to the Tribunal constituted under the said Act. Before the Tribunal the only material produced by the Central Government was a resume prepared on the basis of some intelligence reports and the affidavits of two officers who spoke only on the basis of the records and not from personal knowledge. The Tribunal held that there was sufficient cause for declaring the Association to be unlawful and confirmed the notification. On behalf of the appellant it was urged that the only material produced at the inquiry does not constitute legal evidence for the purpose in as much as it was, at best, hearsay and that too without disclosing the source from which it emanates to give an opportunity to the appellant to effectively rebut the same.
On the other hand, on behalf of the respondent it was submitted that the requirement of natural justice in such a situation was satisfied by mere disclosure of information without disclosing the source of the information. This Court, while holding that the minimum requirement of natural justice must be satisfied to make the adjudication meaningful, observed that the said requirement of natural justice in a case of this kind had to be tailored to safeguard public interest which must always out-weigh every lesser interest. It was said:
"It is obvious that the unlawful activities of
an association may quite often be clandestine
in nature and, therefore, the source of
evidence of the unlawful activities may
require continued confidentiality in public
interest. In such a situation, disclosure of
the source of such information, and, may be,
also full particulars thereof, is likely to be
against the public interest. ....... However,
the nondisclosure of sensitive information and
evidence to the association and its office-
bearers, whenever justified in pubic interest.
does not necessarily imply its non-disclosure
to the Tribunal as well." [p.447]
39.These observations in Jamaat-e-Islamdi Hind (supra) lend support to the view that in a case where the material is of such a nature that it requires continued confidentiality in public interest it would be permissible for the court or tribunal to look into the same while permitting the nondisclosure to the other party to the adjudication. It cannot, therefore, be said that the Tribunal, in the present case, was in error in looking into the record for the purpose of determining whether the satisfaction has been vitiated for any of the reasons mentioned by the appellants.
40. The learned counsel for the appellants have invited our attention to the averments contained in C.M. No. 8494 of 1980 filed on behalf of the respondent in W.P. No. 1117-19 of 1980 in this Court in support of their submission that the impugned orders of dismissal have been passed on the basis of the activities referred to in para 6 of the said application. This submission has to be, rejected in view of the finding recorded by the Tribunal that the materials considered by the President relate to the activities of the appellants which would prejudicially affect the security of the State and that the said materials have nothing to do with the activities of the appellant in
relation to IBEA.
41. Having regard to the facts and circumstances of the case we are unable to hold that the impugned orders for the dismissal of the appellants are vitiated by malafides or are based on wholly extraneous or irrelevant grounds and we do not find any ground to interfere with the decision of the Tribunal. The appeals are, therefore, dismissed.
But in the circumstances without any order as to costs.
The cruel hands of Jamaat-e-Islamdi Hind near Police Headquarters Delhi is a filthy representation of mata mandir at Jammu wherein the muslims claim that the goddess of power in India is theirs through organised crime supported by Britain,
as well as their subsidiary alliances in Arya Samaj and Khalistan terror outfits who are surviving by the cunt and murder of women.
It is also an obvious reference to Jamaica /West Indies and English Cricket Betting ,through which a major chunk of terrorist earnings come.
Carlos Marcello was a fervent racist. He despised blacks and vehemently opposed the civil rights movement during the 1960’s. He openly expressed his hatred of Dr. Martin Luther King and his white knight, Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy. Known to be a supporter of the Ku Klux Klan, Carlos was a generous financial supporter of anti-civil rights movements.
THE AMAZING FACTOR IS THE HISTORY OF JUDAISM AND CHRISTIANITY WHICH IS BEING UPHELD IN ETHIOPIA !READ THE FOLLOWING:-
The Ark of the Covenant (ארון הברית in Hebrew: aron hab'rit) is described in the Bible as a sacred container, wherein rested the Tablets of stone containing the Ten Commandments as well as other sacred Israelite pieces. According to the Biblical account, the Ark was built at the command of God, in accord with Moses' prophetic vision on Mount Sinai (Exodus 25:9-10). God communicated with Moses "from between the two cherubim" on the Ark's cover (Exodus 25:22). The Ark and its sanctuary were "the beauty of Israel" (Lamentations 2:1). Rashi and some Midrashim suggest that there were two arks - a temporary one made by Moses, and a later one made by Bezalel (Hertz 1936)
The Hebrew word aron is used in the Bible to refer to any type of ark, chest or coffer, for any purpose (Book of Genesis 50:26; 2 Kings 12:9, 10). The Ark of the Covenant is distinguished from all others by such titles as "Ark of God" (1 Samuel 3:3), "Ark of the Covenant" (Josh. 3:6; Hebrews 9:4), "Ark of the Testimony" (Ex. 25:22).
The Ark is referred to by several names in the Bible, among them the Ark of the Testimony, the Ark of the Covenant, the Ark of the Covenant of the Lord of all the Earth, the Holy Ark, and the Ark of thy God's strength.
Some sources suggest that during the reign of King Manasseh (2 Chron 33) the Ark was smuggled from the temple by way of the Well of Souls and taken to Egypt, eventually ending up in Ethiopia. There are some carvings on the Cathedral of Chartres that may refer to this. Another theory was dramatized by George Lucas, Philip Kaufman and Lawrence Kasdan in their story and screenplay for the movie Raiders of the Lost Ark, which was directed by Steven Spielberg. The movie theorized that the ark was taken when Pharaoh Sheshonk (biblical Shishak) warred with the Israelites and took the ark to the Egyptian City of Tanis.
 Ethiopian Orthodox Church
The Ethiopian Orthodox Church in Axum, Ethiopia is the only one in the world that still claims to possess the Ark of the Covenant. According to the Kebra Nagast, after Menelik I had come to Jerusalem to visit his father, King Solomon, his father had given him a copy of the Ark, and had commanded the first-born sons of the elders of his kingdom to travel back to Ethiopia to settle there. However, these Israelites did not want to live away from the presence of the Ark, so they switched the copy with the original and smuggled the Ark out of the country; Menelik only learned that the original was with his group during the journey home. Solomon lost not only the Ark to his son by the Queen of Sheba but the divine favor that went with it.
Although it was once paraded before the town once each year, the object is now kept under constant guard in a "treasury" near the Church of Our Lady Mary of Zion, and only the "Guardian of the Ark" as he refers to himself, is allowed to see it (not even the Patriarch of the Ethiopian Orthodox Church, His Holiness Abuna Paulos, is allowed to view the Ark.).
In a December 2007 article, Smithsonian Magazine detailed a trip to Ethiopia in search of the Ark. Ethiopian Christians have claimed that the ark rests in a chapel in the small town of Aksum after arriving nearly 3,000 years ago. It has been guarded by a succession of virgin monks who, once anointed, are forbidden to set foot outside the chapel grounds until they die. Author Paul Raffaele reached the chapel but was only able to go so far as to meet the guardian. He expressed fear that if he sneaked past the guardian the alarm would have been sounded and feared possible harm by the ark itself.
In the Litany of the Blessed Virgin Mary, one of the titles by which Mary is addressed is "Ark of the Covenant".
INTRODUCTION OF FORENSIC PSYCHOLOGY TO THE LAW AND JUDICIARY OF INDIA BY INDIAN EVIDENCE ACT OF 1872 -CLAUSE 45 "OPINION OF EXPERTS" PIL SC